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

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Special issue:
European Trends in Spatial Mobility

Edited by
Dallen J. Timothy and Gábor Michalkó

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European trends in spatial mobility

Dallen J. TIMOTHY[1] and Gábor MICHALKÓ[2]

From a Eurocentric point of view, Europe has long functioned as the *caput mundi* of human mobility – a home and destination for hunters and gatherers, conquerors, colonizers, learners and scientists, pilgrims, tourists, emigrants and immigrants. From Europe's ancient frontiers and marches to today's precisely delineated and demarcated state boundaries, borders have long affected economic, social, military and political relations between ancient and modern states. During the past half century, however, globalization processes, including the supra-nationalization of Europe, have changed inter-state relations and human mobilities perhaps more than any other force in recent history.

These geopolitical vicissitudes have had a clear and concise 'de-bordering' effect, particularly since the Schengen Convention of 1990, which paved the way for the abolishment of intra-Schengen Area border inspections and the establishment of a shared visa regime (Timothy, D.J. 2001; Timothy, D.J. and Saarinen, J. 2013). This de-bordering process has accelerated migration to Europe and between states within Europe, as well as stimulated tourism as an economic growth engine (Etzo, I. *et al*. 2014).

Because of its relative location, high standard of living, colonial history, and generous immigrant and refugee benefits, Europe has become a magnet for migrants from Africa and the Middle East across the Mediterranean Sea and through Asia Minor. This pattern of migration, especially since 2013, has generated a great deal of pressure on Europe, which has flared many debates and spurred legal challenges continent-wide. While much public opinion, thanks largely to the media, concentrates on arrivals from Africa, the Middle East and Asia, intra-regional migration in Europe receives much less media attention.

There are many migratory flows between European countries in the form of amenity (quality-of-life) migration (Gosnell, H. and Abrams, J. 2011), labour migration (Andrijasevic, R. and Sacchetto, D. 2016), student migration (Wells, A. 2014) and return migration (Illés, S. 2015). Together, these form a relatively new and dynamic phenomenon enabled and encouraged by the establishment of the European Union and its associated 'freedom of movement' treaties, such as the 1985 Schengen Agreement and the 1990 Schengen Convention. Simultaneously, the entry of Europe's former socialist states into the EU and Schengen Area, and the concurrent permeation of these countries' citizens into the Western European labour market, has significantly broadened the scope and scale of intra-European migration (Andrijasevic, R. and Sacchetto, D. 2016), just as economic hardships in Mediterranean Europe have induced large-scale migrations northward.

Besides migration, tourism is one of the most widely researched configurations of cross-border human mobility. Migration and tourism share a number of symbiotic relationships, which result in several manifestations of tourism supply and demand (Hall, C.M. and Williams, A. 2002; Coles, T.E. and Timothy, D.J. 2004; Illés, S. and Michalkó, G. 2008; Lew, A.A. *et al*. 2015). Europe has

[1] School of Community Resources and Development, Arizona State University, 411 N. Central Avenue, Suite 550, Phoenix, Arizona, USA 85004. E-mail: dtimothy@asu.edu

[2] Geographical Institute, Research Centre for Astronomy and Earth Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45; Department of Tourism, Corvinus University of Budapest. H-1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8. E-mail: michalko.gabor@csfk.mta.hu

been the most visited region in the world for many decades, and the connections between tourism and migration are very apparent. First, migration stimulates a wide range of tourism types, including 'visiting friends and relatives' (VFR) tourism, second-home tourism, religious tourism, diaspora tourism and roots tourism. Secondly, it provides a heritage resource base for tourism, including ethnic neighbourhoods, cultural landscapes, heritage cuisines and ethnic foods, festivals, and other culture-based resources (Coles, T.E. and Timothy, D.J. 2004). Third, one of the most salient reasons people migrate abroad is to seek work in the tourism sector. Labour migrants are eager to find employment and often provide affordable labour for the service industries, including tourism. Finally, there is a long history of people being attracted to foreign locales (e.g. the UK to Spain) for entrepreneurial reasons, including setting up hospitality-related businesses.

Migration and tourism are two of the most salient manifestations of human mobility, but so are short-distance and same-day cross-border trade, work, healthcare and shopping trips (Michalkó, G. and Timothy, D.J. 2001). As noted earlier, the topic of mobility is one of the most researched contemporary themes in human geography (Merriman, P. 2009; Staeheli, L.A. 2016). There are mounting pressures associated with migration to and within Europe, growing trends in cross-border tourism and trans-boundary labour, increasing supranational trade and cross-frontier utilitarian shopping, a need for more cost-effective and convenient forms of transportation (e.g. ride sharing), and the creation of new spaces and places of mobility. Therefore, it is incumbent upon geographers and other social scientists to continue examining and debating the spatial and regional dimensions of human mobility and to disseminate knowledge through publications, scientific workshops and conferences.

This special issue of the *Hungarian Geographical Bulletin* does just that by focusing on spatial mobility trends in Europe. This issue is comprised of papers presented in the 'Globility' sessions at the 2015 EUGEO Congress in Budapest, Hungary (*Photo 1*).

With the support of the International Geographical Union (IGU), the Commission on Global Change and Human Mobility ('Globility'), was founded in 2000 to specialize in human movement in border areas and hu-

Photo 1. Participants of EUGEO 2015 Congress (Budapest) in the „Changing world, changing human mobilities: global convergence and divergence" session

man spatial mobility in general. Today, the 150 members from 50 countries hold their annual scientific meetings at different locales throughout the world to present research and deliberate about a wide range of issues in numerous conference sessions focusing on a trans-disciplinary understanding of spatial mobilities.

In 2015, the EUGEO Congress in Budapest hosted the meetings of the IGU GLOBILITY Working Group. Scholars from a wide range of countries presented some 35 papers on many aspects of human mobility and global convergence in a changing world. The papers in this issue reflect some of the primary themes presented and discussed at the EUGEO Congress, such as the 'brain-drain', retirement migration, labour migration, return migration, the push and pull factors of international refugees coming to Europe, transportation innovations, tourism, cross-border economics and collaboration, debordering processes and 'Europeanisation'.

The paper by Lados and Hegedűs in this theme issue deals with Hungarian return migration and the effects of identity change through the migratory process. The authors examine the post-return migration experiences of Hungarians who had gained significant experience, skills and assets abroad and those who had not. Higher-skilled returnees faced fewer socio-economic obstacles to reintegrating into Hungarian life, while those who had gained fewer skills were less content with their life back in the homeland. As such, low-skilled migrants appear more likely to re-emigrate abroad in the future than those who are more satisfied with their renewed life in Hungary.

Montanari and Paluzzi examine the role of 'Europeanisation' in increasing people's relocation from various EU countries to Italy. Their regional approach to assessing the spatial patterns and concentrations of European migration to Italy considered the influential variables of labour needs, age, nationality and tourist behaviour, including amenity migration. Gallo and Staniscia used a similar spatial clustering and mapping approach to examine the out-migration of Italian youth to other EU countries and the possible reasons for such patterns. They argue that the emigration of large numbers of young people in search of economic progress, adventure and lifestyle change may destabilize the social and economic sustainability of the countries and regions of origin. Similarly, Siska-Szilasi, Kóródi and Vadnai examine the socio-spatial manifestations of Hungarian out-migration to other parts of Europe and North America. Their work highlights many of the socio-economic push factors in Hungary that cause people to emigrate, as well as the pull factors in destination countries that draw Hungarians there—work, already emigrated friends and relatives, and perceptions of a more stable future.

Also examining migration patterns, Kocsis and his colleagues take a meta-European perspective in surveying the historical geography of migration patterns and their causes from Europe, to Europe, and within Europe. In particular, they look at the demographic implications of these mobility trends and provide a spatio-temporal analysis of recent and current patterns. The authors provide valuable insight into the current trend in mass migration to Europe from the Middle East, Africa and Asia, and the concrete sense of hopelessness, despair and persecution that overshadow these contemporary movement patterns more so than the more socio-economic tendencies of past generations.

In their study of ride sharing in Hungary, Bálint and Trócsányi touch on many socio-spatial aspects of human mobility. Ride sharing is an increasingly important part of the new sharing economy (Heo, C.Y. 2016) and has major implications for employment commuting, commerce, and tourism. The authors examine price sensitivity, settlement size/hierarchy and critical mass of passengers and drivers, as well as demographics and education levels, in mapping the spatial configurations of ride sharing. While most of their data were confined to Hungary, their work also illustrated the potential of ride sharing to become a key part of the sharing economy for international travel as well.

In their study of worker and retiree migrants in Spain, Parreño-Castellano and

Domínguez-Mujica investigate the multifarious trends associated with these forms of human mobility. Among other things, they focus on pensioners who had worked previously in Spain and remained there to spend their retirement years and the reasons for this behaviour. Many of these 'lifestyle immigrants' had worked in tourism and other services, including owning their own businesses, and had decided to remain in Spain's busiest coastal tourism regions after retirement for quality-of-life and socialisation reasons.

The treatise by Gellér-Lukács, Töttös and Illés speculates on the implications of the freedom of movement between the United Kingdom and the rest of the EU following the BREXIT vote of June 23, 2016. Taking a futuristic, scenarios-based approach, Illés looks at the immigration policy portions of the initial negotiation documents and tries to predict some of the likely outcomes of the UK's departure. His examination of the current situation underscores the potential repercussions of the 're-bordering' process that has become quite evident in others parts of Europe and North America.

These 8 papers represent a sustained effort to understand human mobility in an increasingly 'borderless' Europe. Today, more than ever, geographers must continue to play a key role in understanding the causes, effects and manifestations of different types of migration and other mobility patterns and paradigms. This is especially the case in light of forecasts that Europe's share of international tourist arrivals compared to other regions will decline in the future while its position as a foremost destination for refugees and other immigrants will continue to swell (OECD 2016, UNWTO 2016). Because of Europe's current refugee crisis and migration predicament, we have seen the beginnings of the re-bordering of a continent that had until 2014 been an example of how a multi-nation region can de-border itself to facilitate freer human mobility (Wilson, T.M. and Donnan, H. 2012). Only time will tell how current geopolitical trends will affect future human mobilities in Europe.

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Returning home: An evaluation of Hungarian return migration

Gábor LADOS and Gábor HEGEDŰS[1]

Abstract

This paper deals with the Hungarian return migration process and the importance of identity changes for migration decisions. Outmigration of labour force from Hungary and other East Central European countries has intensified after the EU accession in 2004 and 2007. The possibility of free movement encouraged many Eastern and Central European citizens to leave their country; however, this is not a one-way process. A significant number of migrants returned to the home country with newly acquired skills and other assets. The majority of migration theories evaluate return migration by the role of family, motivations or different kinds of acquired capital, but the importance of identity change is less considered. Our primary aim is to investigate the future migration strategy of Hungarian returnees. The paper is based on national policy analysis and in-depth interviews. According to our results, interviewees highlighted the role of work experience and family status. In general, highly skilled returnees met fewer obstacles during their return due to higher flexibility and former employer contracts, but family issues might represent more obstacles during the return. Lower skilled returnees were more dissatisfied with their return, especially those who migrated together with their family members. Hence, the chance for another emigration was higher than in the highly skilled group.

Keywords: emigration, return migration, circular migration, migration policies, identity change, Hungary

Introduction

The importance of migration including return migration is increasing worldwide. Global professionals take part more and more in different migration processes (Conway, D. and Potter, R.B. 2009). As part of global trends, millions of people moved to the more developed countries within the European Union after the enlargements in 2004 and 2007 (Nagy, G. 2010; Egedy, T. and Kovács, Z. 2011; Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015).

The countries suffering from emigration are increasingly aware of the negative effects of this phenomenon called "brain drain". More and more specific national policies, initiatives and programmes with different territorial scopes have been established. We use the terms of "remigration policy", "remigration initiative" and "remigration programme" as synonyms, as they are considered such in Hungary. Remigration policy measures were not very successful at the beginning, since re-attracting emigrants is a difficult objective. A reason for such hardship is that remigration policies define the group of returnees in a fairly general way. But some researchers point out individual factors determining the decision of return (Van Houte, M. and Davids, T. 2008; Sinatti, G. and Horst, C. 2015), including the effects of different territorial scales (Boros, L. and Pál, V. 2016).

The first main question of our study focuses on the features of return migration policies in Hungary. We analysed most of the Hungarian policies and initiatives previously in a more detailed way (Kovács, Z. *et al.* 2012; Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015). In addition, in 2016 we made content analysis of the website "Come Home, Youth" programme aimed explicitly at re-attracting emigrants. Our second main question examines the identity change of Hungarian returnees

[1] Department of Economic and Social Geography, University of Szeged, H-6701 Szeged, P.O. Box. 650.
E-mails: ladosg@geo.u-szeged.hu, hegedusg@geo.u-szeged.hu

in the analytical framework of the Cultural Identity Model of Sussman (Sussman, N.M. 2011), with some adaptations.

We conducted 48 semi-structured interviews with Hungarian citizens who returned to Hungary between 2012 and 2015 in order to analyse their identity change. Interviewees were selected by snowball sampling, and we used pseudonyms in our study. Our sample includes both highly-qualified (e.g. researchers, physicians) and less-qualified (e.g. waiters, unskilled workers) returnees. Returnees who took up unskilled jobs in foreign countries as compared to their professional qualifications were also included in the less-qualified group.

The examination of macro- and micro-level factors that are often indistinguishable played an important role for both of our research questions (Cassarino, J-P. 2004; Sussman, N.M. 2011). We consider individual factors in a narrower sense (e.g. family or friends). In our analysis, the macro-level encompasses basically national or transnational factors (e.g. general economic or income conditions).

The general features of emigration, remigration and change of identity

According to the literature, research on return migration within the broader phenomenon of migration became significant from the 1970s (Glaser, W.A. and Habers, C.G. 1974; Gmelch, G. 1980; Cassarino, J-P. 2004; Van Houte, M. and Davids, T. 2008; De Haas, H. 2010), and as for Hungary, from the late 2000s (Langer-Rédei, M. 2007; Kovács, Z. *et al*. 2012).

National policies supporting return migration can be classified according to various aspects (Lowell, L.B. 2001; Van Houte, M. and Davids, T. 2008). Based on these aspects, we developed our own categorisation. According to their objectives, remigration polices were classified as "re-attraction", "reintegration", "re-employment", "networking" (with diaspora members abroad) or "immigration" (which encourages immigration and therefore prevents "brain drain" – Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015). In our research, re-migrants are persons older than 15 years old, who returned to their country of birth after having been international migrants in another country (Kovács, Z. *et al.* 2012; Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015). Theories of return migration focus generally less on the individuals' personality such as their identity and identity changes (Sinatti, G. and Horst, C. 2015). Nevertheless, identity and identity changes can significantly influence the individual's future migration decisions (Berry, J.W. 1997; Van Houte, M. and Davids, T. 2008; Sussman, N.M. 2011).

In relation to return migration, circular migration can also be defined diversely (Wickramasekara, P. 2011; Illés, S. and Kincses, Á. 2012). According to the definition by Wickramasekara, P. (2011), circular migration is a temporary, repeat movement of a population that consists of more than one migration cycle (a migration cycle involves an outmigration phase from the sending country and a remigration phase to the sending country).

The integration into the host culture is not uncomplicated for emigrants. Berry's acculturation model points out two main challenges for emigrants: how they maintain their native culture and how they adopt the host culture (Berry, J.W. 1997). Berry, however, does not examine the case of remigrants (e.g. their "re-acculturation"), but Sussman studies this group and process as well. Sussman's Cultural Identity Model examines the temporal change of cultural "identity" and the cultural "flexibility" of re-migrants from the time before emigration until the period after remigration (Sussman, N.M. 2011).

According to Sussman, the adaptation of host cultural values takes places in different ways during the migrants' period abroad. The "Cultural Identity Model" defines four different strategies of identity shift (and groups) of returnees.

The "affirmative" identity shifters maintain their home culture identity while abroad, and they are not so adaptive towards the host

culture. They feel much better in their native country. The members belonging to the two other types have a lot of stress related to their return. But the features of these two groups are different. Therefore, it is important, that people of the first group (called "subtractive") are not attached firmly to the culture of the host or the native countries either. But they attempt to acquire as many new things as possible while they are abroad.

The second mentioned group, called "additive" is quite similar, except for their relation to the different cultures, which distinguishes them from the "subtractive" group. Additive returnees also insist on keeping their native culture. Nevertheless, they are more open towards new things abroad, and usually adapt to some of them. They still uphold connections with their host country even after their return.

The fourth returnee group within the Cultural Identity Model is called "global" or "intercultural". Its members are able to have more identities simultaneously, and adapt different cultural patterns according to their actual circumstances. This does not imply a kind of mixing of native and host culture elements for them, or establishing a dual (e.g. bicultural) identity. Such returnees consider themselves transnational and cosmopolitan, and they can adapt to the expected social requirements everywhere in the world in a fast and flexible way. They esteem their return as a moderately positive and not a final experience, since they are ready to move abroad again for a shorter or longer time in the future (Sussman, N.M. 2011).

The place of Hungary in the European migration pattern

The emigration of qualified workforce is a serious problem in Hungary. It is difficult to provide the exact number of Hungarian emigrants, but it has been increasing for the last several years (Gödri, I. *et al.* 2014). Therefore, the reasons for emigration and return initiatives that counterbalance the brain drain are worth investigating.

Differences in wage levels among member states of the European Union intensified East-West European migration flows. Furthermore, it was supported by the liberalisation of the labour markets of old member states and the free movement between EU countries. Source countries and regions suffer from most of the negative effects of emigration, such as a lack of qualified workforce, but migration also puts pressure on the social services and housing market of the host countries (Lados, G. *et al*. 2015). Analysing the migration patterns of European regions we can distinguish central, peripheral and internal-peripheral regions (Kovács, Z. *et al.* 2012). The most developed European regions could be characterised as central regions (e.g. the successful post-fordist regions, Pál, V. and Boros, L. 2010). Conversely, peripheral regions are located mainly in post-socialist countries, southern parts of the Mediterranean and the sparsely populated regions of Scandinavia. The so-called "internal-peripheries" were recorded in the former East Germany, North of France or North of England (*Figure 1*).

The majority of EU regions suffering most intensely from out-migration are located in post-socialist countries (Kovács, Z. *et al.* 2012). Millions of East Central Europeans left their home countries during the last few decades (*Table 1*). Most of them originated from Romania or Poland, while more developed countries such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia were less affected by emigration. However, the out-migration of the labour force has different effects on the home countries. For example, in the less populated Baltic states the share of out-migrants per 10,000 inhabitants is higher than in the Visegrád countries (Lados, G. *et al.* 2015).

According to previous research, about 330,000–350,000 Hungarians live in other EU countries. This is only an estimate, because only the age group between 18 and 49 was considered during this research (Kapitány, B. and Rohr, A. 2013). National and international statistical databases cannot provide the exact number of emigrants; however, they show the dynamics of the emigration process



Fig. 1. Population change by main components (2000–2007). *Source*: Kovács, Z. *et al.* 2012.

Table 1. The number and rate of East Central European's living in another EU country, 2014

Country	Number of emigrants	Emigrants per 10,000 persons
Romania	2,402,792	1,204.6
Lithuania	327,641	1,113.1
Latvia	172,190	860.3
Croatia	292,245	688.2
Bulgaria	420,080	579.8
Estonia	70,166	533.2
Poland	1,968,035	517.7
Slovakia	191,353	353.3
Hungary	276,710	280.1
Slovenia	34,036	165.1
Czech Republic	92,662	88.1

Source: The authors' own calculation based on Eurostat 2015.

very well (*Figure* 2). The rate of out-migration from Hungary was three and a half times higher in 2014 than in 2001 (Gödri, I. 2015).

Initially, after the EU enlargement in 2004 the number of Hungarian emigrants raised slowly. The main host countries for Hungarians did not change essentially, although there were some shifts compared to the period before 2004. In 2015, the most important host country was still Germany. According to Eurostat, 40.7 percent of Hungarian emigrants are currently living in Germany; however, in 2001 this proportion was 59.8 percent. The role of United Kingdom increased most dramatically. In 2001 only 4.7 percent of Hungarian emigrants lived in the country, whereas in 2015 it had grown 23.4 percent. As a historically important destination country, 14.7% of Hungarian emigrants settled in Austria (Hárs, Á. *et al.* 2004; Gödri I. 2015). It is more difficult to provide the number of Hungarians living outside of Europe. Major non-European destination countries are USA, Canada, Australia, Russia and Israel. According to UN data, 36 percent of Hungarians living abroad moved to these countries. The role of North America is significant; every fourth Hungarian emigrants lives there (Gödri, I. 2015).

Providing the exact number of returnees is also challenging. Aside from the increasing flows of out-migrants from Hungary, more and more Hungarians are returning. According to available data, there have been more than 10,000 Hungarian returnees in recent years (Kincses, Á. 2014).

When considering their return, the labour market conditions of Hungarian regions play an important role. The rate of return to the previous places of residence was only 30.7 percent. Most Hungarians return to Budapest and its agglomeration, Lake Balaton and its surroundings, and bigger cities are also more attractive than rural peripheral areas (Kincses, Á. 2014).

The study of remigration policies and initiatives in Hungary

Hungarian remigration initiatives are usually not co-ordinated. Additionally, they focus only on some narrow fields of the return migration (Kovács, Z. *et al.* 2012; Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015). A general and comprehensive national-level policy has yet to be created and implemented in Hungary.



Fig. 2. Hungarians living in other EU countries (2005–2015).
Source: Authors' own calculation based on Eurostat 2015.

The "Project Retour" (2003–2005) was the first Hungarian initiative, which offered networking services and help in returning for well-educated young Hungarians working abroad. After 2011, scholarships were established in different areas of the Hungarian health-care system with the aim of retaining health-care professionals mostly by raising their wages (Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015; Boros, L. and Pál, V. 2016). Workforce retention was also targeted at by the adoption of a new law on higher education in 2011. According to the law, students have to work in Hungary for the 20 years following their graduation for a time period that equals their government-financed university education. Campaign films realised as part of the "Future of New Generation" government programme were made for the youth in 2012 (Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015).

One of the best-known Hungarian initiatives is the "Momentum" programme, which has functioned since 2009. In the beginning, the main aim of this initiative was to re-attract young talented researchers to Hungary. But so far, the main objective of this initiative has been retention (Hegedűs, G. and Lados, G. 2015). Such initiatives are significant in the academic world not only in Hungary, but in other countries, as well (Martin, R. and Radu, D. 2012).

The "Come Home" Foundation was established in 2010 as a non-governmental initiative to facilitate the return of Hungarians living abroad who are willing to come home. Supported by the Ministry of Human Capacities, the foundation extended its services in 2013. The "Come Home, Youth" programme was launched also by the Ministry for National Economy in 2015. This complex programme included the "re-attraction", "re-employment" and "retention" types of remigration policies, similar to several other initiatives (e.g. ThAFF in East-Germany, Kovács, Z. *et al.* 2012) in the European Union.

The target groups of the "Come Home, Youth" programme were mostly emigrants with higher education or a profession in great demand in the Hungarian labour market. Emigrants from the United Kingdom alone could participate in the programme [1]. This programme offered many services to returnees (*Table 2*), but it attracted only a small number of migrants. As a result, in June 2016 the programme was discontinued [2]. Nevertheless, another programme was set to be launched in June 2016, that encourages young Hungarian returnees to become entrepreneurs. It would support returnees who would start a new enterprise in Hungary, since, according to the experiences with "Come Home, Youth", some of the returnees had such plans [3]. The Foundation "Come Home" will continue its activity, as well.

Evaluation of emigration and return migration of Hungarian returnees for different perspectives

For the purpose of our study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with Hungarian returnees to find out how they personally assess their return. On the one hand, we aimed to analyse the extent of their identity change while abroad. On the other hand, we examined the role of micro and macro factors at three moments: before emigration, while living abroad and after their return.

Only relatively few interviewees could be characterised as affirmative returnees according to Sussman's identity change model (Sussman, N.M. 2011). Those were mainly lower skilled migrants. They did not feel comfortable abroad and came back with some savings, which was spent immediately after their return. Subtractive identity shifters were primarily lower skilled migrants who emigrated with their families. They typically tried to utilise each input abroad, but they managed to acquire new skills only to a limited extent because of their working conditions and their lower language skills. This latter issue also prevented them from improving their language abilities at work because they could not communicate clearly with other immigrant colleagues, or simply they did not need to use the language of their host country, because they only had Hungarian colleagues.

Table 2. The main services offered by "Come Home, Youth" Programme

Services offered	Details
Introduction of partner firms.	General information service for returnees about partner firms registered in the programme.
Information about the latest vacancies at partner firms.	Detailed information on new vacancies at partner firms registered the programme.
Information about: *a)* job search assistance, *b)* housing allowance, *c)* mobility allowance.	*a)* A single reimbursement of the costs of travelling to the job interview and back. *b)* Supplement on rental prices and general expenses. *c)* Housing supplement for taking up a job far away from the place of residence, mobility supplement on commuting between residence and workplace (both for employers and returnees).
Information about employment opportunities in Hungary.	Detailed information.
Information on entrepreneurship opportunities in Hungary. Assistance for starting up an enterprise.	Elementary entrepreneurship knowledge, e-learning education, professional advice on making business plan, mentorship for enterprises.
Information package about possibilities of return.	Practical advice (task before leaving the United Kingdom, the administrative process of homecoming, information needed after returning).
Mentorship in London and Budapest.	E.g. preparation of returnees for job interviews with firm chosen.
Latest news.	Different news targeting the youth.
Success stories.	Some selected individual success stories.

Source: The authors' own edition based on "Come Home, Youth Programme. http://www.gyerehazafiatal.hu/ Accessed 13.06.2016.

The integration of subtractive migrants to the host society was hampered by their family ties. They usually stayed close to each other, and spent their free time together or with other Hungarians, while singles were more sociable. They reported several difficulties related to their reintegration. For instance, reintegration to the labour market of the home country was often difficult, as foreign working experiences were not necessarily advantageous. Another significant problem was that they were unable to achieve their goals, their original expectations of their return.

Many returnees mentioned that they had hoped to be able to start a family or have a stress-free life without financial problems after their return, but the majority were disappointed. A returnee quoted one of his friends, also working abroad: "*we are working so much here [abroad] (…) and we absolutely do not have better living conditions than those who never left home*". He mentioned as an example a former class mate who "*has a house, two cars, children, goes to Greece every year for a holiday (…) and we are working like crazy*". He had realised that his life in general was not as good as he had thought it would be. He returned home with great expectations, but very soon he changed his mind, when he faced an unexpected situation during the construction of his house: *"It was a real slap in the face. Work inspectors came and fined me. At my house! That was outrageous!"* (Ferenc, labourer).

For subtractive and additive identity shifters, the most important return motivation was family. On the one hand, subtractive returnees felt unhappy about their return because it was contrary to their initial ambition. *"Our children wanted to come back. We did not want to be separated from each other, so we followed them. When they finish secondary school, we [the parents] are sure to go abroad again because I cannot find any suitable job here"* (Zoltán, butcher). In view of these negative

factors, lower skilled people are more likely to leave their home country again; hence, they could be regarded as potential circular migrants (Illés, S. and Kincses, Á. 2012; Martin, R. and Radu, D. 2012).

On the other hand, additive returnees also made some compromises during their return; however, thanks to their better skills, they could seek more opportunities abroad, so they felt more positive about their return. This group of returnees also includes graduates who were employed in lower skilled jobs in the host country. They consider their foreign working experience and their improved language skills as major benefits of their emigration. Furthermore, highly skilled returnees returning with their family were also classified with this group. We found that they also felt more unhappy about their return than their family members because the migration decision was made at the family level: "*I would have gladly stayed abroad, but my child did not feel comfortable there. (…) I rather chose my family (…) On my own I would have not returned home. But as for my current workplace, I don't have anything to complain*" (Tamás, researcher).

According to the identity change model, the most successful returnees are global identity shifters who changed most during the migration process (Sussman, N.M. 2011). Mainly highly skilled single returnees could be characterised as returnees with a global identity shift. They experienced changes in both their professional and private lives. One of them said: *First, I would position myself as a European; second, a Budapester; and third, a Hungarian*" (Szabolcs, translator).

Highly skilled returnees did not cut their ties with their former employers, so their reintegration to the Hungarian labour market was smoother than in the case of lower skilled returnees. Further, they could easily utilise their newly acquired skills, such as management and technological know-how, therefore, in most cases their return generated job advancement as well.

During the research we also focused on the importance of micro and macro factors and assessed their role three times during the migration process: before emigration, during the stay abroad and after the return. The fact that micro and macro factors were equally important demonstrates the complexity of migration decisions. Moreover, there was a slight difference among interviewees according to their qualifications. The role of micro factors was more important among highly skilled returnees.

Almost each of them regarded their emigration as a temporary stage of life. As one of them evaluated his emigration: "*it was a well calculated, almost obligatory step in my career*" (Tamás, researcher).

Another interviewee was looking for a challenge in his life, severed almost all ties with the home country, and moved forward towards the second host country: "*I sold my stuff I owned here [in Hungary] and I could have lived only from its interest [abroad]. However, I did not see any perspective in Germany, because I did not own anything, nor did my wife, as we were not born there. It was too comfortable, too perfect. There was no challenge at all*" (Márk, entrepreneur).

On the contrary, the role of macro factors was more important for lower skilled returnees, among them higher wages, and the expected savings: "*Me and my partner wanted to save as much money for a house as possible. Here, in Hungary it seemed unlikely to reach our goal within some years*" (Mária, semi-skilled worker).

The majority of returnees were satisfied with macro factors in the host country and they missed them after their return. Many of them mentioned the advantages of social security (e.g. housing benefits) and the positive effects of change of environment, and numerous possibilities they enjoyed abroad. "*We went on excursions a lot. If we did not, we had an invitation to barbeque party (…) Sometimes we just jumped in the car, refuelled it (…) and we drove until it was half empty. Indeed, we did stuff like this all weekend long*" (Zoltán, butcher).

Most of the interviewees seemed to have also some very positive memories related to their stay abroad. For instance, learning traditions and culture of the host society was often mentioned. One of the returnees highlighted when he was talking about his colleagues abroad that "*politeness is the primary*

behaviour of people in Anglo-Saxon countries. Even so, if they do not like you, they remain polite with you" (József, researcher).

Another returnee confirmed this statement: *"It does not matter who you are visiting (…) 'How are you'? (…) Even if you have not met before (…) And they asked it every day, each afternoon they said to me 'See you tomorrow'. It is partly good. And what is going on here? Do not dare to ask a Hungarian because he really tells you in the end"* (Zoltán, butcher).

During the return phase the interviewees were motivated by different factors, both on the micro and macro levels. Among micro-level factors, which were more important than macro ones, family had the most conspicuous role. *"My elderly parents live here, some of my friends also tie me here, but I had already known before my return that I do not want to live here anymore (…) I just cannot find any job in this region"* (Márta, receptionist).

Another returnee came home because his child could not integrate to the host society and did not feel comfortable abroad. Hence, his family decided to return home rather than remain separate from each other. As he assessed his own return: *"On a personal level, being here is great, I am together with my family, I think I settled down; I do not have to travel all around the world. But on a professional level this is terrible*" (Tamás, researcher).

Nevertheless, family was not the only return motivation. Professional development, especially for highly skilled returnees, was also a significant motivation to return: *"In terms of prestige my actual workplace is one of the best in Hungary (…) And I wanted to utilise my foreign working experience in a great place"* (Sándor, researcher).

The place of origin also played a crucial role when deciding about the return, but it can be seen as a micro factor rather than a macro factor: *"This is an undeveloped region, I know it quite well. But I grew up here, I love all these hills; I almost know every single bush here*" (Csaba, labourer).

In conclusion, returnees do not form a homogeneous group. They might go through several identity changes, and micro and macro factors influence them differently. Obstacles during their return might make them consider leaving their home country again.

Conclusions

Emigration, return migration and circular migration have become inevitable processes of our age. The emigration of professionals often called "brain drain" tends to afflict Hungary and other East Central European countries more intensely, like other semi-peripheral or peripheral countries in the world. In this paper we analysed the most important recent remigration programmes in Hungary. These programmes have various objectives, which can be evaluated positively; however, they have managed to attract only a limited number of return migrants.

We studied the identity change of returning migrants who could be classified into four groups according to Sussman's model. According to our research findings, the role of micro-level factors and identity change should be considered more in the design and implementation of remigration initiatives than previously. It implies on the one hand, that people who are more likely to take part in circular migration or have more stress upon their return should be more assisted by, for example, more detailed information, financial gain or other means. Otherwise their motivations for another emigration increase again. On the other hand, future policies on remigration should also focus more on the skills and social capital of groups maintaining their transnational connections.

Both emigration and circular migration will presumably remain long-term processes in Hungary, a member state of the European Union. Consequently, return migration policies will have more relevance in the future, and an increase the technical and financial support available for returnees seems to be inevitable.

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Human mobility and settlement patterns from eight EU countries to the Italian regions of Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily

Armando MONTANARI[1] and Evelina PALUZZI[2]

Abstract

Mobility within the EU is increasing with the emergence of a culture of Europeanism, ease of movement and the affordability of travel. Personal mobility joins the mobility of goods, financial markets and financial transactions. The situation has not always been positive, partly because of the economic crisis of 2008 and later; the construction of Europe, far from being complete, continues to encounter obstacles and difficulties. The current migration crisis is one of the strongest motivations for analysing the phenomenon of human mobility in the EU. This article considers the phenomenon of migration in five regions of Italy (Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily) by citizens of countries that predominantly experience emigration (Latvia, Romania, Slovakia), immigration (Germany, Sweden, the UK) and countries like Italy where flows of both emigration and immigration are common (Ireland and Spain). The study uses regional units defined not in relation to the history of Europe over the centuries but in relation to the labour market (Labour Market Areas) identified by the National Institute of Statistics (Istat) on the basis of a contemporary parameter related to commuting. This new division of areas in relation to contemporary economic and social situations has made it possible to focus on the actual presence of immigrants by nationality and age in areas that are smaller and which more clearly demonstrate the reasons that explain mobility for production and mobility for consumption.

Keywords: human mobility, settlement patterns, labour market area, international retirement migration, return migration

Introduction

There are approximately 5 million foreign nationals currently living in Italy, with the pressing problems and opportunities that follow. Most foreigners arriving in a host country are driven by reasons related to a state of necessity or conditions difficult to withstand in their countries of origin (Montanari, A. and Cortese, A. 1993). However, part of the foreign presence in Italy has a long history of settlement, mainly tied to the appeal of culture and tourism, the manifestation of the *Bel Paese*'s inviting pull on some groups, such as the English or the Germans (King, R. and Patterson, G. 1998; King, R. *et al.* 1998). To tell the whole story, though, we have recently seen an increasingly established number of EU foreigners, especially Britons, choosing to settle in Italy, not only to 'age' in the sun but also to start entrepreneurial activities. According to the Unioncamere report, there are more than 10,000 British entrepreneurs in Italy. Nearly a fourth have chosen Lombardy for their companies, but significant portions of this business community are also found in Lazio (14%) and Tuscany (10%).The sector enterprises run by British immigrants represent a significant portion of the market and include trade (19%), manufacturing (10%), and accommodation and food services (9%).

This research is part of the European project, HORIZON 2020 Youth Mobility: Maximizing Opportunities for Individuals, Labour Markets and Regions in Europe (YMOBILITY), the goal of which is to exam-

[1] Department of European, American and Intercultural Studies. La Sapienza University, Piazzale A. Moro 5, I-00185 Roma. E-mail: armando.montanari@uniroma1.it

[2] National Institute of Statistics (Istat), Viale Oceano Pacifico 171, I-00144 Roma. E-mail: paluzzi@istat.it

ine the mobility of young people between the three groups of EU countries chosen for their significance mainly as countries of emigration: Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia (Group 1); immigration: Germany, Sweden, and the UK (Group 3); or both inflows and outflows: Ireland, Italy and Spain (Group 2). Consideration is given to flows into Italy from the other eight countries listed. To verify and better specify what is happening in Italy, immigration is considered in two regions of the north (Lombardy and Veneto), two central regions (Lazio and Tuscany) and one in the south (Sicily).

The approximately five million foreigners residing in Italy represent an important economic factor both in their host country, where they produce some EUR 125 billion in wealth each year, as well as in their countries of origin because of their remittances and because of the relationship between Italy and their countries of origin encouraged by difficult-to-quantify political, social, economic and cultural factors.

In Italy, 48.4 percent of the population measured by census and 56.5 percent of the foreign population resides in the five regions being considered: Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily, and there are significant differences between the north and the islands. The demographic relevance of the regions selected is evident, as is the significant attractiveness they exert on migration. Considering the information potential of a population census, LMAs were selected as the regional units of analysis. LMAs are an innovative way to classify the nation's regions, going beyond the traditional administrative divisions and thus making it possible to acquire a targeted and precise geographical reading of social and economic phenomena. LMAs are an analytical tool that takes a region-based approach to studying the socio-economic structure of the country. They are aggregations of adjacent districts and are the basic unit for data collection on daily commuting. *Table 1*. summarizes the distribution of LMAs in the five regions and the municipalities within them, as well as the distribution of the foreign resident population and the total resident population.

Sicily contains the highest number of LMAs, but Lombardy, with 57 LMAs and the over 1,500 municipalities comprising them, is more demographically and economically significant. In fact, that one region along contains more than 16.3 percent of the total population and 23.5 percent of the foreign residents in Italy.

If the group is analysed by nationality, there is an overwhelming number of Romanians. In fact, Romanians account for one-fifth of all foreigners residing in Italy, and 55 percent of the foreigners residing in the five regions. Almost 90 percent of the sample (immigrants from the eight countries studied), in fact, are Romanians; specifically, they account for almost all of the young people (15–34 years) and about 87 percent of those between 35 and 64 years in our sample. Over 70 percent of Europeans whose countries are 'old' members of the EU are over 65; 40 percent are Germans and 21 percent are British. There is therefore a clear pattern of older age immigrants from Germany, the UK and Spain. These are those who have his-

Table 1. Distribution of residents in Labour Market Areas (LMAs) of five Italian regions

Region	LMA	Municipalities	LMA %	Municipalities, %	Total population	Foreign population	Foreigner's rate, %
Lombardy	57	1,544	22.5	48.6	9,704,151	947,288	9.8
Veneto	49	581	19.4	18.3	4,857,210	457,328	9.4
Tuscany	54	287	21.3	9.0	3,672,202	321,847	8.8
Lazio	22	378	8.7	11.9	5,502,886	425,707	7.7
Sicily	71	390	28.1	12.3	5,002,904	125,015	2.5
Together	*253*	*3,180*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*28,739,353*	*2,277,185*	*7.9*

Source: Authors' elaboration on ISTAT 2011 census data.

torically been attracted to the Bel Paese more for reasons of culture and tourism than for employment. By contrast, the young age of the Romanian population in Italy indicates that Romania, which only recently joined the EU, is still strongly characterized by mobility related to production (*Table 2*).

Table 2. Age distribution of foreign population came from eight EU member countries inside LMAs of five Italian regions in percent*

Age group, years	Latvia	Romania	Slovakia	Ireland	Spain	Germany	Sweden	UK	Eight countries
15–34	0.3	95.5	0.7	0.1	1.1	1.3	0.2	0.8	100.0
35–64	0.2	86.7	0.5	0.4	2.8	5.1	0.5	3.9	100.0
65+	0.1	26.3	0.1	1.4	9.3	39.9	1.8	21.0	100.0
Together	*0.2*	*89.6*	*0.6*	*0.3*	*2.1*	*4.0*	*0.4*	*2.8*	*100.0*

* Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily together. *Source*: Authors' elaboration on ISTAT 2011 census data.

Regarding each nationality, there is a higher number of women in each group. Germany shows an imbalance between the genders in the younger and middle groups. That then balances out in the older group. For the British and Irish, there is a less marked gap, which further decreases as age increases. For the other nationalities, however, the numerical gap between men and women is very marked. For Spain it decreases significantly in the oldest age groups (*Table 3*).

This study seeks to fill the numerous gaps left by previous analyses of migration in Italy's regions. It is an original study because it does not focus only on inflows, which are quantitatively larger, but examines the differences typical of foreigners with different geographical origins, varying age groups and the spatial distributions of various nationalities and age groups. The purpose of the paper is also to use LMAs as the regional unit of analysis rather than the more traditional counties and provinces.

Human migratory mobility in Europe

Urry's book (2000) constitutes the manifesto of human mobility. It defines the various forms of human mobility, goods, images, information, communication, social relations, and economics. The concept of human mobility consists of various individual mobilities, as well as the ways they are interdependent and the social and economic consequences they produce. This view of mobility does not characterise humankind's ancient nomadic behaviour but rather a set of mobilities for the twenty-first century—a futuristic assessment of mobility, the implications of which have yet to be discovered (Urry, J. 2000).

The burst of technological innovations that made this mobility possible is now behind us, but its applications – and therefore waves of applied technologies – continue to develop, meaning that human mobilities are still evolving. Urry considered mobility a geographical and social phenomenon that deals with the sociology of fluids; therefore, the points of departure and arrival are no longer as relevant. Much more important are references to the speed and the viscosity of flows, and the particular features of temporary lifestyles.

Montanari, A. and Staniscia, B. (2016) assert that, of the works published since 2000, about a dozen are significant in the current debate on human mobility through the research of sociologists and geographers. Geographers Hall, C.M. and Williams, A.M. (2002) pointed out some issues typical of the mobilities paradigm from a tourism perspective: migration resulting from tourism production; migration resulting from tourism consumption; and visits to relatives and friends. There is also debate today about mobility as complex existence. This line of thinking links physical bodies "in movement" with "represented mobility" and are fundamental to understanding situations that could not be interpreted otherwise.

Table 3. Age and gender distribution of foreign population came from eight EU member countries in all LMAs

Age group, years	Persons			%		
	Males	Females	Together	Males	Females	Together
Latvia						
15–34	80	484	564	14.2	85.8	62.1
35–64	40	292	331	12.1	87.9	36.5
65+	2	11	13	15.4	84.6	1.4
Together	*122*	*786*	*908*	*13.4*	*86.6*	*100.0*
Romania						
15–34	84,315	104,131	188,446	44.7	55.3	50.5
35–64	75,647	106,794	182,441	41.5	58.5	48.9
65+	565	1,843	2,408	23.5	76.5	0.6
Together	*160,527*	*212,768*	*373,295*	*43.0*	*57.0*	*100.0*
Slovakia						
15–34	228	1,110	1,338	17.0	83.0	54.7
35–64	309	786	1,095	28.2	71.8	44.8
65+	4	8	12	33.3	66.7	0.5
Together	*541*	*1,904*	*2,445*	*22.1*	*77.9*	*100.0*
Ireland						
15–34	100	138	238	42.0	58.0	18.6
35–64	398	510	908	43.8	56.2	71.1
65+	64	67	131	48.9	51.1	10.3
Together	*562*	*715*	*1,277*	*44.0*	*56.0*	*100.0*
Spain						
15–34	697	1,460	2,157	32.3	67.7	24.4
35–64	1,315	4,497	5,812	22.6	77.4	65.9
65+	255	599	854	29.9	70.1	9.7
Together	*2,267*	*6,556*	*8,823*	*25.7*	*74.3*	*100.0*
Germany						
15–34	825	1,758	2,583	31.9	68.1	15.3
35–64	3,522	7,116	10,638	33.1	66.9	63.0
65+	1,732	1,926	3,658	47.3	52.7	21.7
Together	*6,079*	*10,800*	*16,879*	*36.0*	*64.0*	*100.0*
Sweden						
15–34	76	276	352	21.6	78.4	23.0
35–64	255	760	1,015	25.1	74.9	66.3
65+	72	91	163	44.2	55.8	10.7
Together	*403*	*1,127*	*1,530*	*26.3*	*73.7*	*100.0*
United Kingdom						
15–34	661	936	1,597	41.4	58.6	13.7
35–64	3,452	4,698	8,150	42.4	57.6	69.8
65+	937	984	1,921	48.8	51.2	16.5
Together	*5,050*	*6,618*	*11,668*	*43.3*	*56.7*	*100.0*

Source: Authors' elaboration on ISTAT 2011 census data.

Hall, C.M. (2005) steps into this discussion and refers explicitly to mobilities of production (economic migrations) and mobilities of consumption. Hall, C.M. (2005) interprets the various forms of mobility in terms of individuals who produce and consume, no longer considering those who had, until then, been considered only tourists.

Ilies, A., Dehoorne, O. and Horga, I. (2002) compared human mobility in Romania in the 1980-89 period, still under the communist regime, with the period following 1990, during

the post-communist transition. In the first period, dominated by a severe economic crisis, internal mobility remained under the strict control of the state and international mobility was greatly reduced and mainly limited to the gathering together of ethnic groups. In the second period, internal mobility increased and new forms of international mobility were triggered, mostly outside the parameters of legality. Ivanov, I.H. (2002) mentions differences in how mobility in Bulgaria was organized before and after the fall of the communist regime. The abolition of obligatory residence did not produce the internal movements that many had feared, and that would have led to uncontrolled growth in the capital, Sofia. Instead, because of the structure of the real estate market in Sofia, psychological reasons, and a significant flow of migrants to Canada, Australia, Germany and the USA, this uncontrolled growth did not happen.

Stoenchev, N. and Stoencheva, T. (2002) mention the process of globalization of the Bulgarian economy and young people's desire to move abroad. This is evident considering the number of young people who learn foreign languages and earn degrees in subjects such as technology and medicine, and cannot find employment in Bulgaria but are in great demand abroad. Baláž, V. and Williams, A.M. (2002) examined the transition to the market economy in Eastern Europe and identified certain countries, such as Slovakia, that constitute a "buffer zone" between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. Their study examines Ukrainians who go to Slovakia to work and Slovaks who go to Austria to work. While the Ukrainians are mainly employed in the secondary labour market, Slovaks in Austria participate in both the primary and secondary markets, resulting in a transition shock that simultaneously produces both brain drain and brain waste. The profound changes that have affected European society have even had repercussions on phenomena that have affected the mobility of particular population groups. The fall of the communist regimes created the conditions for new forms of mobility between countries, even with very different economic systems and relationships for intergovernmental collaboration.

Ilies, A. (2005) considers the characteristics and the changes in cross-border mobility in the Romanian-Hungarian and Romanian-Ukrainian border regions during the communist period (1948-89) and in the post-communist era (since 1990) with the changes caused by the Schengen Accord during the 1990s. Likewise, Boar, N. (2005) examines the Maramures region, which lies on the border of Romania and Ukraine. Maramures was historically a unified social and economic entity; only at the end of the First World War was it divided between Romania and Ukraine. After the fall of the communist regimes and up to the beginning of the 1990s, mobility was mostly internal, mainly seasonal, tied to agricultural activities. Later, international mobility became increasingly developed, with people moving to look for better-paid work or for repatriation in the case of ethnic minorities (e.g. Jews, Germans and Hungarians). In particular, it was especially the young people who had adequate degrees and were able to speak foreign languages who emigrated. Illés, S. (2006) studied the phenomenon of international elderly migration (IEM) ('pension hunters'), which was particularly important in Hungary beginning in the 1990s, as IEM accounted for more than 12 percent of immigrants during those years. This discussion illustrates some of the multifarious patterns of human mobility for labour, entrepreneurial activities, an overall better quality of life, and retirement/amenity migration taking place in Europe during the past few decades. These changes and migratory patterns have significantly affected the demographic profiles of many of Italy's regions.

The Italian regions

Analyses of migration flows generally study administrative areas, which, in Italy, according to the availability of data, may be municipalities (NUT 4), provinces (NUT 3) or regions (NUT 2). In this study, analysis was

carried out at the level of Labour Market Areas (LMAs) known as “Sistemi Locali del Lavoro” (SLL) in Italy. As defined by Istat, these do not refer to the administrative organization of municipalities but are defined by the forms of commuting measured by the Censimento Generale della Popolazione e delle Abitazioni (General Census of Population and Housing) (http://www.istat.it/it/strumenti/territorio-e-cartografia/sistemi-locali-del-lavoro).

Each LMA identifies the place where the population lives and works, and where it establishes the main social and economic activities of a given region. Also, it considers not only flows of young people (15–34 years) but also the working age population (35–64 years) and the retired population (over 65 years). This makes it possible to consider both the migratory flows focused on production for the working-age population and those focused on consumption, as is the case with a segment of young people and pensioners. Changes in Italy’s economic and social system since the 1950s have made it impossible to calculate the connections across Italy’s economic landscape today. This is why the concept of LMAs has been widely used in recent years by scholars in the social sciences, and there are many publications on migratory flows considered primarily as demographic movements rather than as components of a system of production.

Calafati, A.G. and Compagnucci, F. point out some inconsistencies in the use of the LMAs in the area of the Apennines and in the hilly zones of the Marche region, where the economic landscape is more compact and therefore should not be further subdivided (Calafati, A.G. 2005; Calafati, A.G. and Compagnucci, F. 2015). The LMA approach may not be suitable when applied to micro areas, but there is certainly no doubt about the system’s value for comparative analyses. Birindelli, A.M., Farina, P. and Rinaldi, S. (2004) analysed the regional distribution of foreigners in Lombardy and the economic area in which they work, demonstrating how informal networks and local labour market conditions are the main causes of different concentrations of various national groups. Using LMAs, the main reason for different concentrations in the region have been identified according to level of welfare; structures for agricultural production; structures of non-agricultural production; and geographic factors.

As of 1 January 2015, there were over five million foreigners living in Italy, equivalent to more than 8 percent of the resident population (*Table 4*).

Nearly 60 percent of these foreigners reside in the five regions studied. The percentage of residents who are foreigners is higher than the national average in Veneto (14%) and Lombardy (12%), as well as in Lazio (11%) and Tuscany (11%). The percentage of foreign residents in Sicily (3%) is far below the national average. Romanians make up the largest portion of foreign residents on a national level (23%), are more numerous than average in Lazio (35%) and Sicily (29%) but with lower numbers in Veneto (23%), Tuscany (21%) and Lombardy (14%). Other nationalities appear in much lower concentrations; citizens of Latvia are present in numbers above the national average in Sicily (0.1%) and Lombardy (0.6%), those from Germany in Tuscany (1.2%) and in Sicily (0.9%), those from the UK in Tuscany (0.9%) and Lazio (0.6%), those from Ireland in Lazio (0.11%), those from Spain in Lazio (0.8%) and in Lombardy (0.5%); citizens of Slovakia and Sweden are not present in percentages above the national average in any of the regions studied.

The number of Romanian citizens in Italy has been increasing consistently since 2002, when the Schengen area was expanded to include Romania. They are most highly concentrated in Lazio, but also in Veneto, Piedmont and Lombardy. According to the Fondazione Moresca (2016), companies operated by foreign entrepreneurs numbered more than 551,000 in 2015 in the sectors of commerce (38%), construction (25%), services (18%), manufacturing (8%), hotels and restaurants (8%) and agriculture (3%). During the 2011–2015 period, companies owned by foreigners increased by 21 percent, while those owned by Italians fell by 3 percent.

Table 4. Foreign population in five regions of Italy came from eight EU member countries on 1 January 2015.

Country		Regions					Italy
		Lombardy	Veneto	Tuscany	Lazio	Sicily	
Latvia	persons	662	209	182	180	86	2,689
	%	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.10	0.05
Romania	persons	159,626	116,056	83,244	224,537	50,772	1,331,839
	%	14.00	23.00	21.00	35.00	29.00	23.00
Slovakia	persons	971	948	438	584	128	8,351
	%	0.10	0.20	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.20
Ireland	persons	551	137	294	723	54	2,598
	%	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.11	0.03	0.05
Spain	persons	5,390	1,379	1,591	4,958	436	21,286
	%	0.50	0.30	0.40	0.80	0.20	0.40
Germany	persons	6,109	2,477	4,723	3,863	1,612	36,749
	%	0.50	0.50	1.20	0.60	0.90	0.70
Sweden	persons	556	177	449	587	108	2,968
	%	0.05	0.03	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
United Kingdom	persons	4,609	1,541	3,545	4,117	613	25,864
	%	0.40	0.30	0.90	0.60	0.30	0.50
Total foreigners	persons	*1,152,320*	*511,558*	*395,573*	*636,524*	*117,116*	*5,014,437*
	%	*11.50*	*14.40*	*10.50*	*10.80*	*3.40*	*8.20*

Source: Authors' elaboration on ISTAT 2011 census data.

Labour Market Areas: regional distribution of foreigners by citizenship

In pointing out different sizes of immigrant populations in the five Italian regions (Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily), we considered both spatial density by region (*Figure 1*) and demographic density (*Figure 2*) compared to the total population. The LMAs provide information that is more effective and closer to the social and economic situation in the region, compared with the administrative areas commonly used. Nevertheless, information on major metropolitan areas such as the LMAs of Milan and Rome cannot go into the details of the neighbourhoods in which the individual nationalities are more concentrated and numerous.

Romanians are the most numerous immigrants from Group 1 countries. In terms of spatial density, they are found in the more industrialized area of the Po Valley, with the largest concentrations in the LMAs of the urban areas of Milan, Verona and Padua, in the northern part of Tuscany, the Arezzo LMA and some LMAs around Rome. As a percentage of the population, the number of Romanians is highest in manufacturing hubs in smaller centres that specialize in specific industrial products. Examples include Stradella, where the largest publishing logistics warehouse in Europe is located; Cittadella, Castelfranco Veneto, home to a large national telecommunications company; Bibbiena in Tuscany; Civita Castellana, where the manufacture of Italian ceramic bathroom fixtures is concentrated; Pomezia in Lazio; and Vittoria, greenhouse farming, produce processing and the largest fruit and vegetable market in Italy, in Sicily. By region, the greatest densities of immigrants from Latvia are found in the LMAs of Como and Desenzano del Garda, and of Slovaks in the LMA of Milan. By percentage of the population, Latvian immigrants are most concentrated in the LMA of Desenzano del Garda, which overlooks Lake Garda, while Slovak immigrants are most concentrated in the LMA of Villafranca near Verona.



Fig 1. Immigrants per km² from 8 EU-member countries to LMA of Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily. *Source*: Compiled by the authors on Istat census data.



Fig 2. Rate of immigrants in percent over Italian population from 8 EU-member countries to LMA of Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily. *Source*: Compiled by the authors on Istat census data.

The highest densities of Group 2 nationalities are found in the MLAs of Milan (Ireland and Spain), Rome (Ireland) and Varese (Ireland). By percentage of resident population, the LMAs of Rome, Milan, Florence and Varese show a marked presence of Spanish immigrants, while the Irish dominate in Barga (including a number of the municipalities in the Serchio Valley and the town of Barga, considered one of the most beautiful in Italy), Montalcino (known for the of medieval village of the same name and for the famous Brunello di Montalcino wine) and Sora. In recent decades, this last area has been marked by an intensification of emigration of Italians to Ireland; still today the largest group of Italians in Ireland comes from the municipality of Casalattico.

For immigrants from Group 3 countries, analysis by spatial density shows a high number of immigrants in the LMAs of Luino (German) and Varese (German, British and Swedish). This high density is due to the presence of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission, where about 1,850 people from every country in Europe work, in the town of Ispra on Lake Maggiore. High densities are also seen in the LMAs of Rome (British), Milan (German and British), Florence (British) and in LMAs that include tourist areas such as Barga (British) in Garfagnana. Barga is considered Italy's most Scottish municipality because of the intense migratory flow from that municipality to Scotland. There is also an intense immigrant presence in the LMAs of Viareggio (British) and Portoferraio (German) on the Tyrrhenian Sea in Tuscany, as well as in the LMA that includes Taormina (German and Swedish) in Sicily, and Salò on Lake Garda (German).

A significant number of immigrants have started businesses and are categorized in the statistics as entrepreneurs, freelancers and self-employed workers. This group, which for purposes of simplicity, we define as entrepreneurs, includes 2,432 immigrants from Germany, 1,760 from the UK and 14,301 from Romania. The entrepreneurs from Germany are widely distributed, but a higher concentration of them (18%) is in the Milan LMA. There are fewer entrepreneurs from the UK (1,760) but these are also found more concentrated (42%) in the LMAs of Milan, Florence and Rome. There are 14,301 immigrant entrepreneurs from Romania, who are located especially (45%) in the LMAs of Milan, Verona, Padua, Florence and Rome.

Labour Market Areas: citizenship and age groups

LMAs also make it possible to analyse immigrants according to age group: 15–35, 35–64 and over 65, studied in terms of spatial density. For Group 1 and for the 15–34 age group, most are found in the major urban areas of the Po Valley (*Figure 3*).

For example Varese (Latvian), Milan (Latvian, Romanian and Slovak), Bergamo (Romanian and Slovak), Como (Latvian and Slovak), Verona (Romanian and Slovak), Vicenza (Slovak), Padua (Romanian), Rovigo (Latvian) and smaller, interconnected centres such as Busto Arstizio (Latvian and Slovak), Desenzano del Garda (Latvian and Slovak), Villafranca di Verona (Latvian, Romanian and Slovak), Schio (Slovak), Thiene, Conegliano and San Donà di Piave (Slovak), Castelfranco Veneto, Cittadella and Oderzo (Romanian). The immigrant presence in the LMAs of the other three Italian regions is more sporadic: Pontremoli (Romanian), Viareggio (Slovak and Romanian), Montecatini Terme (Latvian and Romanian), Massa and Portoferraio (Slovak), Rome (Romanian) Pomezia (Romanian and Slovak), and Bagheria (Latvian).

In this age group, the number of employed Romanian immigrants includes 62,232 males and 50,994 females, while students, who are therefore members of a family that moved previously, include 8,420 males and 10,156 females. The census records show 25,186 housewives in this same age group, many of whom may actually be employed as domestic workers without being registered. For the 35–64 age group, the major presences in the Po



Fig 3. Immigrants from Romania, Germany and UK to LMA of Lombardy, Veneto, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily. *Source*: Compiled by the authors on Istat census data.

Valley are in urban areas such as Varese and Como (Latvian), Milan (Latvian, Romanian and Slovak), Verona and Padua (Romanians) and in less urbanized areas such as Luino (Latvian), Villafranca di Verona (Slovak) and Cittadella (Romanian). In the other regions, aside from the LMA of Rome (Romanian), the LMAs of Pontremoli, Viareggio and Pomezia (Romanian) are also noteworthy. For the over 65 age group, immigrants from Romania are present mainly in urban areas such as Milan, Bergamo, Brescia, Verona and Villafranca di Verona, Padua and Cittadella, Florence and Prato, Rome and Pomezia. In Tuscany, immigrants from Romania are present in seaside areas such as the LMAs of Pontremoli and Viareggio, those from Latvia in Sperlonga and those from Slovakia in Civitavecchia.

For Group 2, immigrants from Spain and Ireland are concentrated in the Milan LMA for the 15–34 and 35–64 age groups, while those over 65 are concentrated in the LMA of Rome. Immigrants from Ireland are concentrated in the LMA of Varese for the 15–34 and 35–64 age groups, and in the seaside towns of Monte Argentario and Sperlonga for those over 65 years.

In Group 3 there is greater continuity by age group in the LMAs where the greatest presence is observed. Immigrants from Germany are more present in the LMAs of Luino, Varese and Milan for the 15–34 and 35–64 age groups. They are also present in Bardolino, Florence and Taormina between 35 and 64 years of age and in Portoferraio (Elba) for all age groups. Immigrants from Sweden are located in the LMAs of Milan and Florence between 15 and 34 years of age, as well as in the coastal centre of the LMA of Sperlonga. They are also present in the LMA of Taormina for all age groups and in the coastal LMAs of Pietrasanta and Sperlonga.

Immigrants from the UK in all age groups are present in the LMAs of Varese and Milan,

in the 35–64 age group and the over 65 age group in Rome, and in the 35-64 age group in Florence. Immigrants from the UK are also found in the coastal centres of Tuscany – Viareggio, for 35–64 and over 65, and Monte Argentario, for over 65. They are also present in Tuscany's inland centres, such as the LMA of Barga (35–64 and over 65) and Montecatini Terme and Cortona (over 65). Pensioner immigrants in the LMAs studied were comprised of 1,316 men and 1,266 women from Germany, 698 men and 687 women from the UK and 49 men and 60 women from Sweden. However, while the Germans are distributed in the LMAs of the major metropolitan areas and along the seaside and the shores of lakes, immigrants from the UK are more concentrated, and therefore more statistically evident, in certain LMAs in Tuscany (*Figure 3*).

Conclusions

A precise examination of the immigrant presence in Italy from a selection of EU countries representative of three different situations has shown a close correlation between the various nationalities and the places where they are most concentrated. Within each nationality, furthermore, the presence of immigrants by territory also varies by age. Closer attention to the relationship between each type of immigrant and their chosen destination for migration reveals particularly significant elements, made possible by the work of Istat, which dedicated part of the Census of Population and Housing 2011 to LMA statistics. This is a unique activity carried out by one of the EU's statistical institutes, and one that ought to be continued on a regular basis and extended to as many countries as possible.

The data available for EU countries generally deal with territories whose borders were defined over the centuries, and in Europe often refer to the administrative structure of the Roman Empire. Analysis of LMA data, however, has shown how the phenomenon of migration from the EU countries is directed to specific, clearly identified, highly urbanized areas of the Po Valley and neighbouring areas. The presence of the JRC in the municipality of Ispra is evident from the presence of numerous young and older immigrants from EU countries who have chosen certain municipalities in the Province of Varese as their place of residence. The LMA of Rome is another draw, whose attractiveness is echoed by the nearby LMAs of Pomezia and Civitavecchia. There there is also a long list of famous resorts along the Tyrrhenian coast where there are mainly immigrants over 65 years old. In addition to the LMAs named in the text, the predominant places include Versilia, Elba and Argentario in Tuscany, Sperlonga in Lazio and Taormina in Sicily.

There is also the significant phenomenon of return migration –Italians who went to work in other EU countries in the 1950s, who became citizens of their adopted countries and then decided to spend their retirement years as re-immigrants in their own places of origin. This phenomenon is particularly evident in the small towns of the Apennines where the presence of return migrants is particularly significant socially and culturally, as well as statistically. It should not be surprising, therefore, that there are small municipalities in the Apennines that celebrate Scottish or Irish festivals, or even a municipal council of a small town in Tuscany that wrote to the Scottish Parliament to express its solidarity on the occasion of the Brexit results. The density of the presence of immigrants has also highlighted some areas where the situation is, or could be, a source of contestation arising from competition for the use of resources and services, whether in the poorer social groups of resident communities, as can happen with Romanian immigrants, or with the rise in real estate values of areas where there are high percentages of pension-age immigrants from the UK and Germany.

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Italian youth mobility during the last two decades: an overview in eight selected EU countries

Gerardo GALLO[1] and Barbara STANISCIA[2]

Abstract

The international mobility of young people from Europe's Mediterranean countries has become an important topic in scientific debate. The issue has major reverberations in the national media since youth outflows – not adequately compensated for by return flows or new inflows – can undermine the economic and social sustainability of development processes in the countries of origin. The 2007–2008 financial and economic crisis, contributed significantly to intensifying those outflows and reducing the return flows. This paper focuses on the international mobility of young Italians during the past two decades. After addressing the problem of existing data sources and their comparability, our analysis, in terms of spatial distribution, will be concentrated on eight EU destination countries presenting three different sets of socio-economic characteristics: the UK, Germany and Sweden (characterised by high mobility, high income, and high capacity for attracting immigration); Latvia, Romania and Slovakia (characterised by high out mobility, medium-low income, and low capacity for attracting immigration) and Ireland and Spain (characterised by high mobility, medium-high income, and a temporally and spatially discontinuous capacity for attracting immigration). In terms of geographical distribution, our analysis will consider the most represented places of origin in Italy at the provincial level. Our study provides an overview of international outflows of young Italians, considering destination countries, places of origin, gender, marital status and age. These results could be used by scientists and policymakers in dealing with the challenge of maximizing the advantages of mobility for individuals while minimizing costs in terms of social and economic sustainability.

Keywords: youth mobility, intra-EU mobility, Italy, regional disparities, economic crisis

Introduction

Starting in the 21st century, the international mobility of young people has been a major focus of attention in the international literature. Early on, this was particularly the studies concerning the international mobility of students and researchers and of highly skilled workers. A comprehensive analysis and literature review on the topic is provided by King, R. *et al.* (2016a) working from various questions regarding youth mobility: Who migrates? Where do young people migrate to? Why and how do they migrate? The authors look into the effects of youth mobility on the regions of origin and those of the destination, and the effects at the personal and individual level, both objective and subjective, of the migration experience.

Youth mobility within the EU has become an issue of major importance and relevance in the countries of Mediterranean Europe. Starting with the economic and financial crisis that began in 2007–2008, the phenomenon has captured the attention of the media, of policy-makers and of the public because of the feared negative repercussions both for young people – "forced" to flee the Mediterranean area because of the high unemployment rates and the structural crisis – and for the regions where the flows originate, "condemned" to increased marginalization as a result of the loss of human capital (Alba-Monteserín, S. *et al.* 2013; Labrianidis, L. and

[1] ISTAT – Italian National Institute of Statistics, Rome.
[2] Sapienza University of Rome. Corresponding author's e-mail: barbara.staniscia@uniroma1.it

Vogiatzis, N. 2013; Domingo, A. *et al.* 2014; Triandafyllidou, A. and Gropas, R. 2014; Díaz-Hernández, R. *et al.* 2015; Pumares, P. 2015; Domínguez-Mujica, J. and Pérez-García, T. forthcoming).

Youth mobility and its increase after the 2007–2008 economic crisis, unites Mediterranean and Eastern European countries (EEC), even with different intensities. Italy has one of the lowest fertility rates in the EU, with a negative trend between the year 1970 (2.38) and the year 2000 (1.26). In 2000, the only EEC showing a lower rate was Czech Republic (1.15), even if other EEC did not display very high values (ex. Bulgaria: 1.26; Romania: 1.31; Hungary: 1.32) (EUROSTAT, 2016a). Thus, the increase in youth mobility cannot be linked to an increase of the youth cohors of the population. Unlike EEC, Italy did not experience a change in the possibility of increased mobility for youth after 1989, as much as their mobility was not affected by the existence of the Schengen Agreement (Italy signed the treaty in 1990). Thus, the increase of youth mobility in Italy cannot be attributed to radical changes in the global political arena, except for EU policies, as will be discussed below.

The European Commission – beginning with the Lisbon Treaty and reconfirmed in the Europe 2020 strategy – encourages the mobility of young people through various policies, programmes and initiatives. Some aim to encourage the mobility of students (Bologna Process, ERASMUS and SOCRATES programmes), while others facilitate the mobility of researchers (ERA-European Research Area), and still others are intended to encourage labour mobility (Youth on the Move, Youth Employment Package, Youth Guarantee). This push toward international mobility on the part of the Commission leads to the creation (or worsening) of problems in places of origin, which suffer a "haemorrhaging" of the potential energy of young people, especially those with high levels of education and qualifications. There seem to be, thus, two (currently opposing) interests with regard to the Commission's overall policy: to encourage the mobility of young people to create a European labour market and identity on the one hand, while on the other hand, avoiding the marginalization of certain areas and promoting regional re-equilibrium.

There are two other interests that are currently in conflict: one individual and the other at the community level. There is, on the one hand, young people's interest in promoting their own personal growth, improving their quality of life and developing their portfolio of skills, competencies and experiences through international mobility. By the same token, this is a salient interest among the communities of origin in retaining their main sources of "renewable energy". This conflict centres attention on the impact of mobility in terms of the supply of human capital, in the regions of origin and in the destination: what effects are generated by this "brain mobility" that youth mobility has set in motion? Are we looking at new forms of brain drain, brain waste, brain training, brain overflow or brain circulation (Lowell, B.L. and Findlay, A. 2002)? In theory, the regions of origin benefit from brain mobility if there is brain circulation or brain return. Otherwise, the free movement of persons undermines the cohesion policy launched in 1988 with the aim of integrating the existing European funds for regional development (EAGGF, EDRF, ESF) to reduce inequality in Europe. It was intended to promote growth in less-developed regions and in disadvantaged communities in isolated areas of the EU with implicitly assumed very low geographical mobility (Jouen, M. 2014). The contradictions between the policies of cohesion and of mobility are persistent and fundamental to the future vision of youth mobility.

In Italian scientific debate, scholars have, in recent years, focused on the upswing in migration – both internal and international – as a result of the system-wide crisis. The flows from the south to the centre-north of Italy and to other countries have been emphasized and viewed with concern (Bonifazi, C. 2015; Giannola, A. 2015; SVIMEZ 2015). An increase is observed in the level of education

of those skilled and highly skilled migrants who move and are willing to accept jobs for which they are overqualified. In geographical terms, some studies have highlighted the "rediscovery" of older destinations which had, for several decades, disappeared from migrants' "mental maps" (e.g. Argentina), and the continuing importance of the highly attractive European countries (e.g. Germany, the UK, France) (Pugliese, E. 2015).

In analysing young Italians in London, McKay, S. (2015) points out that the number of young people from the Mediterranean has been on the rise since the 2007 crisis. More young Italians moved to the UK from 2007 to 2011 than in the thirty years from 1961 to 1991; in 2012 the number of Italians who moved to the UK exceeded the number from any other country in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Greece). The flow towards Germany also regained momentum beginning in 2010 and, in 2013, inflows from Italy were the highest of those from any Mediterranean country. A high percentage of Italians moving to Germany (especially women) were under the age of 25 (Haug, S. 2015).

King, R. *et al.* (2016b), in their analysis of new flows of young people – Germans, Italians and Latvians – in London, draw attention to characteristics including: (i) the renewed importance of the contrast between developed and less-developed economies in the world and in Europe, (ii) the attractiveness of London as a Eurocity (Favell, A. 2008) and a global city (Sassen, S. 2001), and (iii) the economic crisis. Italy itself is divided in two, a "developed" North and a "less developed" South.

In this paper we analyse the mobility of Italian young people (aged 15 to 34 years old), during the last two decades (1995–2014), toward eight countries in the European Union characterized by different profiles in terms of attractiveness to migrants: the UK, Germany and Sweden (characterized by high mobility, high income, and high capacity for attracting immigration); Latvia, Romania and Slovakia (characterized by high outbound mobility, medium-low income, and low capacity for attracting immigration) and Ireland and Spain (characterized by high mobility, medium-high income, and a temporally and spatially discontinuous capacity for attracting immigrants). The analysis focuses on the sizes of the flows, on the differences in gender and location of origin between the young and the very young (analysis by area will be carried out at the level of provinces).

Through data analysis at the provincial level we intend to test the hypothesis that the recent international mobility of young Italians is induced, mostly, by economic factors. We intend to explore the possibility that it is motivated by the desire of young people to experiment with new lifestyles, of enriching language capacity, expanding cultural background, and improving skills and competencies. In this case, mobility will presumably not follow the classical path of labour migration characterized by permanent settlement and non-return. We intend, also, to verify if southern Italy still represents the main area of out-migration, if it is an homogeneous area, and if there are spatial differences in the south.

Definitions, sources, data

Prior to analysing of the data, a careful description and discussion of operational choices is provided, i.e., definitions adopted, data selected, and indicators chosen for analysing the recent dynamics of Italian emigration to the eight countries described previously.

Definitions of emigrants and critical issues in the use of administrative data

In terms of defining the emigration events examined, it should be specified that, both at the macro and micro levels, the basic data used refer to the transfer of residence abroad by persons who are registered with each Italian municipality's Population Register Offices. The population register regulation (Law

no. 223 of 30 May 1989) requires all citizens (Italian and foreign) who reside in Italy to inform the Register Office in their municipality of changes in their place of usual residence if their stay outside Italy lasts for at least one year. This rule is also explicitly provided for international law, by (EC) Regulation No. 862/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of Europe of 11 July 2007, which governs migration statistics of EU member states. In particular, according to the international definition "Emigrants are people leaving the country where they usually reside and effectively taking up residence in another country. According to the 1998 UN recommendations on international migration statistics (Revision 1), an individual is a long-term emigrant if he/she leaves his/her country of previous usual residence for a period of 12 months or more" (UNECE 1998). However, it should be noted that this principle of mandatory reporting is not always respected in reality, and that the data from the population registers in almost every country in Europe are often forced to deal with the problem of citizens who emigrate without reporting their departure.

Wallgren, A. and Wallgren, B. (2011) and Poulain, M. and Herm, A. (2013) pointed out that the use of the population register to count the usual resident population does not automatically solve reporting problems: the accuracy of this register is a critical issue. Administrative data on a population involve problems in reporting due mainly to the difficulty in recording international migration which primarily concerns two main subpopulations: citizens or foreigners habitually living abroad who have official residence in the country and usually-resident foreigners without legal residence in the country. In Italy, nationals living abroad and foreigners who have left the country permanently or on a long-term basis should be removed from the population registers. However, emigrants see no reason to notify the authorities of their departure. In addition, local authorities have an incentive to maintain the stability of their population numbers by considering these people "temporary" emigrants, so they keep them in the registers (Cibella, N. *et al.* 2015).[3]

Despite the extent of under-reporting of migrations, the data from population registers are still a valuable source of information for analyzing the demographic characteristics, destination countries and regions of origin of individuals who have moved abroad.

Data and indicators

In the first part of the work, data used to analyse the evolution of the national mobility of Italian citizens abroad during the past two decades were taken from the names entered in and cancelled from population registers for Italian citizens who transferred their place of residence abroad from 1995 to 2014. For this period, the trends and the size of the flows, the main demographic characteristics and the destination countries are analysed.

In the second part of the paper, we examine in detail the provinces of origin from transfers of residence. Data are analysed by comparing two points in time: the first three-year period of the new millennium (2002–2004) and the most recent three-year period for which data are available (2011–2013).

Individual data validated by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) make it possible to calculate indicators that express people's propensity toward international migration, across all of Italy's provinces, as well as providing information about gender, age, marital status and destination country of those who moved. In particular, reference is made to the specific migration rates which have been calculated by gender and also for the younger age groups (15–34 years), and by the ratio of the number of emigrants who registered their departure abroad in a given year and the average of usual resident population in their area of origin. This ratio has been broken down by gender and age group

[3] It should be noted that neither ISTAT or EUROSTAT provide estimates of individuals who permanently moved abroad without notifying the local authorities of their departure.

so as to allow for the precise construction of specific rates, as well as according to the classification and division into macro areas of destinations. The construction of emigration rates makes it possible to create maps focusing on specific periods of time and very fine geographical scale.

Moreover, ISTAT carried out an initial trial to identify the usual resident population by using administrative data for defining the new census strategy. ISTAT analysed the quality of the registers and identified patterns in the administrative data. These patterns enabled ISTAT to classify individuals into specific groups, which also represent the "critical" subpopulations to be considered when evaluating population register data. Data used in the trial came from specific administrative sources already stored and integrated in the System of Microdata (SIM): Municipal Resident Population, Residence Permits, Employees and Self-employed persons, Compulsory Education, University Students, Retired People, Non-Pension Benefits, Income and Taxation.

The most important subpopulation that emerged from the aforementioned assessment is represented by individuals present in the population registers without "indications" from other administrative sources. The absence of "indications" in the labour and education registers could involve a high risk of emigration, especially for younger people (Chieppa, A. *et al.* 2016). For this reason, our analysis also considers the provincial indicator of young Italians who are listed in the population register but for whom the available administrative sources offer no direct indication of study and work, nor even indirect indications, such as declarations of dependent family members of an income-earning parent.

Results

The early 1990s saw a radical change in the dynamics of Italy's resident population. Population growth began to be almost exclusively the result of the significant and continuous arrival of foreign nationals from abroad.

The sudden slowdown in flows of Italians going abroad, which had begun in the mid-1970s and also simultaneously led to the recording of significant return flows, seemed to have made migration to other countries decisively stagnant. However, with the increase of migrants coming from the other European Union member countries, which since 1995 has risen from less than one million to more than 3.3 million people (Livi Bacci, M. 2016), Italian emigration has made its contribution, although mostly in recent years and as a result of particular conditions.

An overall picture of Italians' moving abroad and their demographic characteristics

Italian citizens' net migration to and from foreign countries was almost null in the 1995–1998 period and hit a slightly more negative low point only for 1999 (–24,000 persons). At the beginning of the new millennium, and until the end of 2010, the balance of Italians abroad alternated somewhat between positive and negative, but was in any case very small; then, suddenly, it exceeded 50,000 persons in 2013 (*Figure 1*).

Several scholars are beginning to discuss the "new European mobility" which, encouraged by the economic and financial crisis that spread through Europe starting in 2007–2008 and by the stronger process of integration of the European Union (EU) –, in fact seems to be affected by new conditions of need. As in the past, it has also been true in recent years that one of the important factors that encourage new processes of mobility by Italians, especially the young, is that of social networks that today have new communication tools at their disposal in the form of *blogs* and other *forums* on social networks (Pichler, E. 2015).

On the whole, from the mid-1990s to the end of 2013, about 900,000 Italians left Italy (*Table 1*). The flows that involved EU countries account for just under 500,000 and more than half of those (273,000) chose



Fig. 1. In-flows, out-flows and migration balances of Italian citizens, 1995–2014.

destinations among the countries offering a strong appeal for migrants (e.g. Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden). In total, 323,000 Italians have moved to one of the eight selected countries, meaning that more than two out of three moves involving Italians within the EU are directed to one of the eight countries examined in this study.

In the same period, young Italians (aged 15–34 years) who left Italy and moved to an EU member country number more than 210,000 (44% of the total) and, of these, about 125,000 (45%) chose a destination country with a strong tradition of drawing immigrants. The eight selected countries account for approximately 147,000 moves abroad by young Italians, or almost 70 percent of all moves by Italian young people within the EU (*Table 1*).

However, we should not forget that the data analyzed in this paper represent, as mentioned, an underestimation of international migration. For example, looking at Germany alone – which, like Italy, has local population registers, – it can be seen that the Federal Statistical Office of Germany counts more than 60,000 Italian citizens in the German population registers in 2013 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). It is true that, given the presence of Italian citizens in other European countries and on other continents, we cannot rule out the possibility of arrivals in Germany from other countries, but even so it appears that the data on cancellations of residence provided by the Italian registers is far too small (about 12,000 persons in 2013) because of citizens who fail to give official notification of their departure from Italy.

The distribution by marital status of flows of Italians abroad shows an ever-increasing proportion of unmarried persons (from 53% in 1995–1999 to almost 61% in 2010–2013) with much higher values for unmarried individuals in the youngest age group, as high as 81 percent in the 2010–2013 period (*Table 2*).[4]

[4] With reference to the comparison with the total resident population in the examined period, it should be observed that the share of married people represent about 52 percent whereas singles are about 42 percent. The gender ratio is equal to 93.8 percent and the average age is about 41 years for men and 44 for women.

Table 1. Italian population change and out-flows of Italian citizens by destination country, time period and age group, 1995–2013.

Time period	AAGR* x 1,000 inhabitants	Total	of which					
			European Union	DE-SE-UK	ES-IE	LV-RO-SK	Eight countries together	Other countries
			Total, in 1,000 persons					
1995–1999	-1.0	219.1	114.3	70.5	4.9	1.8	77.2	104.8
2000–2004	-0.3	232.4	115.6	70.9	5.9	2.5	79.4	116.8
2005–2009	-1.3	203.2	116.4	66.0	14.4	1.4	81.9	86.8
2010–2013	1.6	239.7	134.4	66.0	16.4	2.3	84.6	105.3
1995–2013	*-0.8*	*894.4*	*480.7*	*273.4*	*41.6*	*8.0*	*323.0*	*413.7*
			Age group 15–34, in 1,000 persons					
1995–1999	-14.8	95.7	52.1	32.7	2.2	0.7	35.7	43.6
2000–2004	-20.4	95.5	48.6	30.0	2.6	1.0	33.6	46.9
2005–2009	-24.0	79.3	51.5	30.5	7.4	0.3	38.1	27.8
2010–2013	7.3	94.3	58.8	31.4	..	0.4	39.3	35.5
1995–2013	*-18.0*	*364.8*	*211.0*	*124.6*	*..*	*2.4*	*146.7*	*153.8*

*Annual average growth rate of Italian population. .. = No data. *Source:* Our own analysis based on ISTAT data.

In the period from 1995 to 2013, the gender ratio of people who moved abroad shows a meaningful trend toward balancing out. Although the gender ratio of Italians abroad continues to show a higher number of males, it registered a sharp decrease compared to the first half of the 1990s, especially for the 15–34 age group (the gender ratio dropped from nearly 152 males per 100 women in 1995–1999 to just over 127% in 2010–2013).

The average age recorded, on the other hand, is growing, for both males and females. An increase of about 2 years has been seen from the beginning to the end of the period studied. For the youngest age group, the average increase is more moderate (about one year) but still shows a perceptible overall trend of increasing over the years (*Table 2*).

In addition, it should be considered that, with regard to young Italians moving, from 1995 to recent years there has been a change both in the age distribution of those moving and in the number whose destinations are among the 8 countries selected as opposed to other countries. Through 2004, the 15–24 age group shows, in relative terms, a higher incidence as compared with the total number of young people in the 15–34 group (*Figure 2*).

However, in later years a higher incidence is observed in the 25–34 age group. This changing trend can probably be related to the prevalence of mobility for work in more recent years compared to that for study typical of the first decade of the period considered.

Regional aspects of places of origin and propensity to move to foreign countries

Aspects of the issue of international mobility of Italians related to place of origin have always interested demographers, geographers, and, in general, population scholars, especially in recent years. However, since Italy underwent the transition from a labour exporting country to one that attracts immigrants, the focus on Italian emigration has in fact gradually waned. With the emergence of an economic crisis of major proportions, such as the

Table 2. Out-flows of Italian citizens by time period, marital status, gender ratio, average age and age group, 1995–2013.

Time period	Marital status		Gender ratio	Average age		
	single	married		women	men	together
Total, in %						
1995–1999	53.1	44.2	143.2	31.8	32.8	32.4
2000–2004	55.9	41.1	134.3	34.6	34.7	34.7
2005–2009	57.5	37.6	132.2	35.1	35.9	35.6
2010–2013	60.6	35.2	135.9	33.2	34.9	34.2
1995–2013	*56.8*	*39.5*	*136.4*	*33.7*	*34.6*	*34.2*
Age group 15–34, in %						
1995–1999	64.3	34.7	151.6	26.4	26.3	26.3
2000–2004	71.0	28.6	137.1	26.8	26.8	26.8
2005–2009	77.1	22.2	126.9	27.4	27.7	27.6
2010–2013	80.8	18.8	127.4	27.5	27.8	27.7
1995–2013	*73.1*	*26.3*	*135.8*	*27.0*	*27.1*	*27.1*

Source: Our own analysis based on ISTAT data.



Fig. 2. Out-flows of young Italian citizens (aged 15–24 and 25–34) towards 8 selected countries (Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK, 1995–2013). *Source:* Our own analysis based on ISTAT data

one that struck Europe at the end of the first decade of 2000, Italian emigration seems to have taken off again, arousing a new wave of great interest from the scientific community.

Compared to the past, however, the ambits in which Italians are moving internationally have changed considerably. In particular, the well-known processes typical of economic globalization and the markets that inevitably involve all areas of the planet, to the process of European integration which, until only a few months ago, seemed to have removed the last political and regulatory obstacles to the free movement of persons. To this we must also add the succession of new forms of communication and new communication tools, such as social networks, which can facilitate, at least at the beginning, processes of mobility within the EU. In this new framework, the regional differences and the dif-

ferences in economic development that have, for decades, characterised Italy can change the intensity and characteristics of the current trends of Italians moving abroad.

Therefore, with regard to the youngest people of the Italian population, it seems appropriate to analyse which geographical areas of the country, in the course of the last decade, have been most affected by this new emigration trend, in order to identify the differences or similarities to places that traditionally fed such movement in the past (*Table 3*).

From 2002 to 2013, more than 227,000 young Italians moved abroad. In absolute terms, the geographical area that registered the highest number of expatriates was the north-west (over 56,000 individuals), followed by the south (almost 54,000), the north-east (more than 46,000 emigrants) and, finally, the centre and the islands (about 36,000 persons from each of the two geographical areas).

However, from 2002 to 2013 the northern and the central regions recorded a steady and continuous increase in the number of Italians moving abroad; for the last three-year period, the number of expatriates from these two areas doubled compared to the first two three-year periods of the millennium. On the other hand, for the south and the islands, the values recorded are certainly significant, but still seem to be in line with the flows recorded during the first two three-year periods (*Table 3*).

Table 3. Out-flows of 15–34 years old Italian citizens to eight selected host countries by geographical origin, 2002–2013.

Time period	Geographical origin					Italy
	North-West	North-East	Centre	South	Islands	
Total, in persons						
2002–2004	9,590	7,563	7,128	17,345	11,881	53,507
2005–2007	10,311	9,140	7,848	11,804	8,512	47,615
2008–2010	13,193	11,061	7,994	8,784	6,092	47,124
2011–2013	23,141	16,848	12,834	15,905	10,191	78,919
2002–2013	*56,235*	*44,612*	*35,804*	*53,838*	*36,676*	*227,165*
of which DE-SE-UK						
2002–2004	2,682	2,140	2,028	6,233	4,420	17,503
2005–2007	2,890	3,119	2,382	5,662	4,979	19,032
2008–2010	3,702	3,630	2,410	3,482	3,078	16,302
2011–2013	6,278	5,130	3,827	6,165	5,109	26,509
2002–2013	*15,552*	*14,019*	*10,647*	*21,542*	*17,586*	*79,346*
ES-IE						
2002–2004	454	326	299	406	335	1,820
2005–2007	1,196	920	890	486	438	3,930
2008–2010	1,612	1,202	1,042	621	548	5,025
2011–2013	1,732	1,182	1,168	1,051	672	5,805
2002–2013	*4,994*	*3,630*	*3,399*	*2,564*	*1,993*	*16,580*
LV-RO-SK						
2002–2004	80	84	81	148	126	519
2005–2007	45	59	39	21	18	182
2008–2010	38	67	36	28	19	188
2011–2013	101	104	72	83	37	397
2002–2013	*264*	*314*	*228*	*280*	*200*	*1,286*
Eight countries together						
2002–2004	3,216	2,550	2,408	6,787	4,881	19,842
2005–2007	4,131	4,098	3,311	6,169	5,435	23,144
2008–2010	5,352	4,899	3,488	4,131	3,645	21,515
2011–2013	8,111	6,416	5,067	7,299	5,818	32,711
2002–2013	*20,810*	*17,963*	*14,274*	*24,386*	*19,779*	*97,212*

Source: Our own analysis based on ISTAT data.



Fig. 3. Emigration rates of young Italians (aged 15–34), by province of origin and gender.
Source: Our own analysis based on ISTAT data.

According to official Italian statistics, during the 2002–2013 period, just under 100,000 Italians moved to one of the eight countries examined, and almost 80,000 of these chose destination countries with a strong tradition of attracting immigrants (e.g. Germany, the UK and Sweden).

Looking at the emigration rates by province, which have also been calculated by gender, we can analyse the propensity of Italian young people, male and female, to emigrate. Comparing the first three-year period (2002–2004) with the last one (2011–2013), very significant differences emerge in the propensity to emigrate from provinces in Italy.

In the first years of the 21st century, the highest values for average emigration rates (ranging from 3 to 8 per thousand), for both males and females, are found in certain provinces of the South, especially in Calabria (Cosenza, Catanzaro and Vibo Valentia) and Sicily (Enna, Caltanissetta and Agrigento). In the north, on the other hand, it is especially certain areas along the border in the provinces of Imperia, Bolzano, Pordenone and Trieste that show moderately intense emigration rates (between 2.0 and 4.7 per thousand), which moreover should be considered in terms of short-range moves across the border (*Figure 3*, a–b).

The situation, however, seems to completely reverse itself in the 2011–2013 emigration rates. This time it is mainly the provinces in the north-east, the north-west and the centre that show a greater propensity on the part of young people to emigrate, with higher levels (between 3.5 and 6.3 per thousand) among males in some northern provinces. Overall, the average intensity of emigration shows slightly lower values than those recorded

in the first three years of the 2000s, but the phenomenon is by far more geographically widespread. Now emigration by young people is also seen in provinces that have been a driving force for the country's economy, including some in the Triveneto (Belluno, Treviso and Udine) and even the province of Bologna, which, for women specifically, shows very high emigration rates. Of the provinces in the north-west, we can point out Lecco, Como and Cremona, where the effects of the crisis in recent years have evidently been strongly felt in the textile manufacturing sector (*Figure 3*, c and d).

Among the provinces in the central region, those whose average emigration rates are significant, include certain provinces in Tuscany, Umbria and Marche and the province of Rome, while in the South the average rate of moves abroad involves more men from the provinces of Calabria and Apulia, and this is even more true with the provinces in Sardinia and some in Sicily (e. g. Agrigento and Enna).

It is interesting, though, that the propensity of young Italians to emigrate to one of the eight observed countries during the 2011–2013 period was even more widespread than the earlier measured average levels for young expatriates to all destinations (*Figure 4*).

This means that young Italians, from provinces in the north, south and the islands, show a greater propensity to migrate to the other eight EU countries than to other possible destinations. This trend is even more pronounced for young men, for whom migration rates are very significant in the southern provinces on the Adriatic side (e. g. Chieti, Campobasso, Foggia, Brindisi), and in the provinces of Basilicata and Calabria (*Figure 4*, b and d).

Campania, and in particular its provinces Salerno, Avellino and Benevento, seem to be unique in the south, in that, despite traditionally being areas marked by emigration, they do not show significant levels of young Italians moving abroad during this most recent period. This situation, which is also widespread in other southern provinces, does corroborate alternative hypotheses regarding the "new state of need" which, according to some authors, has emerged among young people as a result of the recent economic crisis.

Over the last year, ISTAT has conducted an experiment using administrative data from multiple sources to define operational criteria for identifying the usual residence of individuals in Italy, according to the definitions of *usually resident population* adopted by the European regulations cited above. Based on these criteria, the data for persons recorded in the population register were matched with individual data from all administrative sources available to the institute, using a unique code to identify each individual. Data were consulted from the archives on employment (including contracts for collaboration, employee work and temporary work) and self-employment, the archive of students enrolled in schools and universities, pensioners records, tax statements (including with dependent family members), non-pension benefits and the archives for residence permits and for domestic work.

To identify the place of usual residence, the date 31 December 2013 was used, and indications of the individual's presence in or absence from Italy in the 12 months before and the 12 months following that date were considered. This criterion made it possible to identify the following critical subpopulations: persons usually resident in Italy but not recorded in the municipal register; and individuals who are registered but for whom the administrative sources cited above nonetheless contain no indications. This second group of individuals, in the 15–34 age group, includes about 500,000 Italians who are largely representative of the so-called "NEET generation" (not engaged in education, employment or training). This subpopulation without administrative indications other than in population registers is, in terms of geographical distribution, strongly concentrated in the central and southern provinces (*Figure 5*), or in other words, in areas where long-term unemployment and the loss of jobs generated by the crisis that began in 2007–2008 have been most substantial.



Fig. 4. Emigration rates of young Italians (aged 15–34) to 8 selected countries (Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and the UK), by province of origin and gender. *Source:* Our own analysis based on ISTAT data



Fig. 5. Young Italian citizens (aged 15–34) recorded in municipal population registers, “without indications” in other administrative sources, 2012–2014. *Source:* Our own analysis based on ISTAT data.

The thematic map shows that these young Italians are highly concentrated in the provinces of Lazio, Campania, Sicily and Calabria: particularly, the provinces of Rome, Naples, Palermo and Crotone. Some moderately high numbers of persons with Italian citizenship are also found in some provinces in the north along the borders with Switzerland, France and Austria, but these must be considered predominantly in relation to the phenomenon of frontier workers. The major concentration of young people in the southern provinces who are not part of the labour market should, as a result of the still-ongoing economic crisis, feed major migratory flows toward foreign countries.

However, we have seen that the emigration rates are higher in the northern provinces and do not entirely overlap the spatial distribution of social disease of young Italian who usually reside in the provinces of the centre and the south and who are characterized by an higher absence of indications of study and work in administrative sources other than the population registers. This suggests that the recent international migration of Italians is not entirely due to the situation of need that supposedly emerged from the recent economic crisis to which most of the national and international scientific literature refers to.

Discussion and conclusions

Analysis by area of origin at the provincial level has demonstrated that it has not been only the traditionally underdeveloped areas – those in the south of Italy – to see an increase in out-migration, but also regions that were prosperous until a few years ago, such as those of the north-east and some border areas in the Alps. The reason might perhaps be found in the Italian industrial system crisis that has hit several areas of the country. In the north-east, the crisis involved mainly small and medium-sized enterprises, which initially reacted by moving operations to areas of Europe with lower labour costs (Eastern Europe) and later by shutting down completely. The south, by contrast, has always been one of Italy's least developed areas.

However, the crisis aggravated the situation; between 2007 and 2013, the real GDP fell by about 14 percent and there was a drop in spending, even on food, in both public and private investments and in net capital stock. Meanwhile, there was an increase in the unemployment rate for young people. In the 15–34 age group, the unemployment rate in the south in 2014 was 23.9 percent (SVIMEZ 2015) and in December 2015 the unemployment rate for the very young people (aged 15–24) was 37.9 percent (EUROSTAT 2016b). Thus, the instability of the labour market increased in the South, but also in Italy in general, and this seems to be one of the main factors that push young people abroad.

This "instability" is the result of the fact that the principles of "flexicurity" being borrowed from the countries of Northern Europe and applied in the Mediterranean countries. However, when transferred to a less-developed welfare system slow to adapt to new job profiles because of the new employment contracts used, in order to lower labour costs, these resulted in instability instead of flexibility (Raffini, L. 2014). Therefore, in Italy and in other Mediterranean countries, there is a generation of young people caught in the "trap" of job insecurity (Murgia, A. 2010), a generation living their lives in a series of unstable or temporary jobs that do not allow them to plan secure futures.

As regards the United Kingdom, in recent decades, emigrants moving to London from Italy were primarily young people going to study in prestigious universities or highly qualified workers going to work in banks, finance companies and hedge funds, insurance companies, legal companies and universities; these were the Eurostars described by Favell, A. (2008). Today in London, however, there are also young Italians who cannot find opportunities in Italy. Finding employment in London is easy, but contracts are often temporary or part-time, the work is strenuous and wages are relatively low. The minimum wage for people over the age of 22 is £ 6.50.

They are working in low-level jobs: bartenders, waiters, chefs, deliverymen, dishwashers, receptionists and bellboys (McKay, S. 2015).

Young Italians moving to Germany today have a higher level of education than those of past decades and, above all, good social and personal relationships and an excellent level of integration. Despite their qualifications and degrees, they are working in low-skilled jobs – services, especially in food service and customer care – often intermittent or temporary, alternating periods of work and periods of unemployment, periods in Germany and periods in Italy or in other countries (Quadrelli, F. 2014).

But if the labour situation abroad in the most attractive countries is so difficult, why do Italian youth want to relocate? Part of the answer can be found in some recent studies on Italian graduates (King, R. and Conti, F. 2013; King, R. *et al*. 2014, 2016b) that point out how young Italians are fleeing from something intangible as well as from economic stresses and employment crisis. They are running away from a system they call "gerontocratic", "clientelist", "corrupt" and "not merit-based", where finding a job requires "recommendations" and networks of personal connections. There is also a flight from the "Italian mentality" which is defined as "provincial" and "narrow-minded".

It is important to observe how the social composition of the young Italians who move abroad has changed. Young Italians – and young people from Mediterranean Europe in general who move to Northern European countries – are born Europeans, with a sense of European identity and previous experience abroad from their time as students (the Erasmus Generation); treat the EU as the larger space in which they see their futures. These young people experience Europe as an open space and a single labour market within which one can move freely. Therefore, they see themselves as mobile citizens, not as migrants, and they see their future as open – open to the stability of their destination country, open to returning to their country of origin, open to moving to new destinations (Raffini, L. 2014; Zurla, P. 2014). At the same time, however, it should be noted that for Mediterranean young people there is a very fine line between being "compelled" to move and "desiring" to move. Raffini, L. (2014) points out that, on the one hand, highly qualified young people, once they move, have the opportunity to work in stimulating and cosmopolitan environments and to develop transnational relationships but, on the other hand, they experience a sense of instability and uncertainty about future work and building a family.

In interpreting the phenomenon of the mobility of Italian young people, we must bear in mind the trends, but also the absolute values. In terms of the latter, even we wonder, following Livi Bacci, M. (2014), if indeed, we can speak of a real brain drain. Livi Bacci notes that, according to the most recent surveys, the international mobility of doctoral students is rather low (6.4% of Italians who earned PhDs in 2004 and 2007 were living abroad at a point five years or three years after having completed the degree) and mobility among university graduates is even lower (one year after earning a graduate degree, 4% were working abroad). A closer look reveals, furthermore, that PhDs and university graduates belong to the privileged classes of Italian society and that those who move abroad come from the families with the highest incomes and education levels; the experience of mobility is for those who do not have a concrete need. In addition, in 2014, for the first time since 2008 the percentage of graduates returning from abroad (34.7% of the total) was higher than the percentage of university graduates who moved abroad (30% of the total) (ISTAT 2015). We will have to wait for final data for 2015 to check whether the trend has reversed itself or whether this was an isolated case.

In this paper we've shown that an increase in the international youth migration of Italians took place after the financial and economic crisis started. Data have shown that new areas of origin have emerged in the recent years and that the Mezzogiorno

(south) cannot be considered a homogeneous unit but should be considered as a composite and complex system – not one Mezzogiorno (south), then, but multiple Mezzogiorni (south(s). Our analysis has also shown that several factors contribute to youth mobility and that the economic factors may not always be the most important ones. Further researches at a finer spatial scale, including qualitative analysis, will be necessary to deepen our conclusions.

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Measuring and interpreting emigration intentions of Hungarians

Beáta SISKA-SZILASI, Tibor KÓRÓDI and Péter VADNAI

Abstract

International migration and problems associated with it attracted increasing attention among geographers. Hungary has been affected by various forms of international migration since the systemic changes of 1990. This paper focuses on the emigration intentions of Hungarians, with special emphasis on regional differences, and age and gender dimensions. For the sake of analysis a questionnaire survey was carried out which resulted a database containing the answers of nearly 10 thousand respondents nationwide. During the survey we measured socio-economic status, age, gender, migrations intentions and previous migration records. Subjective quality of life factors, like happiness and satisfaction which may influence the migration intentions were also recorded. Based on the survey the main push factors of potential migration were defined. Our results confirm a more globalised pattern of migration intentions where women are at least as much involved in the process of preparation as men, and regions with good economic performance are equally affected as regions with economic hardship.

Keywords: international migration, labour mobility, Emigration Intention Index, post-socialism, Hungary

Introduction

Hungary has been strongly affected by international migration recently and problems associated with it. Although the Hungarian government and media predominantly focus on the issue of immigration, we should not ignore the growing number of Hungarians who left the country (emigrated) which also generates serious problems for the economy and society (Illés, S. 2008). The main objective of this paper is to examine the emigration intentions of Hungarians via empirical research methods. We would like to know which social groups and which geographic areas are the most affected by possible emigration, and what are the main triggering factors of migrants planning to leave the country. Though, the topic of emigration intentions among young people has been increasingly on the agenda in the media little has been said so far about the possible measurement of the process (Marien, A. 2015). During our research we carried out a questionnaire survey among Hungarian people regarding their migration intentions. Through this survey the following research questions are anwered:

1. Is emigration a selective process in Hungary?
2. Which social and demographic groups are the most affected?
3. What are the spatial differences of planned emigration within Hungary?
4. Are there any differences between rural and urban areas in this respect?
5. What are the main push factors behind the emigration intentions of people?

The growing importance of international migration in Hungary

The bulk of academic literature on migration focuses on models of international migration with special attention to push and pulls factors (Portes, A. and Böröcz, J. 1989). Most of these studies come to the conclusion that behind long-distance migration processes we usually find economic factors closely re-

[1] Institute of Geography and Geoinformatics, University of Miskolc, H-3515 Miskolc, Egyetemváros.
E-mails: ecobea@uni-miskolc.hu; ecokt@uni-miskolc.hu; ecovape@uni-miskolc.hu

lated to employment opportunities and labour market conditions of the home country (Dayton-Johnson, J. *et al*. 2009). International migration has been steadily growing in the world. In Europe the number of migrants was 64.1 million in 2005, while in North America 44.5 million. Increasing part of the European migration flows migration was stemming from East Central Europe (ECE), a geographical area that includes the former communist-bloc countries (including Hungary) (Robila, M. 2010). Another important issue often discussed in the literature is the growing complexity of migration. Previous concepts cannot always been used for explaining new forms of movements (Salt, J. 2001).

Countries can be predominantly sending (e.g. India, China) or receiving (e.g. USA, Australia) areas of international migration or as the case of Hungary demonstrates they can fit to both categories (Lakatos-Báldy, Zs. 2011). International migration has several advantages for the host and the sending countries (Nyáradi, G. 2011). The emigration intention is mostly determined by economic factors, but among young people the role of study abroad is also important (Hidasi, J. 2011). Focusing on youth migration the Active Youth in Hungary Research Group examined the migration intentions of Hungarian university students. The study focused on future plans of students about working abroad. The research found that while in 2013 about one-third of the Hungarian students planned emigration, by 2015 this ratio increased by 37 percent (Szabó, A. 2015).

Other case-studies on migration intentions of university students showed similar results. In a study about the University of Pécs, two-thirds of respondents planned international emigration (Rohr, A. 2012). The Identity Research Workgroup of National Minorities in Zenta (Serbia) made a similar research among high school students in 2010. Results showed that 25 percent of the students wanted to go abroad after graduation. In 2013 the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute (Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet, NKI) interviewed 1,500 people and calculated a 33 percent cumulative migration potential among young people. Similarly, the "Omnibusz" survey of TÁRKI Social Research Institute showed that in April, 2012, 39 percent of the young people (age between 18–29) wanted to go and stay abroad for a couple of weeks or months. Almost 40 percent wanted to work abroad for a couple of years and almost 25 percent of them planned permanent residence abroad.

Examining the emigration statistics of the EU countries based on data of the EUROSTAT, the emigration of Hungarians does not seem to be very high. 20 out of the 28 member states of the European Union have higher emigration rate than Hungary, including those more developed Western European countries. France, Sweden, England and Austria are all ahead of Hungary regarding the rate of emigration. However, since these countries have a continuous supply of human resources due to substantial immigration, emigration does not make a serious problem for them. On the other hand, even a more modest emigration rate can cause serious concern in Hungary, as population loss caused by emigration is exacerbated by an aging population which is not compensated by immigration.

Previous research results already showed that the intensity of emigration continuously grew in Hungary, especially among highly educated people (Sik, E. 1999; Langer-Rédei, M. *et al.* 2011; Blaskó, Zs. *et al.* 2014; Blaskó, Zs. and Gödri, I. 2014; Dabasi Halász, Zs. and Hegyi Kéri, Á. 2015; Molnár, J. *et al.* 2015; Hárs. Á. 2016). In the case of the six main destination countries (USA, Canada, Australia, Germany, United Kingdom and France) the number of emigrants exceeded 100,000 in 2000 (Egedy, T and Kovács, Z. 2011). Recently, the number of migrants has multiplied. While before 2007 3,000–4,000 people left Hungary annually, in 2008 this figure jumped to 9,500 and since then it has been growing steadily. The increase became more and more dramatic, while in 2011 a total of 15,100 Hungarians moved abroad, in 2012 this figure was already 22,800 and in 2013 it went up to 34,691. We must also note that these figures are the offi-

cial data of EUROSTAT, and they are likely to be under-represented because of the difficulty of measuring migration. Thus, the number of Hungarians who live, work or study abroad is probably higher.

Measuring migration intentions, research method and data

The measurement of international migration is not an easy task. Due to the expansion of the EU and the Schengen Area the registration of migrants became more and more difficult, because neither passport, nor visa is required to cross international borders anymore. It is also problematic that international migration statistics focus exclusively on quantitative issues, and they do not deal with the characteristics of migrants. However, it is necessary to understand the process and the motivations of participants, in order to find policy responses for the negative effects associated with it.

In the light of these it is easy to understand that more emphasis should be placed on measuring migration intentions and estimating future migration flows. Of course, we can try to outline future trends with analysis of time-series data, but based on recent experiences, there could be a lot of unforeseen variables which affect the process and question the reliability of the method. In addition, if the basic data are just estimated or there is some inaccuracy, the future trend calculated from these data could differ from reality. Therefore, we have decided to use empirical research method (i.e. questionnaire survey) to measure the emigration intentions of Hungarians. This method helped us not only to estimate the level of emigration in the near future, but we also got information about the reasons and motivations. In addition, the questionnaire survey shed light on the role of subjective factors (e.g. happiness and satisfaction), which allowed us to find out if subjective or objective quality of life factors have more influence on migration intentions in Hungary.

To meet the challenges of representative data it is important to achieve a high number of respondents. During the combination of field survey and online questionnaire survey finally we received nearly 10,000 filled forms. Due to the large number of respondents, the limited human resources and time, we had to make the fieldwork as efficient as possible. The easiest way was to keep the questionnaire as short and concise as possible. To fill out the questionnaire it took about 2–5 minutes on average. Before the survey dozens of test questionnaires were filled out by persons also with or without relevant professional experience of surveying. According to the original plan, a random generator selected the sample areas where surveys would have taken place on site. Given the fact that international migration affects mainly urban residents, and more than a third of Hungary's population lives in the county seats, we decided that only these cities were subject to random selection. It also seemed to be a good decision, because during the field surveys we could easily find people in the county seats, who live in the county but not in the seat (i.e. main centre), ensuring balanced spatial distribution. During the field survey we collected a total of 6,461completed questionnaires.

In order to reach the appropriate response rate at the national level (one respondents per thousand people), we also launched an online questionnaire survey. During the design we took into consideration that young people are the most affected by emigration in Hungary (Sansum-Molnár, J. 2012), therefore, the online questionnaire was sent out mainly to higher education institutions. Finally, a total of 3,372 filled questionnaires were received through the online survey. Thus, the total number of respondents in our sample was 9,833, which provided a solid basis for deeper analysis.

Main findings of research

Emigration intentions by gender and age

Due to the size and nation-wide coverage of the sample the representativeness of our data can be considered high. Also, during

the sampling the group of university and college students was paid special attention, and they are slightly over-represented. The measurement of the emigration intentions of students is really a crucial issue because the loss caused by the emigration of young people, whether it is a short or long-term stay, or permanent move, has an immediate impact on the economy and society (Siska-Szilasi, B. *et al.* 2016).

In terms of gender distribution women are slightly overrepresented (ration of female respondent was 55.2%) in our sample. The intention of women to emigrate is higher than to that of the men, thus, our results also confirm previous research results (Gödri, I. 2005) that the earlier dominance of men in international migration has mostly disappeared by now (*Figure 1*).

The relatively high willingness of women to emigrate from Hungary can be explained by several factors. Firstly, the growing employment level of women which causes the prolongation of starting a family and having children plays clearly a role. Secondly, cultural and social factors (globalisation) also influence the growing participation of women in emigration. Nowadays the family and the society accept the higher mobility of women which gives them more freedom in decisions regarding emigration.

Due to the method of sampling younger age groups were overrepresented among respondents. 76 percent of them belonged to the age group 13–40 years. As *Figure 2* shows, the propensity for migration among younger people is higher, for the age group below 40 the overall emigration propensity is 52.3 percent, whereas in the age group over 40 the ratio drops to 17 percent. This is in line with earlier research findings on Hungarian emigration (SEEMIG 2014). We can find sharp differences between the two main age groups (below and above 40) also regarding concrete migrations plans and previous experiences. In the younger age group (those below 40) the ratio of those who plan to move abroad within one year is 18 percent, whereas in the older age group (those above 40) it is only 4.5 percent. Previous migration experiences do not show substantial differences. 1.5 per cent of the younger cohort had already lived abroad while it was only 1.1 percent among those above 40.

The geography of emigration intentions

Due to the sampling method we could aggregate answers of respondents (according to the places of residence) for 38 geographical units within Hungary, among them 19 counties, 18 county seats (i.e. major cities) and the capital Budapest. To measure the intensity of emigration intentions we created a new index, which shows the weighted emigration intentions of people. The Emigration Intention Index (*EMINI*) was calculated as follows:



Fig. 1. Emigration intentions by gender. *Source*: own survey



Fig. 2. Emigration intentions by age. *Source*: own survey

$$EMINI = \frac{(0{,}25 * Th) + (0{,}5 * Pre) + (1 * La)}{N_{resp}} * 100$$

where Th = Thinking about emigration, Pre = Preparing to emigrate, La = Living abroad and N_{resp} = Number of respondents

The *EMINI* index could help us define the relative strength of emigration intentions by counties and major cities in Hungary. The pattern shown by *Figure 3* is somewhat different from the classic East–West dichotomy, which is otherwise very characteristic for Hungary. Three counties with the lowest emigration intentions (Pest, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Hajdú-Bihar counties) are located around Budapest and in the eastern part of the country. Highest *EMINI* values were found in the north (Nógrád, Heves and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén counties), in the southern Transdanubia (Baranya county) and along the Austrian border (Vas and Győr-Moson-Sopron counties). The first group of high *EMINI* values covers those counties that suffered most from economic restructuring and the loss of industrial jobs over the last two decades. On the other hand, counties along the Austrian border belong to the most developed part of the country, with low level of unemployment and higher average wages. Yet, the proximity of Austria and Germany with much higher salaries creates a significant triggering factor for local labour force.

In most cases cities (i.e. county seats) showed lower level of relative emigration intentions than their hinterland. The value of EMINI index was highest in the major centres of Eastern Hungary: Miskolc, Nyíregyháza, Debrecen, Szolnok and in Budapest. In the case of Budapest the role of global information flows and the higher educational level of population are also undeniable. The EMINI index also shed light on interesting rural-urban dichotomy. Generally, people living in rural areas showed much less intentions to emigrate than urban people. In this case the role of place attachment and the strong retaining function of family and local social networks seem to be relevant.

The analysis of push factors behind the emigration intentions was also important part of our research. *Figure 4* illustrates the main push factors for counties merged into broader categories. The most important group with



Fig. 3. Emigration Intention Index (*EMINI*) by counties and cities in Hungary. *Source*: own survey and calculation



Fig. 4. Distribution of *EMINI*, with the main push factors in Hungary. *Source*: own survey and calculation

29 percent of the answers referred to "economic and financial problems".

The second most important push factor was "lack of jobs" with 13.6 percent of the answers. Future uncertainties (mostly financial) were handled as a separate category and covered 5.2 percent of the answers. Thus, we can say that answers related to economic difficulties and uncertainties made up nearly fifty per cent of the total answers regarding push factors. Other factors like political situation (5.3%), "low living standards" (3.9%), "lack of appreciation" (3.0%) had much less influence. Answers categorised as "social problems" included discrimination, cultural problems, minority problems, bureaucracy. The weight of this group was also relatively low with 3.1 percent of the answers. In the group of "other reasons" answers were included like: do not like the country, lack of experience, frustration, privacy problems, unhappiness, fear, lack of recreational opportunities. However, their role was negligible.

If we examine counties with highest *EMINI* values and their push factors we can see that the role of economic and financial problems as push factors is everywhere outstanding. Special case is Békés county where the weight of economic factors is low, however, uncertain future appears with a higher than average weight.

Important agents of emigration are friends and relatives who are already living abroad and who can help potential migrants to find a job and housing in the target country, who can assist in arranging bureaucratic affairs or even in integration as well. *Figure 5* shows the distribution of those who have intentions to emigrate or has been living abroad according to two major categories whether they have contacts abroad or not. The results are not so much astonishing people with contacts abroad have higher share among potential migrants than the mainstream population. However, a very important trend was shown by our results, due to increasing emigration rates there



Fig 5. Relation between emigration intention and having contacts abroad. *Source*: own survey

are more and more people who have acquaintances abroad. This trend makes the hypothesis on further accelerating emigration very likely, due to intensifying personal relations.

Conclusions and future research questions

The free movement of people principle within the European Union has left its imprints on the Hungarian labour market and economy since 2004. A significant part of the active population has decided to work abroad after taking into account various factors. In our research the emigration intentions of the Hungarian population was investigated, with special focus on the main triggering factors of the process.

As part of the research we carried out a questionnaire survey among Hungarian people (both on site and online) which created a unique data base. The survey focused primarily on the emigration intentions of people. Our data showed that the main destination countries for Hungarians are still Germany, the UK, Austria and the USA. We pointed out marked territorial differences within the country regarding emigration intentions. Based on our empirical research, the following findings can be summarised:

– The main reasons behind the emigration intentions of Hungarians are the economic situation of the country and unsatisfactory job opportunities. Uncertain future, corruption and people's mentality are also among the push factors, but with less relevance.

– The level of emigration intentions is somewhat higher for women than men which are the outcomes of growing employment and career opportunities of ladies. This is clearly a break with the state-socialist past when males were much more mobile than female.

– The intention to move is much stronger among people of the young active age groups (i.e. below 40). This is not surprising and it can be explained with better language skills and less family ties among young people.

– The Emigration Intention Index (EMINI) proved to be a useful indicator showing emigration intentions of people living in different geographical areas. We calculated EMINI values for counties, county seats (i.e. bigger cities) and other settlements. According to our data the classic East–West dimension of emigration intentions within Hungary has changed, Budapest and regions located in the west are also heavily affected by international migration, just like former mining and industrial regions and agricultural areas with serious economic problems.

– The growing importance of personal networks in emigration was also confirmed. Information and help provided by friends and relatives who live or had been living abroad has utmost importance in current migration decisions.

We plan to continue this research with investigating Hungarian migrants who actually live abroad. For this purpose an online questionnaire survey has been launched which aims to collect information about the Hungarian communities living abroad. Besides, using the snowball method we also try to extend our survey with interviewing Hungarians living abroad, and also some of those who have already returned to Hungary. We think that migration (both emigration and return migration) will remain a hot issue in Hungary and other post-socialist countries; therefore, the topic deserves increased attention among geographers.

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Geographical characteristics of contemporary international migration in and into Europe

Károly KOCSIS[1], Judit MOLNÁR SANSUM[2], Lea KREININ[2], Gábor MICHALKÓ[1], Zsolt BOTTLIK[3], Balázs SZABÓ[1], Dániel BALIZS[1] and György VARGA[1]

Abstract

The study offers a short geographical overview of migration studies and theories, doing so in the context of the European migration crisis of 2015–2016. It outlines the history of international migrations affecting Europe (immigration, emigration, migration within Europe and between countries) and the demographic effects of such migration on the present European population. It then analyses and examines the global and regional causes of recent migration to Europe (the European Economic Area, EEA), the countries of origin of the migrants, the main routes of migration, and the destination areas in Europe. As far as intercontinental migration is concerned, Europe was characterised by emigration between the 16th and mid-20th centuries (partly in consequence of colonisation) and mainly by immigration thereafter. Immigration has principally affected Western Europe, the more developed part of the continent. In consequence of post-World War II reconstruction, dynamic economic development, local labour shortages, and the decolonisation process, Western Europe received many migrants, initially from the Mediterranean region and subsequently (i.e. after the collapse of communism in 1989–1990) from the post-communist European countries. Meanwhile, the core areas of the EEA became the main destination for migrants coming from predominantly Muslim regions in Asia and Africa (SW Asia, Muslim Africa). This decades-old process has recently accelerated and now constitutes mass migration. The global and regional causes of such intercontinental migration in the sending areas are as follows: the population boom, economic backwardness, unemployment, growing poverty, climate change, desertification, negative ecological changes, global political rivalries and local power changes (e.g. the Arab Spring, 2011), growing political instability, wartime destruction, multiple and cumulative crises, general hopelessness and despair.

Keywords: migration, theories of migration, foreign-born population, allochtonous minorities, asylum seekers, refugees, Europe, Middle East, Africa

Introduction

Migration is a process which has existed since ancient times. It affects every dimension of social existence, and develops its own complex dynamics. According to UN DESA reports, in 2015 the number of international migrants worldwide was 243.7 million (3.3% of the world population)[4] and the global population of international migrants is growing at about 1.6 percent anually. From 2000 to 2015, high-income countries received an average of 4.1 million net migrants each year from lower- and middle-income countries. The 2016 UNHCR Global Trends report finds 65.3 million people (or one person in 113) were displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution in 2015; they are now asylum seekers, internally displaced or refugees[5]. The great majority of people

[1] Geographical Institute, Research Centre for Astronomy and Earth Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, H-1112 Budapest, Budaörsi út 45. E-mails: kocsis.karoly@csfk.mta.hu, michalko.gabor@csfk.mta.hu, szabo.balazs@csfk.mta.hu, balizs.daniel@csfk.mta.hu, varga.gyorgy@csfk.mta.hu

[2] Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, 8–9 Lilybank Gardens, Glasgow G12 8RZ E-mails: Judit.MolnarSansum@glasgow.ac.uk, Lea.Kreinin@glasgow.ac.uk

[3] Department of Regional Geography, Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences, Eötvös Loránd (ELTE) University, H-1117 Budapest, Pázmány Péter sétány 1/C. E-mail: agria@gmx.net

[4] http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

[5] www.unhcr.org/576408cd7

in the world are not international migrants. However, communities everywhere and people's way of life are changed by migration, and we therefore live in the age of migration (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009).

Different types of problems arise when studying international migration. There are two main issues: who are the immigrants (refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants etc.) and how many are there in the receiving countries. Geographers especially are also interested in detecting immigrants' and refugees' countries of origin or the departure countries. These questions are common among scholars investigating immigration. King and Öberg stated that the terms used for immigrants in different countries often have different meanings which are specific to those countries (King, R. and Öberg, S. 1993). Fassmann and Münz pointed out other problems – apart from the complications around definitions of terms – like the poor quality of data or historical issues around citizenship and the registration of immigrants (Fassmann, H. and Münz, R. 1994). As King and Öberg concluded, these issues "make any study of contemporary European migration very difficult, especially regarding statistical data" (King, R. and Öberg, S. 1993, 2) and 23 years later these problems still apply to the study of immigration.

Short overview of the history of migration studies and theories

The number of the publications about international migration is enormous; it is impossible to look at and study them all. Here we provide a brief overview of the main theories of migration particularly from a geographical perspective. Geographers made a significant contribution to the study of migration (Robinson, V. 1996). "Migration is clearly a space–time phenomenon, defined by thresholds of distance and time; this makes it intrinsically geographical" (King, R. 2011). In his paper, King selected four geographers' works which contributed to migration theory the most significantly: Raveinstein, Zelinsky, Mabogunje and Hägerstrand, arguing that they had an influential effect on other scholars' work on this issue (King, R. 2011).

Migration is a very complex process. Richmond states that theories of migration can be classed according to the level of analysis as macro (focusing on migration streams, describing the conditions and the outcome of migration) and micro (socio-psychological and personal adaptation studies) (Richmond, A.H. 1988). According to Massey and her colleagues, the study of international migration has often fallen into two rather separate bodies of social scientific investigation: 1) research on the determinants, processes and patterns of migration, and, 2) research on the ways in which migrants become incorporated into receiving societies (Massey, D. *et al*. 1993). Castles and Miller argue that this distinction is artificial, and detrimental to a full understanding of the migratory process. In their view, the second area should be understood more broadly as the way in which migration brings about change in both sending and receiving societies (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009).

Determinants, patterns and processes of migration

Migration studies started to develop at the end of the 19th century. It is an interdisciplinary field that encompasses history, geography, political science, ethnology, anthropology, demography and sociology. This is reflected in the myriad of different approaches and methods of research. Probably the economic theories of migration are the most well-known of all. One of the dominant and the most simplistic amongst them is the so-called neoclassical theory, or push-pull theory, which has its antecedents in the work of Ravenstein (Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. 2009). According to this theory, migration is governed by unfavourable conditions (poverty, oppression) which push people out and favourable conditions in another location (better economic opportunities) which pull people in.

This theory was widely criticised and researchers altered this migratory model by adding a wider range of factors to the migration process (Castles, S. and Miller, M. J. 2009). In the late 1970s, Piore introduced a new approach, the dual labour theory, which considers a subdivided labour market with two sectors: one has demand for highly educated employees and provides them with high wages, while the other is characterised by low wages and uncertain working conditions (Newbold, K.B. 2014). Stark and Bloom introduced the new economics of labour migration approach and argued that decisions about migration lie in the hands of a family rather than an individual and that the decision-making process is influenced by such other factors as access to credit, remittances and the volatility of local agricultural markets (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009; Newbold, K.B. 2014). These theories, however, focus mainly on the economic factors in people's choices.

There are other explanations of international migration trends which attempt to take note of different characteristics and factors. The world systems theory expresses the importance of globalisation in the process of international migration (Newbold, K.B. 2014). Castles and Miller described this theory as focussing "on the way less developed 'peripheral' regions are incorporated into a world economy controlled by 'core' capitalism" (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009, 26). The institutional theory emphasises the role of different institutions and organisations, arguing that they promote or facilitate migration (Newbold, K.B. 2014). The migration systems theory has its background in geography and incorporates both ends of the migratory process as well as the connections or linkages between them (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). The social network theory concerns mechanisms for the perpetuation of international migration and focuses on micro-level elements, like families, friends and immigrant communities (Newbold, K.B. 2014).

As the migration process is very complex, in recent years these theories have been developed further, becoming more sophisticated approaches that take into consideration age, education, family status and other important personal characteristics which can influence people's decisions and therefore facilitate or retard migration.

A big shift has also occurred in terms of viewing the interaction of migratory processes with different social spaces. Whereas previously migration was looked at as a rather directed movement with a point of departure and a point of arrival, it is now increasingly understood as an on-going movement between two or more social spaces or locations. This is captured by the terms transmigrant and transmigration. "Transmigrants are people who belong to more than one world, speak more than one language, inhabit more than one identity, have more than one home, who have learned to negotiate and translate between cultures, and who, because they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking histories and cultures, have learned to live with, and indeed to speak from, difference. They speak from the 'in-between' of different cultures" (Inda, J.X. and Rosaldo, R. 2002).

Types of migratory movement can be forced and voluntary, long-term and short-term (Richmond, A.H. 1988). As already mentioned, migration can be planned as only short-term for a certain period, but may also last longer and sometimes there will be no return to the country of origin (Lados, G. and Hegedűs, G. 2016). The duration of migration may be difficult to determine, as in the beginning the migrants may consider it only temporary but then change their mind. This happened in North America and Europe with the temporary workers of the 1960s, who later settled down and brought their families over, forming new ethnic minorities (Van Hear, N. 2010). In some cases, people still consider their migration temporary even though they have been living somewhere for many decades. Sometimes there is no possibility of returning. This leads us to the next types of migration – voluntary and involuntary (forced) migration.

According to some researchers, there is a fundamental difference between whether

people themselves decide to migrate (for economic reasons) or are forced to leave their homes due to war or persecution. Others, however, complicate this distinction and do not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary migration (Fischer, P.A. *et al.* 1997; Jürgenson, A. 2011). Fischer and his colleagues argue that involuntary migrants try to minimise their risks rather than maximise their utility (Fischer, P.A. *et al.* 1997). Van Hear, in addition to these, brings in one more type of migration – mixed migration, which is the intersection between voluntary and forced movement. It is argued that migration can be mixed in several senses: motivations about making the decision to move; travelling with others in mixed migratory flows; motivation changes en route; ending the journey in mixed communities (Van Hear, N. 2010). The previous study shows very clearly that it is, in many cases, difficult to distinguish between voluntary and forced migration and that there is no agreement on this dichotomy amongst migration researchers.

Migrant experiences of incorporation into receiving societies old models and transnationalism

The second, larger field of migration studies is research on the ways in which migrants become incorporated into receiving societies. The focus here is on the receiving society and the migrants' personal settlement experience. This field started to bloom as an area of academic research after World War II, especially in the United States, where the rapidly growing migrant communities in cities were intensely researched. These communities were looked at as enclave societies with relatively intact cultures. The traditional "melting pot ideology" emphasised acculturation, treating minority cultures in urban contexts as conservative, maladaptive residues, 'survivals' resisting cultural change to the dominant white mode (Lewis, W.A. 1978). In migration research, the assimilation model was prevalent from the beginning of the 20th century until the 1990s. It predicted an eventual blending of immigrant strains into a single novel amalgam (Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B.A. 1998). According to the assimilation model, newer and newer waves of immigrants all start from low positions, and as they gain better status in society they will be absorbed into the dominant community (Massey, D.S. *et al.* 1993).

The second half of the 20th century provided more and more examples of deficiencies in the assimilation model. The segmented adaptation theory is based on three factors: 1) the nature of migration to the host country (forced or voluntary); 2) the resources that immigrants bring; and 3) the host country's reception (Portes, A. and Zhou, M. 1993; Skop, E.H. 2001). Woltman and Newbold consider the segmented assimilation theory ("discrimination and unequal opportunities affect processes of adaptation") "in the context of how the adaptation of Cuban émigrés differs along lines of race" (Woltman, K. and Newbold, K.B. 2009). Skop argues the same issue in respect of the adaptation of Mariel exiles (Skop, E.H. 2001). Zelinsky and Lee pointed out the impact of new technologies on immigrants' socio-spatial behaviour – innovations revolutionised the late 20th century's communication, providing new prospects for people to maintain contact, create and keep their social networks – envisaging a mosaic of self-sustaining ethnic communities instead of a melting pot (Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B.A. 1998). They argue that this approach can cope with the diversity of immigrants and they characterise it as a pluralist approach. A study of immigrants in London has shown that these two models can co-exist in the same city – 'assimilationism', being played out by the Caribbeans, and pluralism as the path being followed by Bangladeshis (Peach, C. 1968; Zelinsky, W. and Lee, B.A. 1998).

Brief history of international migrations concerning Europe

As we may learn from the Atlas of Migration (King, R. *et al.* 2010), migration is not a new phenomenon in human history, but rather

an "ever-present theme". Earlier in time when national territories were not always defined by hard borderlines "the distinction between internal and international migration is meaningless. A more appropriate distinction is that between short- and long-distance movement" (Jones, H.R. 1990, 229). Many migration periods have shaped Europe's social, economic, and political-geographic characteristics through human history. These events can be seen and analysed via different narratives: ecological, pioneering, Marxist and diaspora narratives (King, R. *et al.* 2010).

Before 1945

Early modern humans migrated from Asia to Europe during the Upper Paleolithic. During the first millennium BC, the migration of Celtic peoples in continental Europe and the expansion of the Ancient Greeks in the Mediterranean region were important phenomena. At the time of the Roman Empire (from 1st century BC to 5th century AD), there was substantial intercontinental migration (affecting Europe, Asia and Africa), exemplified by the dispersion of the Jews throughout the empire in the aftermath of the Jewish-Roman wars (1st –2nd centuries AD). At the time of the Roman Empire and especially after its collapse, almost the whole of Europe was affected – in the form of a military invasion – by the migrations of the Germanic tribes (2nd –5th centuries). Successive migrations of various peoples then followed (within Europe and often originating in Asia): Huns (4–5th centuries), Slavs (5–7th centuries), Avars (6–7th centuries), Turkic Bulgars (7th century), Hungarians (7–9th centuries), Moors (Islamic Arabs and Berbers from the Maghreb, 8–9th centuries), Cumans-Kipchaks, Mongols-Tatars (11–13th centuries).

Intercontinental migration was particularly significant in the first centuries of the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire (1299–1922), as it extended its control to Southeast Europe and North Africa. Such migration mainly took the form of Turkish colonisation in Europe and the deportation of European slaves to Asia and Africa. During this period (14–15th centuries), the Romani people (Gypsies) of Indo-Aryan ethnic origin migrated from Asia and settled in Europe. The period also saw the expulsion or emigration of Jews from Western Europe and the Iberian Peninsula, most of whom migrated – in the form of West–East migration – to Eastern and Southeast Europe (Gilbert, M. 2010). Later, (16–17th centuries, during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation) religious wars were the primary cause of international migration within Christian Europe. After the geographical discoveries and as part of the process of colonisation (mostly from the 16th to 20th centuries), the most important international migration era was the New World: the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa, Australia and Oceania "embracing some 55–65 million emigrants from Europe between 1820 and 1930, or about one-fifth of Europe's population at the beginning of the period" (Jones, H.R. 1990).

Until the end of World War II, emigration was a dominant phenomenon in Europe's migration, but there were significant intra-European spatial movements as well. Labour migration, which has been driven by industrialisation, was significant. Britain, Germany and France were the most important receiving countries. "By 1851 there were over 700,000 Irish in Britain … [and] 120,000 Jews, who came as refugees from the pogroms of Russia between 1875 and 1914 (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). Germany had almost a million foreign workers in 1907 from Poland, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and other countries across Europe (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). France had even more foreign workers; by 1911 their number reached 1.2 million, constituting 3 percent of the total population (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). These immigrants had an essential role in the industrialisation of these countries.

World War I changed the situation in Europe. During the war, many immigrants returned home, and there was a shortage of labour. France responded to this challenge by recruiting workers and even soldiers from the colonies: North Africa, West Africa, Indo-China and

China. Their numbers were altogether about 225,000 (Castles, S. and Miller. J.M. 2009).

In the interwar period the number of foreign workers (and immigration) was reduced due to the economic crisis and increased xenophobia. At that time, "France was the only Western European country to experience substantial immigration" (Castles, S. and Miller. J.M. 2009), and some French migrants returned from North Africa. World War II and the military operations brought about large scale migration with huge number of refugees, displaced people and forced foreign labourers. In the post-war period, a new era began in Europe with fresh waves of international migration.

Since 1945

In the aftermath of World War II, millions of people were relocated, forcibly or voluntarily, in consequence of international and bilateral agreements (Ohligher, R. *et al.* 2003). Between 1944 and 1947, 15.2 million Germans were forced to leave their homes under population transfers or through evacuation and flight (Kulischer, E.M. 1948). Europe still had a net loss of 2.7 million migrants between 1950 and 1959, and the shift to a continent of immigration only occurred in the 1970s (Bade, K.J. 2003) despite the mass migration of guest workers to Western Europe. Although many of these guest workers were migrants from other European countries (Ireland, Finland and the Southern European countries), significant numbers of them arrived from North Africa and Turkey (Bade, K.J. 2003; Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). In 1970–1971, the foreign resident population in 18 Western European countries comprised almost 11 million people, and this number had risen to 18.4 million by 1990–1991 (Fassmann, H. and Münz, R. 1994). During the post-war decades, there was also significant return migration of former colonists to their home countries after the colonies became independent (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). Bade estimates that, taken together, return migration and immigration involved between 5.5 and 8.5 million people in Europe after decolonisation (Bade, K.J. 2003). After the 1973 economic crisis, the character of immigration changed. In the Western European countries, net migration rates decreased as soon as these countries ceased recruiting foreign workers (*Figure 1*), and family-type immigration became more frequent (King, R. and Öberg, S. 1993; Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009).

In the 1980s, the Eastern Bloc countries (in particular the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic) also recruited contract workers from Vietnam, albeit they were called trainees (Castles, S. and Miller. J. M. 2009). Furthermore, since the 1960s students and highly skilled workers have been moving to Europe, and the continent has also provided home for refugees from troubled Asian and African countries (Castles, S. and Miller. J.M. 2009).



Fig. 1. Net migration rate in Northern, Western and Southern Europe between 1960 and 2014. *Source*: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the large-scale migration of ethnic Russians and other ex-Soviet citizens (Robertson, R.L. 1996). In the meantime, "a new Eurasian migration system has emerged. Migrants come from Russia's own distant provinces, such as the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia, from its 'near abroad' countries – the successor states in Central Asia and the Caucasus – and from 'far abroad' countries such as China, Turkey and Vietnam" (King, R. *et al.* 2010). The estimated numbers of these workers in Russia were 8 million, 2 million with and about 6 million without permission in 2007 (King, R. *et al.* 2010).

In the 1980s and especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European migration experienced a rapid change again: many Southern European states became receiving countries, and net migration started to grow again in the Western European countries (*Figure 1*). Creating a single market and the enlargement of the European Union, all contributed to the changing features of European immigration. "This geopolitical shift coincided with the acceleration of economic globalization, as well as an increase in violence and human rights violations in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America" (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). From the beginning of the 2000s, net migration increased rapidly as "economic globalization continued to increase commercial and employment opportunities" (Castles, S. and Miller, M.J. 2009). Many Central and Eastern European countries became receiving countries after 1990. With EU membership, however, the historical East–West migration resumed. There are no reliable data about how many EU citizens from the former communist countries are working in the more developed areas of the EU. Still, Eurostat data indicate that in 2015, 4.78 million EU citizens from the former communist countries were residing in other EEA states and in Switzerland, whereas only 312,000 EU citizens from the rest of the EEA and Switzerland were living in the post-communist EU member states (*Figure 2*).



Fig. 2. Number of EU citizens from the former communist countries in the rest of EEA and Switzerland; and number of citizens from the rest of the EEA and Switzerland in the post-communist EU countries between 2006 and 2015). *Source*: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_pop3ctb&lang=en

According to UN data, the international migrant stock of non-European immigrants has increased significantly since 1990, from almost 20 million to 35.3 million. In 2015 the five largest non-European resident populations were in Russia (6.9 million), UK (5.4 million), France (5.1 million), Germany (4.8 million) and Spain (3.6 million) (*Figure 3*).

Immigration to Europe has been characteristic and significant since World War II, but the countries of origin of the migrants have not been constant. Since 1990, the largest numbers of immigrants to Europe have come from Kazakhstan, Turkey, Morocco, Algeria and Uzbekistan, but many people have also come from India, China and Pakistan. In the case of the EEA countries and Switzerland, the greatest numbers of new arrivals have come from Turkey, Morocco, the Russian Federation, Algeria and India.

Allochthonous minorities and foreign-born populations resulting from international migration

As a consequence of international migration that occurred in the second half of the 20th century, Europe experienced sharp increases in the absolute and relative population size of the so-called allochthonous ("newcomer")



Fig. 3. Non-European migrant stock with the largest number of immigrants in the European countries between 1990 and 2015. *Source:* http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml

minorities and the foreign-born population. In general, cross-border migration means the arrival of people who differ from the receiving country's population in terms of ethnicity, language, religion and cultural traditions, but this is not always the case. Indeed, in recent decades, many millions of people belonging to the European titular nations have migrated to the "kin-country" from foreign countries – either because of a political-economic crisis or due to ethnic discrimination, examples are: Germans ("*Spätaussiedler*") moving from Eastern Europe to Germany; Russians and Ukrainians from the ex-Soviet republics to Russia and Ukraine; Serbs and Croats from ex-Yugoslav republics to Serbia and Croatia; Hungarians from the neighbouring countries to Hungary etc. Over the past half a century, there has been a tenfold increase in the number of people (currently 67 million) belonging to the so-called allochthonous minorities, which are communities that have been present in a country for less than a hundred year (*Table 1*).

These new immigrant groups have settled principally in Western Europe, where, in 2011, their share in the total population exceeded 15 percent. This particularly applies to those Western European countries (usually former colonial powers) that have the highest income and living standard as well as the best social welfare systems i.e. France[6], Germany[7], the United Kingdom[8] (16–10 million people in the allochthonous minority population), Spain[9], Italy[10] and the Netherlands[11] (6–3 million people in the allochthonous minority population). At the time of the 2011 censuses, the allochthonous minorities already included a large number (17 million)[12] of Muslims (Arabs, Turks, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Albanians), whose numbers were particularly high in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy (Bottlik, Z. 2009). A significant difference between the eastern and western halves of Europe pertains to the relative sizes of the allochthonous minorities and the foreign-born populations. The percentages of both are very high in Western Europe, but the size of the allochthonous minority population relative to the foreign-born population is higher in the West (due to the presence of the locally born descendants of the immigrants) and

[6] Arabs, Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, Chinese, Turks, Poles.

[7] Turks, Poles, Italians, Romanians, Greeks, Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Russians.

[8] Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Germans, US-Americans, Jamaicans, South Africans.

[9] Romanians, Moroccans, Latin Americans, British, Italians, Germans.

[10] Romanians, Arabs, Albanians, Chinese, Ukrainians.

[11] Turks, Moroccans, Indonesians, Surinamese.

[12] http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/

Table 1. Allochthonous minorities and foreign-born population in Europe (1960, 2011)

Region	allochthonous minorities		foreign-born population	allochthonous minorities		foreign-born population
	in thousands			in percent		
	1960	2011	2011	1960	2011	2011
Western Europe	6,191	63,364	51,018	1.9	15.3	12.4
Eastern Europe*	360	3,311	19,029	0.1	1.2	6.6
Europe	*6,528*	*66,676*	*70,047*	*1.2*	*9.6*	*10.0*

*Post-communist countries of Europe, including the European parts of Russia. *Sources*: Calculated by K. Kocsis based on Bruk, S.I. and Apenchenko, V.S. ed. 1964, census data (ethnicity, citizenship, foreign-born population, migration) and estimations of ethnic communities. Foreign-born population: http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=pop&f=tableCode%3A44

lower in the East, where a large proportion of foreign-born immigrants belong, ethnically, to the titular nations. During the period under discussion, international migration has evidently been characterised by the arrival of "home comers" in Eastern Europe and of "exotic newcomers" in Western Europe.

Between 2011 and 2015, the ratio of foreign-born persons in the European Economic Area[13] and Switzerland – the main destination areas for international migration in Europe – increased from 10.5 percent to 10.7 percent. In 2015, the share of foreign-born population was particularly high in the richest and smallest countries: Liechtenstein (63.7%), Luxembourg (44.2%) and Switzerland (27.4%). Countries with lowest shares of foreign-born population were Romania (1.4%), Poland (1.6%) and Bulgaria (1.7%) (*Figure 4*). The corresponding figure in Hungary was 4.8%, mainly due to Hungarians who moved to the country from the ethnic Hungarian-inhabited areas of the adjacent countries.

People born outside the EU accounted for 64 percent of the total foreign-born population in the area under inquiry (the EEA and Switzerland). The number of people born outside the EU is particularly high (4–6 million) in each of the following countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain. The major groups of people born outside the EU are the Turks in Germany, the Indians and Pakistanis in the United Kingdom, the Algerians and Moroccans in France, the Moroccans, Ecuadorians and Colombians in Spain, and the Albanians and Moroccans in Italy. This population percentage is negligible (0.5–1.7%) in the former communist countries lying between the Baltic and Black seas (Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary).

As far as Estonia, Latvia and Croatia are concerned, politically motivated migration (rather than economic attraction) explains the relatively high share of people born outside the EU. In the case of Estonia and Latvia, the major factor is the politically motivated settlement of Russians (with smaller numbers of Belarusians and Ukrainians), who came from other parts of the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1989. In Croatia's case, the high percentage of people born outside the EU (12–14%) is due to the influx of ethnic Croatian refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia at the time of the Yugoslav wars (1991–1995).

European migrant crisis: motivations and sending countries

After the decline in the waves of migration caused by the collapse of the European communist regimes[14], the year 2015 saw – partly

[13] European Economic Area (EEA): the European Union's 28 member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. For the purposes of this study, we have also included Switzerland, an EFTA member that is not an official member of the EEA but which is tied to it by bilateral treaties.

[14] For example, the Croatian and Bosnian wars (1991–1995) and the Kosovo Crisis (1990–1999).



Fig. 4. Foreign-born population in the countries of the EEA and in Switzerland (1 January, 2015). *Source:* see the map

in consequence of the events of the "Arab Spring" of 2011 – a dramatic increase in illegal immigration, as asylum seekers reached Europe from neighbouring areas in Asia and Africa (*Figure 5*).

In 2015, almost 1.3 million[15] new asylum applications were submitted in the EU. This was more than double the previous record for such applications, which had been recorded in 1992 (after the outbreak of the Bosnian war). The question arises: How does the current migration crisis differ from earlier such crises? The following possible answers can be formulated: an unprecedented number of migrants/refugees arrived in the EU (the highest number since World War II); the migrants

[15] By the end of September 2016, 598,826 new asylum applications had been registered.



Fig. 5. Change in number of first time asylum seekers in the EU and Germany (1980–2016). *Source*: http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers

arrived predominantly by sea and from very great distances; the earlier crises were more geographically concentrated in terms of both the countries of origin and the countries of destination; the motives for migration and the national (ethnic) composition of the migrants are far more complex and diverse now than they used to be; today's migrants target – in a far more conscious fashion than did their predecessors – the Western European countries with their stronger economies and higher living standards; several European countries at the forefront of events were subjected relatively rapidly and unexpectedly to substantial migration pressures (e.g. Italy, Greece, Hungary, Croatia).[16]

There are numerous global and regional causes of migration into Europe and the sudden acceleration of such migration. Among these factors, emphasis should be given to the *social and demographic factors*, in particular intercontinental *demographic imbalances*, namely the fact that the European countries find themselves in the fourth and fifth (the low stationary and declining) stages of the demographic transition. These stages are characterised by population stagnation/decrease, low birth rates, and an ageing population (Káčerová, M. *et al.* 2014). In contrast, the Afro-Asian regions (Muslim Africa[17] and Southwestern Asia[18]) neighbouring Europe, which are inhabited predominantly by Muslims, are in the second and third (early and late expanding) stages of the demographic transition: dynamic population growth (in some locations, a veritable "population boom"), high birth rates, falling death rates, and a rapid increase in the percentage of young people of working age who are most inclined to migrate (*Figure 6*).

Between 1950 and 2015, the population of Europe grew by a third (owing basically to immigration into Western Europe), whereas in the same time interval Muslim Africa and SW Asia experienced an almost fivefold population increase. In Syria, which is currently the principal source of immigration to Europe, the population increased by a factor of six during this period, while in Iraq

[16] http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf

[17] Muslim Africa: countries in Africa with majority Muslim populations: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Western Sahara.

[18] Southwesten Asia: Asian countries of the Middle East, Caucasus countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan.



Fig. 6. Change in population number of selected Eurasian and African macroregions (1950–2015). *Source*: https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/

the population increased by a factor of 5.4. In several of the Afro-Asian countries under inquiry, the societal motives for migration include *a very high level of ethnic and religious diversity*, which has been and remains a constant potential source of conflict. In this regard, the most unstable countries in SW Asia are: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria and Turkey.[19]

In the source areas of intercontinental migration, the local economy, GDP growth, and job creation could not keep up with the population boom and demographic growth described above (*Figure 7*). Coupled with other *economic factors* (e.g. the global economic and financial crisis), all this has resulted in a rapid rise in unemployment and, in the first instance, in growing domestic (rural→urban) migration.

Natural factors (e.g. climate change, desertification, water scarcity, and other natural hazards) have exacerbated the migration process. Most of the source areas for Afro-Asian migration to Europe lie in the arid and semi-arid regions of dry climate zone, where average annual precipitation is less than 250 mm (Siegmund, A. and Frankenberg, P. 2013). Studies on climate change and desertification in the Middle East and on the socio-political effects of such phenomena have shown that the changes are adding to the aridity of the region and that increasing greenhouse gas emissions are significantly influencing climate change in the Eastern Mediterranean region (Gleick, P.H. 2014, Kelley, C.P. *et al*. 2015). In Syria, desertification and poor groundwater management have led in recent years to significantly lower levels of agricultural production. A three-year drought occurred between 2007 and 2010, which was unprecedented since climate records began. Around half a million workers who were previously engaged in agriculture have moved to urban areas, where tensions increased steadily in the years prior to the outbreak of civil war.

In addition to the social, economic and natural causes outlined above, global and regional *political factors* (global political rivalries, local power changes, wars)[20] also

[19] *Afghanistan*: 15% Shia Muslims; 42% Pashtun, 27% Tajik, 9% Uzbek, 8% Hazara, 4% Aimaq, 3% Turkmen; *Iran*: 16% Azerbaijanis, 10% Kurds, 6% Lurs, 2% Turkmens; *Iraq*: 65% Shia and 37% Sunni Muslims, 1% Christians; 20% Kurds; *Lebanon*: 27–27% Sunni and Shia Muslims, 40% Christians, 5.6% Druze; *Pakistan*: 10–25% Shia Muslims; 45% Punjabi, 15% Pashtun, 14% Sindhi, 8% Saraiki, 8% Muhajirs, 4% Balochi; *Syria:* 13% Shia Muslims, 10% Christians, 3% Druze, 10% Kurds; and *Turkey*: 18% Kurds. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/

[20] Sudanese civil wars (since 1955), conflicts, wars in the Horn of Africa (since 1961), Six-Day War (1967), Yom Kippur War (1973), Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), Kurdish-Turkish Conflict in Turkey (since 1978), Iranian Islamic Revolution (1978–1979), Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Gulf War (1990–1991), Iraq War (2003–2011), Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Civil wars in Afghanistan (1989–1992–1996–2001), American/NATO War in Afghanistan (2001–2014), "Arab Spring": Tunisian Revolution (2010–2011), Libyan Civil War (2011), Egyptian Crisis (2011–2014), Bahraini Uprising (2011), Yemeni Revolution (2011) and civil war (since 2015), Syrian Civil War (since 2011).



Fig. 7. Change in per capita GDP* in selected Eurasian and African macroregions (1950–2015). *GDP, in 2015 USD converted to 2015 price level with updated 2011 PPPs. *Source:* https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/index.cfm?id=27762

lie behind international migration. As far as the present European migration crisis is concerned, the most influential factor has been the so-called "Arab Spring"[21] (2010–2012). The associated revolutionary events had several triggers: the global economic crisis that began in 2008, the gap between demographic and economic growth, social inequality, unemployment, poverty, and increasing corruption. The "Arab Spring" led to civil war in Libya and Syria and to the fall of governments in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. In most cases, democratisation did not follow the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes. Instead, extreme Islamist forces came to power, precipitating general chaos and civil war in many places. For this reason, the ensuing period has been called the "Arab Winter".[22] The political events and wars described above have destroyed much of the local economy. In this regard, the fall in GDP was particularly significant (–64%) in Iraq under Saddam Hussein (1979–2003) and in Syria since the outbreak of the civil war (2011) (*Figure 8*).

[21] http://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrights-democracy/a/Definition-Of-The-Arab-Spring.htm

[22] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/9753123/Middle-East-review-of-2012-the-Arab-Winter.html

The social, economic, natural and political factors underlying migration into Europe are extremely interwoven and mutually reinforcing. This multifaceted and cumulative crisis in the Afro-Asian region is the subject of our investigation. Only in the mid-term is there any hope of mitigating or "resolving" the crisis in the various places. During the European migrant crisis (taking January 1, 2014 as a starting date), in the EEA countries, 1.2 million new asylum applications were made by August 31, 2015 and 2.7 million by August 31, *2016.* Southwestern Asia accounted for 61.7 percent of the applications (*Figure 9*).

In the migration processes described here (which have various motives), the most important source countries were Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan (which account for 27.5%, 13.3%, 8.7% and 3.7% respectively of all applications submitted in the EEA).

Migrants – almost exclusively Muslims – who have left their homes in the conflict region between the Mediterranean Sea and the Himalayas currently constitute the most important source of international migration into the EEA. In the period 2011–2015, the largest increases in the number of persons of concern to the Office of the United Nations



Fig. 8. Change in total GDP* of selected countries in the Middle East (1950–2016, in millions of USD). *GDP, in 2015 USD converted to 2015 price level with updated 2011 PPPs. *Source*: https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/index.cfm?id=27762



Fig. 9. Asylum seekers in the EEA by country of origin (1 January, 2014 – 31 August, 2016). *Source*: see the map

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons etc.) were recorded in Syria (from 1 million to 6.7 million) – owing to the Syrian civil war and the war against ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) –, in Iraq (from 1.7 million to 4.7 million), in Turkey (from 36,000 to 2.8 million), in Afghanistan (from 1.5 million to 1.8 million) – owing to the Afghanistan wars that have been raging

intermittently for almost a century– and in Pakistan (from 2.8 million to 3.4 million).[23]

Since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, there has been a sharp increase in the number of Syrians fleeing to the neighbouring countries of the Middle East. The most recent data of the UNHCR[24] indicate that at least 4.8 million Syrians are currently registered in the neighbouring countries (2.8 million in Turkey, 1 million in Lebanon, 655,000 in Jordan, and 229,000 in Iraq). In the period 2011–2016, the lack of any prospect of returning to Syria and the despair of the refugee camps led an increasing number of Syrians to travel to Europe through Turkey and by sea, with a view to seeking asylum in the EEA: 8,000 in 2011, 378,000 in 2015, and 246,000 in 2016 (until August 31). The number of asylum applications made by Syrian, Afghan and Iraqi migrants in Europe peaked in the autumn of 2015 and then declined substantially from the early spring of 2016 after the EU and Turkey signed an agreement to stop irregular migration from Turkey to the EU (Statement of March 20, 2016).

Another significant source of migrants to the EEA is *Sub-Saharan Africa* (accounting for 16% of asylum seekers in 2014–2016). Most of the people arriving from this region have come from Muslim areas in Eritrea, Somalia, Nigeria and Gambia. The motives for emigration among these African Muslim migrants are diverse: economic and political factors (demographic boom, unemployment, desertification, natural hazards, repressive regimes, civil wars, ethnic-religious conflicts etc.).

In the EEA, almost 11 percent of asylum seekers (298,000 persons) in the past three years have arrived from the *Western Balkans* (principally from Kosovo, Albania and Serbia). Most of these people are Muslim Albanians, Roma and Serbs. Most arrivals from the Western Balkans, who are usually treated as economic migrants in the EU, came to Western Europe before the spring of 2015 when Germany introduced stricter regulations. Factors causing them to leave the Western Balkans were economic problems, general poverty, corruption, dysfunctional government (Bosnia, Kosovo), and the lack of any prospect of EU membership (Kocsis, K. 2001). Most Eastern European asylum seekers arrived from Russia and Ukraine. In the case of the latter, they came mainly from areas affected by the recent civil strife (Karácsonyi, D. *et al*. 2014).

Main routes of the recent international migration into the EEA

The shortest land routes into the EEA for migrants coming from Africa or Asia lead via the Spanish enclaves on Morocco's Mediterranean coast (Ceuta and Melilla) or via the Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Bulgarian borders. Between 1993 and 2005, to prevent what had initially been a large-scale illegal (mostly Sub-Saharan) African influx, Spain built and expanded border barriers around Ceuta and Melilla. Greece constructed a barrier along its border with Turkey in late 2012, while Bulgaria did so in early 2014.

After the closure of the land routes, the focus of the illegal border crossings switched to routes in the central and eastern Mediterranean. A 2008 agreement between Berlusconi (Italy) and Gaddafi (Libya) represented a temporary solution aimed at stopping African migrants from reaching Italy. The agreement became defunct at the time of the Libyan Civil War (2011). In the chaos of war, Libya, which had no central government and the coutry was regarded as an ideal base for the human traffic networks, became an open gateway to Europe. The number of illegal border crossings into Italy (mostly via the islands of Lampedusa and Malta) increased from 4,500 in 2010 to 170,760 in 2014.[25] In addition to this Central Mediterranean route, where there have been several hundred fatalities, in 2015 the focus switched to the

[23] http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview

[24] http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php (17 December 2016)

[25] http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/

Eastern Mediterranean, where people can reach Europe by making a short sea journey (of no more than a few kilometres) from the Turkish coast to the nearby Greek islands (e.g. Lesbos, Chios, Kos). In consequence of these developments, the number of sea arrivals in Italy fell in 2015 by 153,000, while in the Eastern Mediterranean there was a surge in migration pressure (mainly on Greece, with the number of sea arrivals increasing from 50,830 in 2014 to 885,386 in 2015).[26] The large-scale shift from the Central Mediterranean to the Aegean Sea reflects the fact that, in the period from January 1, 2014 until August 31, 2016, 62 percent of first-time asylum seekers in the EEA were from Asia (due to the departure from Turkey of hundreds of thousands of Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis), whereby an additional factor was Bulgaria's construction of a barrier along its land border with Turkey in 2014.[27] In view of the geographical location of their countries of origin, almost three-quarters of the migrants arrived in the EEA via the Balkans (or, indeed, originated from there).

In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of illegal border crossings in western and southern areas of the Balkans, while the directions and trends of such migration have changed. In terms of granting refugee status and the prospect of asylum, the EU drew a sharp distinction – as early as 2015 – between migrants from the Western Balkans (e.g. Kosovo Albanians, Roma people) and refugees from the Middle East (e.g. Syrians). In consequence of this distinction, the number of asylum seekers from Serbia and Kosovo declined to an eighth of the previous figure between February and September 2015, while there was a sevenfold increase in the number of asylum seekers from Syria. Instead of taking the traditional route from Turkey to Central Europe (Istanbul–Sofia–Belgrade), the migrants from Asia entered Europe via the Greek islands and along the Athens–Thessaloniki–Skopje–Belgrade route (*Figure 10*). Until the closure of the Hungarian-Serbian border (September 15, 2015), which was followed by the construction of the Hungarian border barrier, most migrants passing through the Balkans continued their journey to Western Europe (mainly to Germany) via Belgrade and Budapest (*Figure 11*).

Subsequently, (owing to the construction of Hungary's barrier along the Hungarian-Croatian border in October), a huge migration pressure fell on the Croatian-Serbian, Slovenian-Croatian and Austrian-Slovenian borders. In response, in November 2015, Austria and Slovenia (and Macedonia too) began to erect barriers on their southern borders. The aim of such barriers was to halt the ever-increasing number of illegal migrants. Owing in part to these actions but mostly to the EU-Turkey statement (March 20, 2016), since late March 2016, the number of migrants crossing by sea from Turkey to Greece has fallen to a mere fraction of the previous figure.[28] In consequence, however, the migration pressure on Italy increased once more, leading to an equalisation of the annual number of registered illegal border crossings along the Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes (in the period until December 11, 2016). On both routes, the numbers were reduced to a minimum in the period from October until the end of the year.[29]

Main destination countries of the recent international migration concerning the EEA

From January 1, 2014 until August 31, 2016, 2.7 million asylum applications were registered in the EEA countries, which may significantly exceed the actual number of asylum seekers, because as a person travels through Europe, he or she may be registered as an

[26] http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/eastern-mediterranean-route/

[27] http://bulgaria.bordermonitoring.eu/

[28] https://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=2244

[29] Eastern Mediterranean arrivals: 172,699, Central Mediterranean arrivals: 179,087 between January 1 and December 11, 2016. http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php

Fig. 10. Most important routes of the non-European migrants in Southeastern Europe (2014–2016). *Source:* see the map

asylum seeker in several different EU member states (e.g. in Greece, in Hungary and in Germany). This explains why the number of applications is high both in the destination countries (Germany, in particular) and in some transit countries where migrants' asylum applications were registered in line with the regulations (above all, in Hungary) (*Figure 12*).

The distribution of asylum applications shows significant geographical differences in terms of the sending countries, the entry routes of migrants, and their destinations. Almost 39 percent of asylum applications were lodged



Fig. 11. Detected illegal border-crossings in selected border sections of Southeastern Europe (2014–2016). *Source*: http://frontex.europa.eu/publications/?c=risk-analysis

by people from SW Asia (mostly Syrians and Iraqis). The greatest numbers were recorded in Germany and Sweden (or, in transit, in Hungary and in Austria) *(Figure 12)*.[30]

Out of almost 630,000 applications submitted by people from South Asia (mostly Afghans and Pakistanis), a third were registered by the German authorities, a sixth by the Hungarian authorities, and most of the rest by the Swedish, Austrian and Italian authorities. The highest numbers of North African Arab asylum seekers were seen in Germany and in France, and such applications formed the majority in Malta, which lies adjacent to Africa. Almost a half of arrivals from the western part of Sub-Saharan Africa were registered in Italy, while a significantly smaller proportion was registered in Germany or in France. The largest numbers of East African migrants (coming mainly from Eritrea or from Somalia, where a civil war is raging) sought asylum in Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. In the period until the spring/summer 2015, many asylum applications were lodged in the EEA (particularly in Germany and – in transit – in Hungary) by people from the Western Balkans (mainly from Kosovo and Albania). Most asylum requests made by Eastern Europeans (mainly Russians and Ukrainians) were registered in Germany, Poland and France.

According to UNHCR data,[31] legally speaking, there were almost 3 million migrants residing in the EEA by the end of 2015, whereby only 49 percent had been granted official refugee status. The others were asylum seekers (asylum seeker: application rejected or under adjudication, 36.1%) or stateless persons (14.2%), or had some other legal status (0.7%). The number and percentage of persons with refugee status is clearly the highest in those EEA countries with the highest living standards, which are the primary immigration destinations for migrants (Western and Northern Europe) *(Figure 13)*. In these countries, migrants seeking a new home can rely on the networks that have been established by mostly Muslim immigrants over the years.

The number of persons with refugee status per 10,000 inhabitants is greater than 20 in these countries. The corresponding figure in countries of EEA with lower income that are less attractive to migrants – the former communist countries, and Spain and Portugal – ranges from 0 to 5. A special category of migrants are stateless persons. These are peo-

[30] http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/asylum_seekers_monthly

[31] http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern



Fig. 12. Asylum seekers in the EEA by macroregion of origin (1 January, 2014 – 31 August, 2016). *Source*: see the map

ple who have an attachment to their place of residence, are not eligible for citizenship, and do not regard themselves as refugees. The numbers and percentages of such persons are particularly high in the Baltic countries (principally in Latvia and Estonia). The explanation for this phenomenon in the post-Soviet republics is the presence of a large community of Russians (as well as smaller numbers of Belarusians and Ukrainians) who settled there between 1945 and 1989. Because they have not yet learned the official state language, these people have not acquired Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian citizenship.



Fig. 13. Population of concern to UNHCR in the EEA by legal status (End of 2015). *Source*: see the map

During the recent European migrant crisis, the countries most affected by international migration targeting the EEA have been those situated in the most developed western and northern areas of Europe, which are particularly attractive to migrants, and those situated in the southern and south-eastern peripheral areas (e.g. Italy, Hungary, and the Western Balkans), which have been particularly affected by temporary/transit migration.

Conclusion

As far as intercontinental migration is concerned, Europe was characterised by emigra-

tion between the 16th and mid-20th centuries (partly as a consequence of colonisation) and mainly by immigration thereafter. In consequence of post-WWII reconstruction, dynamic economic development, local labour shortages, and the decolonisation process, Western Europe received many migrants, initially from the Mediterranean region and subsequently (i.e. after the collapse of communism in 1989/90) from the post-communist European countries. Meanwhile, the core areas of the EEA became the main destination for migrants coming from predominantly Muslim regions in Asia and Africa.

This important process has recently accelerated and now constitutes mass migration. The global and regional causes of such intercontinental migration in the sending areas are as follows: the population boom, economic backwardness, unemployment, growing poverty, climate change, desertification, global political rivalries and local power changes, growing political instability, wartime destruction, multiple and cumulative crises, general hopelessness and despair. Partly in consequence of the events of the "Arab Spring" of 2011, in 2015 a wave of mass migration – mostly illegal immigration, with vast numbers of asylum seekers – reached Europe from adjacent regions in Asia and Africa.

The main features distinguishing this European migration crisis from earlier crises were: the arrival of an unprecedented number of migrants/refugees in the EU (the highest number since World War II); the migrants arrived predominantly by sea and from very great distances; the earlier crises were more geographically concentrated in terms of both the countries of origin and the countries of destination; the motives for migration and the national (ethnic) composition of the migrants are far more complex and diverse now than they used to be; today's migrants target – in a far more conscious fashion than did their predecessors – the Western European countries with their stronger economies and higher living standards; several European countries at the forefront of events were subjected relatively rapidly and unexpectedly to substantial migration pressures (e.g. Italy, Greece, Hungary, Croatia). The rapid construction of European border barriers and the signing of migration agreements with Europe's neighbours (with Libya in earlier years, and more recently with Turkey) have very effectively influenced the direction and intensity of migration.

The global and regional causes of Afro-Asian migration into Europe and the associated cumulative and multifaceted crises will not be resolved even in the medium term. Nor will the reasons for international migration cease to exist.

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New ways of mobility: the birth of ridesharing. A case study from Hungary

Dóra BÁLINT and András TRÓCSÁNYI[1]

Abstract

Recent emerging globalisation and post-industrial development partly driven by IT services influence not only markets, but all other subsystems of the society, too. This revolutionary change has fundamentally transformed our mobility and movements in space. In the era of network society, the idea of shared-use mobility has brought about possibilities in transportation that resulted in the emergence of new groups, directions and destinations. By now this type of alternative transportation has spread among the most developed countries and shows a flourishing example of sharing economy, an internet-based peer-to-peer model, which does not require a top-down service provider. The main focus of the present study is a socio-geographical analysis of how this innovation has spread among Hungarian citizens. Which social groups are the most active users of ridesharing? What geographical endowments or insufficiencies result this way and what are the spatial patterns of transportation? To answer these questions we studied the biggest Hungarian ridematching system 'Oszkár' and its users with the help of questionnaires (N=425).

Keywords: shared-use mobility, ridesharing, sharing economy, Oszkár

Introduction

As the era of information set in, internet and virtual spaces have fundamentally transformed the everyday life of society, influencing all aspects of our lives including geographic space and mobility. However, the appearance of ridesharing in the 20th century was evoked, instead of internet applications, by other factors. The issue of cost-effectiveness, the high fuel costs and the aims of reducing traffic jams and protecting the environment all played an important role in trying to find solutions to the challenges created by immense motorisation in North America. During the more than half-century period since this highly special combination of individual and community transportation appeared, it has become popular in many places of the world, in a variety of local ways, but could become a global phenomenon only through the immense development of info-communication.

The objective of the present study is to map the Hungarian spatial patterns of ridesharing, a subtype of community transportation. The authors attempt to investigate the old and new spatial paths drawn up by journeys taking place in the offline geographic space, and to find out about the social background of users. Our research consists of three main parts. Firstly, we have examined the background of users (their age, socio-economic conditions), focusing on possible typical characteristics. Secondly, we have studied their attitudes towards carpooling (motivations, type of carpooling trips), aiming to reveal the most important factors of using this type of transportation. Thirdly, the spatial pattern of ridesharing has been mapped on the basis of completed routes within the framework of the largest Hungarian ridesharing platform ("Oszkár").

The study is done in an empirical way, approaching the answers through a case study, by analysing the most popular destinations

[1] Department of Geography, Faculty of Science, University of Pécs, H-7624 Pécs, Ifjúság u. 6.
E-mails: dorabalint29@gmail.com, troand@gamma.ttk.pte.hu.

in a Hungarian ridesharing community, and by analysing the questionnaires completed by its users. We choose this particular community because this rideshare management system has several hundred thousand registered users and covers the entire Hungarian spectrum of users both vertically and horizontally. Among various shared-use mobility types, 'Uber' is the most well-known sharing transportation start-up, providing shorter, multi-directional routes of one or two kilometres rather than longer journeys, but Uber is present only in the capital. Thus, it is not suitable for a country-level analysis.

Research background

Context of the research: the rise of the sharing economy

Sharing economy (also called on-demand, access-based or collaborative economy) is an umbrella term describing emerging economic-technological systems, which first appeared in the 2000s. It is not a brand new phenomenon, sharing being an old, culturally learned behaviour (Belk, R. 2007), but recently it has been fuelled by developments in information and communication technologies (ICT) (Hamari, J. *et al.* 2015). Due to this revolution, new technology-driven platforms make possible individuals to connect with each other peer-to-peer and share their underused tangible (flats, cars, goods etc.) and intangible (time, skills etc.) assets when others need or can make use of them (on-demand economy). The main platform where transactions occur is Web 2.0. With the help of global social media use and the worldwide proliferation of smart phones, demand and supply can find each other easier and quicker, often in real-time without centralised organizations. Therefore, one of the most important factors is the bigger scale the large number of people and societies who have internet access can participate in this model. Consumption is also transformed; access has become more important than ownership in the concept of the access-based economy (Bardhi, F. and Eckhardt, G. 2012, 881). The third often used term connected to the sharing economy is collaborative consumption *"where people coordinate the acquisition and distribution of a resource for a fee or other compensation"* (Belk, R. 2014, 1597).

Obviously, these changes are part of a larger shift facilitated by ICT, which represents the evolution of the network society. According to Manuel Castells (2000) networks restructure the morphology of our societies, while Jan van Dijk (2012) highlights that in the new, network society people increasingly organise their relationships in media networks, which might gradually replace or complement the traditional social networks of face-to-face communication.

The sharing economy has caused fundamental changes in society (including mobility) and has raised a huge number of challenges. New paradigms always cause tensions between the old type of actors, in this case between public sector leaders and new types of organisations and their users, supporters. Therefore, the sharing economy is also referred to as a *disruptive innovation* (Guttentag, D. 2015), using the concept of Christensen, C.M. (1997). In our globalised and interconnected world, sharing economy actors have grown to become influential organisations. The largest ones, Airbnb and Uber, have appeared in many countries of the world (Uber in 471 cities in 70 countries in June, 2016 – www.uber.com) raising a number of challenges and conflicts, regulatory and legal issues as in the case of Oszkár, which we present here in details. These conflicts are embodied in "offline spaces" like the streets of urban areas from Rio de Janeiro to London or even to Budapest where there are continuous protests against Uber, the urban short-distance ride-sourcing service. Ironically, popular sharing economy start-ups have changed the image of the sharing economy itself, as their activities are less about creating great values like building social capital or reducing environmental pollution, but in the first place, about making huge profits. They have turned from altruistic

efforts to profitable business ventures and as such they have become global players. The best known example of this phenomenon is probably the accommodation renting start-up Airbnb, which was valued at around 20 billion USD in 2015 (skift.com). Only traditional hotel brands like Marriott or Hilton have a higher value.

Sharing economy in transportation: shared-use mobility

With the use of the sharing economy, a wide range of vehicles, routes and distances can be shared among individuals. Services include different transportation means and sources from bicycles car sharing, ride-sourcing, ridesharing, to taxis and limos and shuttle services. Geographical differences develop local varieties of global ideas and services including short-term ride-sourcing in US metros, daily commuting sharing (carpooling) in South Africa, and long-distance guest labourers sharing travel between Hungary and Germany. Shared-use mobility and alternative ways of transportation are not new concepts in motorized societies either: the most obvious example is traditional public transport system. This operates on a similar principle, but probably the most important difference between public transportation and shared-use mobility is flexibility.

Public transportation is often organized in a top-down, fixed routes and price models; however, more flexible services have been available in less-developed countries in the forms of urban and rural shuttles, and minibus taxis. Shared mobility is more efficient than individual travelling because it can reduce traffic congestion and pollution, also it allows people to travel together with other people in one vehicle any distance from within the urban environment to transcontinental routes. Better effectiveness results from the fact that already existing, utilised capacities are used more efficiently, but the popularity of this phenomenon also encourages people to launch their own businesses that rely precisely on this ever increasing customer base. In this case, it is not already existing capacities that are utilised more rationally, but new capacities are included in the particular service. Shared mobility is not only more efficient, but it is also more flexible, as it can react to demand changes rapidly. Lacking a fixed time schedule, shared mobility requires a different kind of attitude from both passengers and drivers. On the other hand, this new form of mobility has disadvantages such as security problems, lack of reliability and taxation issues.

In this study we focus on a popular shared transport mobility service in Hungary, a technology-facilitated long-distance ridesharing. This type of shared travel is defined as "*two or more trips are executed simultaneously, in a single vehicle*" (Morency, C. 2007, 240). It is important to distinguish between the two most popular concepts in shared-use transportation, i.e. car vs. ridesharing. The main difference between car- and ridesharing is the object being shared. In the first case, it is a tangible asset, the vehicle, usually a car, while in the second case it is a traveller's ride that is shared, even if the common mode of transport is an automobile. When a ride is shared, a small group of people (at least two people) travel in one vehicle (car or shuttle) at the same time, while in car-sharing people use the same car one after the other.

Both types had existed much earlier than the spread of Web 2.0. Traditional forms of ridesharing (car-pooling and van-pooling) were promoted as early as WW2 because of oil and rubber shortages and also later in the 1970s employers started supporting the creation of carpools, which was a rather a top-down system (Furuhata, M. *et al.* 2013). On the other hand, bottom-up processes also exists, and are motivated by parking conditions, according to user focused studies (Csonka, B. and Csiszár, Cs. 2016). Carpooling is mostly used among commuters who share a privately owned car so they increase car occupancy potential and decrease the costs of regular travelling and traffic congestion. HOV (high occupancy vehicle) lanes in countries like the US or New Zealand were also created to sup-

port carpooling. Car sharing first appeared in Europe around 2000, but it has become especially popular with the introduction of peer-to-peer car-sharing systems in 2010, and now it is present on all continents. The largest car-sharing company is Zipcar, which can be found in most countries of Europe and North America, but some automobile manufacturers (e.g. General Motors, Mercedes) have also started participating in this developing sector (Bardhi, F. and Eckhardt, G. 2012).

Car-sharing services provide their members access to automobiles for shorter distances, usually for local trips, therefore they do not have to pay the constant costs (insurances, taxes, depreciation) of owning a car (Bardhi, F. and Eckhardt, G. 2012). Participants have to pay a reasonable monthly or yearly fee for the service, must have a valid driving licence and pass a background check, which includes their driving history. The advantages of commercial car sharing is that members do not have to pay the high costs associated with maintaining a car but they can enjoy the flexibility a car (pool) can provide (Belk, R. 2013).

Most ride-sharing start-ups that have emerged in Hungary since the 2000s (e.g. BlaBlacar, Oszkár) match drivers offering vacant seats for long-distance drives with passengers travelling to the same destination through applications. Companies typically limit the amount drivers can charge in order to exclude profit oriented drivers.

Oszkár, a Hungarian start-up enterprise in ride-sharing

In this study we investigated the rides of Oszkár, the largest and most popular long-distance ride-matching company in Hungary, with nearly 320,000 registered users (that is 3.23% of the Hungarian population) and nearly 100,000 active users.[2] Oszkár is a typical start-up related with online space and not operated as a profit-oriented organization. Its number of users, history, operation and the variety of the available routes make Oszkár worth studying from a geographic point of view.

In the Oszkár ridesharing system drivers offer vacant seats in their vehicles on their routes, as a way of reducing costs and in many times to reduce boredom. Passengers can reserve a seat through the web page where they obtain information – after their registration – and read comments about the driver, the car, possible fellow passengers, and can find out more about the journey (e.g. smoking, travelling with pets, etc). The passenger can join the ride during the agreed time in a predetermined location (normally in a parking lot), and the journey commences, leading to the destination(s).

The rides are usually unidirectional, return journeys with the same drivers not being typical. According to Gyürüs, M. *et al.* (2008) there are three main types of routes. These are simple one-way trips, routes repeating aperiodically the same path (holidays trips), and routes repeating periodically the same path (daily commuting trips).

The trust between passengers and drivers is ensured by the service provider through a reviewing system, a vital element for all kinds of community services operating in online space, since while on the move, users entrust strangers with their safety. The trust ensured by evaluations from the community counterbalances for the official, legal guarantees missing in the case of non-professional drivers (e.g. professional driving licence, more frequent technical inspections and medical investigations, compulsory technical parameters). The studied ridesharing system does not have fixed prices, but there is an upper price limit in the system (18 HUF per km – approx. 5 Eurocents per km – in 2015), in order to avoid abuse and to keep prices lower than official tariffs (oszkár.com).

In the case of services based on sharing, an often discussed issue is regulation and taxpaying by users. Because ridesharing and other similar platforms developed too fast for legislation to be able to follow them,

[2] Definition of an active user according to Attila Prácser (Co-founder and Managing Director, Oszkár.com): at least one journey over three months.

the majority of them are still part of the to grey economy. Non-commercial ridesharing with the purpose of only sharing the costs of a journey is not subject to taxation according to Hungarian law, but it is also possible to do a profit-oriented passenger transport business through Oszkár, in which case a National Tax and Customs Administration registration (taxation number) and launching a private enterprise are required. In this case, certain regulations of Oszkár (e.g. upper price limits) do not apply to commercial drivers (oszkár.com).

Methods

In this study we used quantitative methods to justify our hypotheses, which can be divided into two major categories. The first includes the questions that look at the profiles, social and societal backgrounds of Hungarian ridesharers, which we acquired through an online questionnaire (N=425). The online survey was shared with the users on the web page and the Facebook page of Oszkár, the ridesharing platform with the highest number of users in Hungary. Accordingly, the sample is not random and not representative; the only precondition of being included in the sample was that the answerer had to have used a ridesharing service at least once, either as a driver or as a passenger. Through the online distribution of the questionnaire, not only the registered users of Oszkár could become included in the sample, but also the users of any other type of organised ridesharing service or platform who accessed the questionnaire either through the webpage or through Facebook page (e.g. BlaBlacar or shared rides organised through Facebook-groups).

The anonymous questionnaire was active for a total of five days between 19–23 August 2015, containing both open and closed questions, asking about the social background and ridesharing habits of travellers. The choice of the time of sampling was a consequence of research scheduling, thus the obtained answers contained seasonal characteristics too, which were eliminated by analysing other types of data as well. The questionnaires were completed by residents of a total of 140 different settlements, most of them being from Budapest (88 individuals), Pécs (39) and Szeged (28). According to our hypothesis, the majority of travellers are mostly young people (between age 20 and 40), since it is these people who most actively use community websites, and have the greatest level of mobility among all social groups[3]. Besides this, due to the price sensitivity of most Hungarians (Tibori, T. 2010), we assume that the cost of travelling has an important role in the growing popularity of ridesharing, in the choice of how to travel, and in determining who is using them.

In the second part of the research we focused on the possible offline effects of shared-use mobility, appearing in the geographic space, whether or not this type of mobility creates new spatial relations in Hungary. Does it facilitate an increased mobility for members of the society, or does it only have a complementary role? To answer these questions, we investigated, in addition to using questionnaire data, the most popular routes and destinations, for which data were obtained from the Oszkár ridesharing system. The database included indicators (directions and prices) of the 50 most popular routes in the study period, adding more details besides the questionnaire to the picture about the spatial structure of Hungarian ridesharing. The database contained the average costs of the routes (locations of departure and destination) in altogether four time periods (two summer, one autumn and one winter week), making it possible for us to make comparisons with the costs of other mobility types. The four different sampling times *(Table 1)* allowed us to reveal seasonal differences, and helped us interpret and counterbalance the results of our questionnaire survey.

The routes in the database were analysed using simple calculations in Excel (adding

[3] http://www.slideshare.net/slideshow/embed_code/31818007.

Table 1. Analysed routes and time periods

Date	Attributes
22–28 September 2014 8–14 December 2014 29 June–5 July 2015 27 July–2 August 2015	50 most popular routes and their average prices

passenger numbers in same destinations, trip calculations per thousand inhabitants) during which they were separated based on departure and destination locations. Thus, it became possible to analyse the greatest source and receiving settlements, and observe any possible spatial paths or patterns being formed.

We collected public transport prices from the official website of Menetrendek.hu[4] in August 2015, which also includes bus and train ticket prices. After that, we calculated average prices for bus, train and also for ridesharing for the same routes.

We conducted an online questionnaire, which was available at www.oszkar.com Facebook page between 19/08/2015 and 23/08/2015. It contained 26 questions in three parts:

- Open questions about ridesharing habits (how do they use it? How far they travel? How often they travel?)
- General background data (age, sex, residence, highest education level) – multiple-choice questions.
- Open questions about their motivations (Why do they use it?)

The routes of the various time periods were then mapped, providing an opportunity to investigate the most important transportation geographic corridors, too.

Results

Social background and age structure of Oszkár users based on questionnaire results

Nearly two-thirds of the questionnaire participants said they had been involved in ridesharing as passengers (62%), 22 percent as drivers, and 16 percent had been involved in both. The latter suggests that ridesharing, in addition to being a necessity is possibly also a sort of community involvement means or even a habit. Regarding the gender distribution of participants, the representation of women was somewhat higher (54%) than that of men (46%), which can be explained by the higher willingness of females to complete questionnaires. However, if the types of ridesharing are analysed among sexes, a different picture emerges. A substantial dominance of women is present regarding the passenger role (70% females, 30% males), while gender distribution is just the other way round in the case of drivers (16% females, 84% males).

The primary reason for this is probably that the proportion of female drivers in Hungary is still smaller than that of males (40% among people possessing a category 'B' driving licence – ksh.hu), and this difference is further distorted by the fact that women probably are more uneasy about taking the higher (safety) risk of being a driver, and passengers are evaluated much less frequently than drivers. Even in an international comparison, female drivers are more typically involved in household-based/internal ridesharing or fampools, or the pooling of children's schoolmates and friends (Vanoutrive, T. *et al*. 2012). Another factor contributing to this result is that regular automobile driving and mobility is more typical for males than for females and even the official or semi-official journeys tend to be shared by predominantly male drivers earning a living partly from driving.

The distribution of people having returned the questionnaire on the basis of highest level of education shows that people with higher education qualifications are over-represented in the sample. Among of the people answering the questionnaire, 58 percent possessed some type of university or college degree, while this rate among the entire population is only 14 percent according to the 2011 census (ksh.hu). In our opinion this is determined by several factors acting together. The rate of using sharing-based techniques and services

[4] A collective timetable for all inter-city public transport in Hungary.

is considerably higher among young people and those with higher qualifications, and also, general mobility is more typical for highly educated people as well as young adults. Based on age data, it becomes clear that these forms of ridesharing in Hungary are used mostly by young people having normally completed their higher education studies.

The first figure (*Figure 1*) shows the age distribution of users, i.e. drivers and passengers. In both categories this type of mobility is most popular among people in their late 20s (between 26–30 years of age), them being the most frequent users of Oszkár. In the case of passengers, there is another peak, namely at the middle-aged group (people between 41–45 years).

Based on the survey the ride-sharers can be grouped into two categories. On the one hand there are the young working people belonging to the young X (millennial) or Z (digital native) generations having completed their higher education studies and thus having no student travel discount (70% of people completing the questionnaires did not have any kind of travel discount), who already belong to the children of information society and use community media as an organic part of their life. For them, it is more natural to organise part of their geographic space use in virtual space. On the other hand, there is the group of middle-aged people in their 40s who, besides quickly adopting the innovation, have some other type of motivation too, such as living in out-of-the-way settlements with weak public transportation connections, thus for them fast and relatively cheap ridesharing means an alternative to other, organised forms of mobility. From the data analysis it also appears that this group also includes the occasional ride-sharers for whom Oszkár means an innovative and flexible solution for reaching a destination every now and then. Relating to this, the following section investigates how much ridesharing functions as a competition to other modes of transportation.

Price sensitivity and complementarity

To analyse price sensitivity, we have compared the prices of the 50 most popular routes in a chosen summer time, with other possible travel options. The average prices of ridesharing were obtained from a source specified by Oszkár, while the fares of bus and train journeys were taken from the public tariff table of the service providers, and all these were then arranged in a database. The reason for choosing the summer time frame was that we wanted the best match with the environment of our online questionnaire, most importantly the seasonally changing prices.



Fig. 1. Age distribution of passengers and drivers in percent. *Source*: Compiled by the authors based on Oszkár data

According to the results, the cheapest way of travel out of the three possible types was, regarding full-price fares, ridesharing (*Figure 2*). The average prices of ridesharing ranged around 3,000 HUF (approx. 10 EUR), followed by the bus fare with 4,500 HUF, and train tickets with 4,700 HUF.

This ranking, however, will be quite different if the popular reduced fares (e.g. student discounts) are taken as a basis, in which case ridesharing will be the most expensive alternative among the three. In other words, ridesharing is positioned by its tariffs in between full-price and reduced-fare interurban public transport prices. This is why Oszkár is used most widely as passengers by the age group of 26–30 years, whereas reduced-fare public transport is the cheaper alternative for the most frequent commuter, price-sensitive group of university students. Thus, from the analysis of routes it appears that cost is the primary factor among the different motivations. This is supported also by the next chart (*Figure 3*), which shows the various transportation modes the participants had used on similar routes before becoming involved in ridesharing.

It was found that most people chose this new type of community-based mobility as a substitute for travelling by train. Besides the high-price factor (full-price tickets) in the case of travelling by train, another important element of motivation is the rigidity of the railway system, and, in the case of certain destinations, insufficient access.

Based on the answers to the questionnaire (*Figure 3*) it is concluded that only a few journeys were induced merely by the newly



Fig. 2. Types of transportation and their average prices. *Source*: Compiled by the authors based on oszkar.com, menetrendek.hu



Fig. 3. Popularity of transport modes before using ride-share (N = 425; multiple choices)

appearing possibility of ridesharing, but instead, the majority of passengers would have travelled on those particular routes anyway, without the availability of ridesharing. This means that journeys having taken place in the studied ridesharing system do not generate significant new spatial paths in the geographic space, but instead they played a complementary role. This complementarity, too, indicates that the mobility routes in the Hungarian spatial structure have not been completed (in such a short time) with new paths, since the market is yet too small for that to happen. In the literature there are few large-scale studies fully answering this question. However, when Airbnb, the hotel industry actor newly emerging in sharing-economy was analysed, it was found that although it does draw away clients from certain segments of the market, it does yet indicate a threat to the whole hotel market (Zervas, G. *et al.* 2015).

Source and destination settlements

If the routes are separated according to departures and destinations *(Table 2)*, and these are summarised on the basis of settlements, the geographic aspects of ride-sharing can be analysed. Regarding both arrivals (destinations) and departures, Hungarian cities dominate. Quite obviously, the most popular destination is the capital, followed by regional centres, with only the seasonally favoured settlements being able to line up in this listing.

The predominantly unipolar character of the Hungarian settlement network, along with the cultural-economic significance of Budapest is reflected well in the spatial structure of ridesharing, too. On the other hand, an essential precondition for the penetration of sharing-economy is the presence of a critical mass (Botsman, R. and Rogers, R. 2011; Chan, N.D. and Shaheen, S.A. 2012), which is another factor justifying the hegemony of the capital city. Regarding the possible routes, Budapest stands out prominently, having a marked positive balance. Values obtained for the capital city stand far above those of the second-ranking entities in both dimensions. However, while this difference is eightfold with respect to destinations (arrivals), i.e. correlates with population sizes, it is only twofold in the case of source (departure) settlements. In other words, ridesharing is used by its passengers mostly for reaching the capital, particularly from areas and in times that offer no other alternatives.

The ranking of ride-sharing destination and departure popularity correlates with the general settlement hierarchy, except for occasional cases of a festival (Sopron), an event (Kapolcs), and certain seasonally attractive settlements (e.g. on the coastline of Lake Balaton) with poor accessibility from certain departure points. Interestingly, the destinations abroad for workers and/or big cities popular among Hungarian employees (Munich, Vienna, Ulm, Passau, London, Stuttgart, Regensburg, Zurich, Nuremberg) have relatively high rankings on the list, with a combined value similar to that of a larger Hungarian city on its own.

Regarding source settlements, the list includes pretty much the same settlements, but the ranking is different in several positions. Evidently, the seasonally popular Hungarian settlements disappear from among the big sources. Foreign departure locations are almost unchanged, although their ranking is somewhat different. This balance is probably related to the size of the particular settlements, and the availability of alternative public transport. Assuming that the ridesharing traveller does not stay at the destination (forever), the data confirms that Oszkár provides a complementary alternative beyond public transport in an era when travellers expect the greatest time efficiency along any route.

Having looked at the absolute numbers, we then focused on where ridesharing was the most popular, relative to population sizes of the communities, and found the following pattern (*Figure 4.).*

Clearly the highest figures came from for regional centres where, in accordance with

*Table 2. Numbers of passengers per settlement (arrivals and departures)**

Rankings	Settlements (arrivals)	Number of passengers	Settlements (departures)	Number of passengers
1	Budapest	16,420	Budapest	9,175
2	Debrecen	2,012	Szeged	4,293
3	Pécs	1,472	Miskolc	3,819
4	Miskolc	1,198	Pécs	3,271
5	Nyíregyháza	1,060	Nyíregyháza	1,158
6	Sopron	816	Debrecen	772
7	Siófok	629	Győr	673
8	Győr	303	Kecskemét	231
9	Veszprém	229	Vienna (Austria)	227
10	Szeged	219	Nagykanizsa	187
11	Eger	218	Szombathely	157
12	Munich (Germany)	180	Hajdúböszörmény	148
13	Balatonfüred	175	Baja	136
14	Kapolcs	157	Zalaegerszeg	128
15	Baja	156	Székesfehérvár	106
16	Kaposvár	146	Kaposvár	103
17	Vienna (Austria)	145	Veszprém	79
18	Kecskemét	118	Stuttgart (Germany)	69
19	Keszthely	110	Keszthely	65
20	Mátészalka	109	Mátészalka	65
21	Nagykanizsa	85	London (England)	63
22	Kazincbarcika	81	Hódmezővásárhely	61
23	Balatonlelle	77	Makó	59
24	Balatonboglár	73	Hajdúnánás	58
25	Békéscsaba	55	Munich (Germany)	56
26	Fonyód	54	Szekszárd	55
27	Szekszárd	51	Tapolca	48
28	Zamárdi	50	Békéscsaba	47
29	Tiszaújváros	46	Sopron	47
30	Révfülöp	45	Eger	42
31	Makó	43	Tiszaújváros	37
32	Salgótarján	40	Kisvárda	35
33	Kisvárda	39	Nuremberg (Germany)	35
34	Ulm (Austria)	35	Polgár	35
35	Zalegerszeg	33	Mannheim (Germany)	25
36	Passau (Germany)	31	Salgótarján	25
37	London (England)	30	Cologne (Germany)	23
38	Stuttgart (Germany)	28	Balatonalmádi	21
39	Szentes	24	Linz (Austria)	21
40	Balatonfenyves	23	Regensburg (Germany)	19
41	Mohács	21	Siófok	17
42	Csongrád	19	Mohács	13
43	Regensburg (Germany)	18	Frankfurt (Germany)	11
44	Zurich (Switzerland)	18	Passau (Germany)	11
45	Nuremberg (Germany)	16	Paks	10
46	Székesfehérvár	16	Szolnok	10
47	Balatonalmádi	11	–	–

*Only settlements with figures greater than 9 are included in the tables. *Source*: www.oszkar.com

those written above, ride-sharing had become a popular way of reaching the capital. This statement is supported by the fact that the relative figures seem to be inversely correlated with the economic development of regional centres located at about equal distances from the capital. The less developed centres (e.g. Miskolc and Pécs) have higher



Fig. 4. All departures per 10,000 inhabitants by main cities. *Source*: Compiled by the authors based on Oszkár data

indicators, while the more developed Győr and Debrecen have smaller figures. The map shows a strong NE Hungarian concentration too, which has multiple reasons. One explanation can be the poor public transportation accessibility of the region, and on the other hand, due to its weaker developmental indicators, it traditionally functions as one of the capital's commuter attraction zones. In such a case, ridesharing is a significant competitor to public transportation, especially the railway, because in addition to being cheaper, ridesharing also substantially shortens travel time, which factors can strongly influence people's choices in long-distance commuting.

When the geographic distances of domestic trips are analysed, a 100 km distance is the critical threshold in ridesharing mobility. The majority of journeys fall into the 150–200 km range; thus, in view of Hungary's size and spatial structure, it can be suggested that ridesharing first of all assists interregional transportation connections (*Figure 5*). Beyond the particular conditions of the country's spatial structure, another reason why greater distances dominate in ridesharing is that, according to literature, when vacant seats are shared with others, and passengers are picked up, the necessary detours make this shared type of mobility less suitable for travelling short distances (Ferguson, E. 1997).

According to the results of the questionnaire, 85 percent of those submitting their answers used ridesharing only on domestic routes, despite the fact that with longer distances even greater savings can be realised. Possibly, the critical mass in the adequate routes and ridesharing offers does not yet exist to allow ridesharing to gain considerable ground as an international travel option.

Seasonality and flexibility

When analysing the seasonality of routes from the perspective of distance, no significant differences are found (*Figure 6*). The average distances discussed above appear here too. There is some difference in the numbers of routes longer than 300 km: they are more



Fig. 5. Domestic departures per settlement size and distance (excluding Budapest). *Source*: Compiled by the authors based on Oszkár data



Fig. 6. Number of routes per seasons. *Source*: Compiled by the authors based on Oszkár data

frequent in autumn and winter, which indicates that Oszkár journeys abroad are made up mostly of commuting of Hungarian guest labourers. As mentioned above, the international numbers are still quite low, which can be explained, besides the absence of the critical mass, by the presence of shuttle services for foreign workers that are much more flexible than public transport in general.

Looking at the spatial element the centralised travel pattern is present in the routes analysed, with only a few transversal paths connecting the towns and cities around the country. As we have found, a route between say Debrecen and Pécs, even if it is present among the offered or demanded routes, disappears from statistics because the majority of the drivers advertise their destinations via the capital too, in order

to maximise their business and to cut down on travel time. These statements are supported by *Figures 7* and *8*, which showing the routes during summer and winter period.

Occasional journeys are more typical in the summer season, such as ones leading to Sopron, the location of the Volt Festival, from Budapest and other significant university towns around the country such as Pécs and Szeged. Routes to and from Budapest and settlements along the coast of Lake Balaton are also more pronounced in the summer season. If the two maps are compared, it appears that journeys to the two German-speaking regions (southern Germany and Austria) are more typical in the winter period, but London, the farthest destination, is present in both. Shorter routes appear in early December – Szeged–Baja, Debrecen–Nyíregyháza, Debrecen–Miskolc – the more common routes of domestic commuters. Based on questionnaire data, the latter represent the minority, since 60 percent of the people answering the questions choose ride-sharing only occasionally, in connection with some particular event (e.g. vacation or visits to relatives), and only 40 percent use it regularly (on a daily, weekly or monthly basis). This indicates the flexibility of ridesharing, that it can adapt rapidly to changes in what users require, and that it is more flexible than the other types of transport, capable of reacting fast to major events. As such, sometimes smaller settlements can have strikingly high shared mobility values (e.g. Kapolcs).

Conclusions

Ride-sharing is a popular form of sharing-mobility, whose wide spread distribution was assisted by the internet, community media and various mobile phone applications. However, its first appearance dates back to the early 20th century.

From the analysis of questionnaire data provided by Hungarian ride-sharers and the routes and destinations of Oszkár, their most popular platform, it can be concluded that in Hungary the primary ride-sharers are young



Fig. 7. Top 50 most popular ridesharing routes in a summer week (29 June–5 July). *Source*: Compiled by the authors based on Oszkár data.



Fig. 8. Top 50 most popular ridesharing routes in a winter week (8–14, December).
Source: Compiled by the authors based on Oszkár data

people in their late twenties, and, partly related to this, mostly those with higher levels of educations. Because the spreading of innovation is typically bound to settlement hierarchies and because of the critical mass, the absolute number of users is correlated with settlement size, but relative to population sizes, it is not Budapest but regional centres that yield the highest numbers of travellers.

Looking at the spatial effects, the ridesharing is also a popular type of mobility in some regions and settlements where a huge gap can be found between fixed public transportation schedules and good accessibility of motorways, and it significantly reduces travel time and rationalises costs. Ridesharing is used mostly for domestic routes, and the critical lower threshold is around 100 km under which this type of mobility is not typically used.

The price-sensitivity of most of Hungarian society plays an important role in the growth of ridesharing. The analysis of costs shows that it is a cheaper way to travel compared with the services of public transport companies (looking at full-price fares), thus the possibility of saving on travel costs for drivers is an important variable, and is also a significant motivation for passengers, too.

The majority of journeys are occasional, meaning that although the advantages of ridesharing, such as flexibility and fluidity, are important, there are challenges related with this type of mobility including the issue of safety, which the ridesharing network tries to tackle through its evaluation system. The geographic limitations of sharing-based mobility include the absence of a critical mass, which prevents peripheral villages with an ageing population from becoming involved in this type of mobility and enjoying this bottom-up community-based form of travelling.

Along these lines we can establish that the emergence of Hungarian ridesharing follows the hierarchical model of innovation distribution, in which Budapest, dominating the Hungarian settlement system in almost all dimensions, is clearly prevalent. Hierarchical diffusion means that it spreads from the higher levels of settlements, to the lower ones in settlement hierarchy; metropolitan areas

are, thus, followed by small towns and rural areas. The ridesharing system is used mostly for reaching the capital, typically from the regional centres that experience the greatest attraction from Budapest, and mostly by young people who are the most open to innovation but are in the early stages of their careers are therefore still sensitive enough to pricing, making them susceptible to looking for alternative solutions.

Due to the dominance of the capital, and because of the narrow Hungarian market, this innovation has not yet actually spread beyond regional centres. In fact, the new directions in this respect are leading across international borders to neighbouring countries and the UK. This application operating in the virtual world has not yet brought about a breakthrough in the offline space either, since as mentioned above, no alternative transportation routes have developed in the country, to contribute significantly to the restructuring of Hungary's transportation networks.

This new form of grassroots mobility is still in an initial stage in Hungary, demonstrating in itself several local peculiarities. Its complementarity is temporal rather than spatial, yet its developmental dynamics and directions are quite promising (e.g. festivals and seasonality), compared to many other new innovations (e.g. Uber) in shared economies. In our sof shared mobility users. It will be interesting to explore the causes of dominant one-way trips with Oszkár, to help explore now ridesharing is in its embryonic, complementary stage at the moment in Hungary.

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Working and retiring in sunny Spain: Lifestyle migration further explored

Juan PARREÑO-CASTELLANO and Josefina DOMÍNGUEZ-MUJICA[1]

Abstract

Spanish tourism destinations have received immigrant workers and retirees from Western and Northern Europe since the sixties. In this paper we focus on the specific group of the retirees who had worked previously in Spain with the objective to quantify them, to interpret the reasons why they migrated and have remained in the Spanish tourism areas, and to acknowledge the relationship between tourism and migration in this context. The empirical research is based on the combination of quantitative and qualitative information. In particular, we have used official statistical sources, semi-structured in-depth interviews and the micro-data from the National Immigrant Survey (ENI) and the Continuous Sample of Labour Life (MCVL). The method used is a mix of transversal and longitudinal analysis revealing that, despite the difficulties to quantity the studied group, labour motivations must be put into question and the role of tourism becomes the core of the explanation of the migration process.

Keywords: tourism labour market, retirees, Spanish tourism destinations, lifestyle

Introduction

Since the 1960s Spanish tourism destinations have been at the receiving end of two main international migration inflows from Northern and Western Europe: a group of immigrant workers of different occupational profiles that have arrived in different intensity over time; and an inflow of non-working immigrants that have also varied in intensity and profile. The latter has been traditionally broken down into alternatively described as retirement migration, lifestyle migration or residential migration.

This paper focuses on a type of migration from Northern and Western Europe that occupies an intermediate position between the two inflows above: retired Europeans who arrive to Spanish tourism destinations while they are still active. These migrants can be classified as belonging to either of the aforementioned groups given that they were workers in Spanish tourism areas but their migration process was motivated for reasons similar to those of non-working migrants. Migration did not entail a considerable improvement of the economic conditions of these migrants, who were rather looking for a change of direction in their lives, just like lifestyle migrants. Therefore, this migration process needs indeed to be examined within the context of lifestyle migrations, broadening the perspective of the complex and close relationships between production and consumption within the migration flows (Williams, A. and Hall, C.M. 2000).

Spain's coastal regions offered in past decades ideal conditions for these migrants to fulfil their projects. On the one hand, they personally experienced their dreamt life in a real environment; on the other hand, they benefited from the labour opportunities that the tourist business created. Following the idea of the methodological dualism analyzed

[1] Department of geography, University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. C/Perez de Toro 1. 35003 Las Palmas, Spain. E-mails: juan.parreno@ulpgc.es, josefina.dominguezmujica@ulpgc.es

by Bakewell, O. in his reflections on structure and agency in migration theory (2010), this article reveals the bracket between the strategic conduct of individuals and the structuring order of the labor market in tourism destinations.

Our paper establishes the following two main hypotheses. First, that we are not dealing with a flow of migrant workers, but with lifestyle migrants *sensu lato*, who do not wish to wait until retirement to start a new life project focused on leisure and a better quality of life. In other words, this group of migrants of working age wish to settle in Spain's coastal areas and share the lifestyle of tourists and retirees alike. The second hypothesis is that the permanence of these people, who will later become retired migrants, can only be explained if we consider the tourism activity. This is a phenomenon related to the tourism destinations, and motivated by tourism activity and leisure. Subsequently to these hypotheses, we have established three objectives in our analysis: (i) to quantify the group object of this study; (ii) to interpret the reasons why they migrated and have remained in Spanish tourism regions; and (iii) to acknowledge the relationship between tourism and migration in this context.

The paper has been divided into five sections. In the first, we introduce some ideas that allow for a better contextualization of the study's aim and its underlying hypotheses. Secondly, we explain the sources and the methodology used in our research. Under the third and fourth heading, we describe the main characteristics of European workers and retirees in Spanish tourism destinations and the relationship between workers and retirees. In particular, we analyse the quantitative dimension of retirees after working in Spain, bio-demographic profiles, their linkages with tourism and their challenging identification as labour or retired migrants. We also explain the characteristics that make it possible to analyse their migration projects and the reasons why they have stayed in Spain after retirement. The article ends with some final suggestions for further discussion.

Research framework: from retirement migration to retirement of labor migrants

Tourism destinations have become places where a variety of processes of international human mobility coexists. Besides tourist flows, we can differentiate 'labour migration', 'entrepreneurial migration', 'return (labour) migration', 'consumption-led economically active migration' and 'retirement migration' (Williams, A. and Hall, C.M. 2002) that have given rise to the development of specific lines of research, particularly on international retirees' migration (Benson, M. and O'Reilly, K. 2009). In the case of Spain, this topic has been profoundly studied both in Spain itself and in the countries of origin of these immigrants, as well as by teams of researchers from both provenances.

From a quantitative point of view, studies of the international migration flow of retirees have been approached by means of a statistical analysis of the data on stock and flows of elderly foreigners residing at tourism destinations. Therefore, the figures of retirement migrations have been associated with permanent migrations, which normally imply home ownership and registration in the municipal census. However, under the relocation of retirees other non-registered flows should be included, given the wide-ranging nature of mobility processes, which can include second-home owners who stay for short periods of time, or the seasonal migrants who rent a property (King, R. *et al*. 2000) and who tend not to register as residents in their host municipalities.

This has led researchers to establish different categories of retired migrants, differentiating between permanent and seasonal migrants, visitors and returnees (O'Reilly, K. 1995). International retirement migration in tourism destinations is consequently a mixture of *sensu stricto* migratory flows and residential tourism (O'Reilly, K. 2007; Huete, R. *et al*. 2008), because there is a lack of 'clear boundaries between international residential migration and either seasonal or circulatory migration or residential tourism' (Božić, S. 2006, 1416) or, in

other words, a crossroads of travel, leisure and migration prevail (Cohen, S.A. *et al*. 2015).

There are several factors that explain Spain's appeal for retired international migrants, although motivation is ultimately always personal (Dwyer, P. 2000). Some researchers point out that some of the main factors propelling the flows are related to the so-called 'lifestyle migration' (Casado-Díaz, M.A. *et al*. 2004; Torkington, K. 2010; Huete, R. *et al*. 2013; King, R. 2015), a complex and nuanced phenomenon that concerns individuals and families who choose relocation as a way of redefining themselves (Benson, M. and Osbaldiston, N. 2014), searching for nice weather, a better environment or outdoor leisure options, while other scholars have highlighted healthcare as the main reason for such mobility, (Hardill, I. *et al*. 2005; Breivik, J.K. 2012; Legido-Quigley, H. and McKee, M. 2012; Bell, D. *et al.* 2015). In any case, the causes can be related to new identities associated to post modern behavioural patterns (Huber, A. and O'Reilly, K. 2004), namely, lifestyle choices inherent to the decision to migrate (Benson, M. and O'Reilly, K. 2009) and to the pursuit of self-realization, self-exploration or self-development (Conradson, D. and Latham, A. 2005).

From the point of view of hosting destinations, the importance of this phenomenon is explained by the existence of a competitive supply of homes for sale or for rent in tourism or coastal municipalities (Dias, J.A. *et al*. 2015; Rodríguez, V. and Domínguez-Mujica, J. 2014); by the governance of second homes and multiple dwellings (Hall, C.M. and Müller, D.K. 2004; Hall, C.M. 2015); by the difference in cost of living between the countries of origin and Spain (McIntyre, N. *et al*. 2006; Huete, R. 2008); and by Spain's leading position as a tourism destination in Europe (Rodríguez, V. 2001; Leontidou, L. and Marmaras, E. 2001; O'Reilly, K. 2003).

Without assessing the various causes mentioned, the magnitude of the phenomenon can only be interpreted if we consider that this multifaceted reality involves further dimensions that need to be taken into consideration. One of these dimensions is that the presence of European retirees in Spain is not only the consequence of retirement migrants, but also the result of the retirement of labor migrants. Some researchers have studied the presence of retirees who had been working in the same tourism destinations before retiring. Gustafson, P. (2009) analysed the cases of Swedish retirees who had migrated to Spain in their fifties, with the intention of working there, and who become pensioners shortly thereafter. Domínguez-Mujica, J. and Parreño-Castellano, J. (2014) studied the linkages between labour migrants from Northern and Western European and retirees in Spanish tourism destinations.

Nonetheless, there is a flow of lifestyle migrants who were not preparing for retirement, but who retired in the place where they had migrated to. According to Benson, M. and O'Reilly, K. (2009), in such cases, the search for a better quality of life involves a new way of life, where time and working conditions are redefined (Madden, L. 1999; Stone, I. and Stubbs, C. 2007). This migratory model has been analysed in some research, such as that of the British nationals in Costa del Sol (O'Really, K. 2000) or in India (Korpela, M. 2010), but it has generally not received much more attention from scholars.

The characteristics of tourist labor market in Spain have facilitated the success of these migratory projects but the permanence in Spain of these migrants, especially after retirement, can only be explained widening the research from a social perspective. The long-time permanence might be linked to a high level of integration in the hosting society, the development of a family project in Spain, and, in many cases, the creation of transnational identities (Vertovec, S. 1999; Gustafson, P. 2008).

Sources and methodology

The research is based on three different sets of sources. The first ones are statistical sources from the National Statistical Institute (INE)

and the Ministry of Employment and Social Security: Continuous Municipal Register Statistics, 2011 Population Census, Residential Variation Statistics and the Spanish Social Security workers registration records.

The second group is comprised by qualitative sources, including 14 semi-structured in-depth interviews developed in the framework of a research project on retirees residing in Spanish tourism destinations. These were conducted in public spaces (cafes, terraces) or at associations in tourism areas of the Spanish Mediterranean provinces and archipelagos during spring 2012. The conversation took place in English or German, depending on the interviewee and on whether the interviewers were native speakers involved in the research project. Besides personal data, questions focused on the decision-making process, the workers' prior status, living arrangements, the identity and belonging feeling, etc. Each interview lasted for one hour approx. and was recorded and transcribed.

The third source corresponds to the microdata from the National Immigrant Survey (ENI) conducted in 2007 by the National Statistical Institute, and to the registration data of workers by the statistical department of the Ministry of Employment and Social Security, the Continuous Sample of Labour Life (MCVL), which lost its original quantitative character once it was processed.

The first source helped develop a descriptive and exploratory statistical analysis; the second one focused on a qualitative analysis and the third one on an observational analysis, following and gathering information of the people under examination for the period of their working and retirement life – 103 people in the case of the National Immigrant Survey and 263 people in the case of the sample of registrations in the Social Security records. All of these sources provided information on Western and Northern European immigrants, including Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandic, Irish, Danish, German, Swiss, Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Luxembourgian, French and British citizens residing in Spanish Mediterranean provinces and archipelagos either as workers or as retired immigrants, focusing particularly on those retirees who carried out their professional careers in Spain.

We examined the professional career that retirees residing in Spanish tourism destinations had developed, by using a quantitative



Fig. 1. Scheme of the research proceedings. *Source*: Compiled by the authors

procedure followed by a qualitative analysis, leading to certain synergies between both approaches. A mixed methodology was applied as an alternative to the quantitative and qualitative approaches, with the goal of reconstructing the story of the migrant's life. Thanks to this methodology it was possible to collect and interpret data, integrate findings, and draw inferences in a single study of inquiry (Tashakkori, A. and Creswell, J.W. 2007), going back and forth seamlessly between statistical and thematic analysis (*Figure 1*).

Workers and retirees

In this section, we study the main characteristics of European workers and retirees in Spanish tourism destinations in order to gather a better contextualisation of the migrants under analysis. Spain has received a substantial flow of migrants from Western and Northern Europe since the 1960s, and especially since the 1990s. According to the 2011 Population and Housing Census, Western and Northern European citizens (Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian, Icelandic, Irish, Danish, German, Swiss, Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Luxembourgian, French and British) reached 737,872 people, i.e. 14 percent of the total number of foreigners residing in Spain. *Figure 2* represents the evolution of the number of these residents according to the information of the Continuous Municipal Register.

Social security registration data record the number of workers and their geographical origin. At the peak of the years of economic expansion (1996–2007), the number of immigrants coming from Western and Northern Europe and enrolling as workers peaked at 181,911. By the end of 2013 that figure had decreased to 155,163 as a consequence of the economic crisis. The main country of origin is the United Kingdom, followed by Germany and France. Most of them were living in the Mediterranean provinces (especially Alicante and Malaga) and in the Balearic and Canary Islands, besides Madrid (*Figure 3*).

The importance of this group is highly significant for three different reasons. First, as stated by Favell, A. (2009, 171), 'the numbers of Western Europeans on the move have by no means been large, but they are highly symbolic. For every one who moves to work and settles freely in a neighbouring member state of the EU, many more are moving temporarily… as eventually retirees'. Secondly, the geographical concentration of these workers in the coastal areas is linked inextricably to the development of these locations for mass tourism – and the activities and identities of the migrants themselves, as well as their attitudes, expectations and actions are better understood when we take into account tourism specialization. Lastly, they are likely to remain in Spain after they become retirees, enjoying the rights of European supranational citizenship.



Fig. 2. Western and Northern Europeans residing in Spain. *Source*: INE Exploitation of the Municipal Register, 2013.

Fig. 3. Geographical distribution of Western and Northern European adult residents (20–59) by provinces. *Source*: INE Exploitation of the Municipal Register, 2013.

On January 1, 2013, there were 334,388 Western and Northern European citizens over 60 residing in Spain, especially in the coastal municipalities of the Mediterranean and Island provinces (93.8% out of them), according to the Continuous Municipal Register (*Figure 4*).

This circumstance indicates the concurrence of both working adults and older residents in the same geographical area. The data from the Residential Variations Statistics show a high influx of these older immigrants since the mid-1990s, with the highest level of settlements between 2004 and 2007. In fact, these numbers would be even higher if we take into account the pensioners between 50 and 60 years of age and the people who voluntarily fail to register with Spanish municipalities. Most of these old residents are British (45.5%) and German (21.0%), but there is also an important number of French (10.2%), Dutch (4.8%), Belgian (3.9%) and Norwegian (3.0%) nationals.

Building bridges between work and retirement

This section is devoted to the migrants under examination. In particular, we analyse their quantitative dimension, their demographic

Fig 4. Geographical distribution of older Western and Northern European residents (> 60) by municipalities (Mediterranean provinces and islands). *Source*: INE Exploitation of the Municipal Register, 2013.

profile, and their complex identification as labour migrants and their linkages with tourism.

Statistical evidence

As noted previously, the relationship between workers and retirees can be ascertained from the information provided by statistical samples. On the one hand, the 2007 National Immigrant Survey (ENI) (2007) interviewed 542 retirees born in Northern and Western European countries and living in the Mediterranean and Spanish Island provinces. Over one hundred of them (19%) had worked in Spain before reaching the age of retirement. On the other hand, the Continuous Working Life Sample (MCVL) (2009) contains information about 311 immigrants from the mentioned European countries who received retirement funds from the Spanish Social Security System. This figure represented about 4 percent of the total number of Northern and Western European elderly residents in the Spanish Mediterranean and Island provinces, taking into account the sample size of MCVL.

The difference between both percentages can be explained by the fact that some of the retired immigrants who worked in Spain

did not meet the requirements to obtain a pension and by the different nature of both sources. Despite this, the combination of them allows us to appreciate the presence of the phenomenon studied and to characterize the demographic and geographical profiles of these immigrants. As expected, most of them were born in France, the United Kingdom and Germany and arrived in Spain before 1980. Both sources also reflect the predominance of males, who normally live alone or, to a lesser extent, with a partner or with a partner and few descendants.

The complex identification of these migrants as labour migrants

According to the data described above, it is obvious that some of the European retirees living in Spain were initially working immigrants. However, is this the consequence of an inflow of labour migrants, or is it a different type of migration?

It is necessary to consider that the subject of our study is a heterogeneous group and, therefore, there is no single answer to the question above. The National Immigration Survey (ENI) data analysed have led us to divide the immigrants we are examining into three distinct groups. Most of them were old adults between 45 and 60 years of age at the time of their arrival in Spain, whose decision to emigrate was often preceded by a family turning point, such as a divorce, a second marriage or the children's independence. The choice to migrate was often linked to the search for new experiences or to the wish to cut ties with the place of birth (in fact, most of them had sold their properties before leaving). We are dealing, therefore, with a group who took the decision to emigrate to bring about a change in their life, moving either alone or with a partner.

The second most important age group is formed by young adults (between 25 and 35 years old), whose decision was related to the wish to begin a professional career, often associated with tourism activities, e.g. holiday representatives, hotel activity leaders, sports coaches. Finally, there is a third group formed by the expatriates who had been assigned to a new post in Spain by the company they worked for, i.e. skilled workers, generally in hotel management. This last group includes immigrants of any age, but normally not young adults. All in all, data lead us to consider different motivations in the change of residence.

Therefore, according the ENI, most of immigrants, those of the first group, did not arrive to Spain due to labour motivations *sensu stricto*. Some characteristics of the immigrants considered in this survey seem weaken the labour character of the majority of the migratory projects. For example, we can mention the fact that a large number (34% of the 103 selected immigrants from the ENI) did not speak Spanish before emigrating or that they normally came to Spain without a contract and with only a vague idea of the job that they could get – in fact, only 20 percent of them were hired before migrating.

The in-depth interviews allow us to shed light to the causes of the migratory process. If we analyze some answers together, we might question the labour dimension of this migratory flow. First, the declared motivations. A high number of migrants highlights the lower cost of living and, above all, the search for a 'place in the sun' where to live and not just to work.

'We came on holiday to Moraira and we loved it. Because then it was just a small fishing village, surrounded by palm trees and it was just paradise. One main street, nice tranquil life, it was lovely! And we decided to try. We liked it here, we stayed six months and my parents liked it. They sold their property in England and they bought a restaurant here. And this is how I came to live here' (Sylvia, Moraira, Alicante).

The same factors propelled the so-called 'lifestyle migration' according to Benson, M. and O'Reilly, K. (2009); Torkington, K. (2010) and Huete, R. *et al*. (2013).

More precisely, in the interviews they refer to the search for nice weather, a better environment and outdoor leisure options. Common, literal explanations by migrants include:

'*At least, here, you can enjoy a lovely lifestyle without spending too much money… so basically, what I try to meet is the lifestyle, and not only the sunshine. I don't like sunbathing. I just like being out in the sun, hiking*' (Kim, Los Cristianos, Tenerife, Canary Islands).

'*I fell in love with the Spanish way of life*' (Nigel, Calvià, Mallorca, Balearic Islands).

In second place, the way which the immigrants tell about the labour situation they lived in their countries of origin. In this sense, none of the immigrants had job difficulties, being either employees or entrepreneurs before departure. They often claim that what they simply wanted was to change their occupation, especially in the case of non-skilled workers. In third place, the low knowledge of the immigrants about Spain and its labour market. Many of the respondents pointed out their absolute lack of contact with Spain or of experience with the country except for a few days' holiday, prior to the migration. This indicates that the decision may have been triggered by television news or reports, tourism flyers, references from acquaintances or their own experience as tourists.

At the same time, there is no shortage of examples of people who came to Spain for a short holiday and decided to stay on and set up a business. As a interviewee said:

'*We saw this bar with an apartment and the idea was that it goes over here, get us something to do, earn a bit of money and decided to stay*' (Klaus, Empuriabrave, Girona).

Overall, from a personal point of view, this behaviour shows that they are people with initiative, who came to Spain because they wanted to begin or to change their lifestyle. The wish to modify their lifestyle is similar to what generally motivates retirees to migrate, a combination of the receiving areas' features and mechanisms closely linked to the individual's life course (Rodríguez, V. *et al.* 2004).

A migration project rooted in tourism

According to the data described above, it would be questionable to classify all these migrants as immigrant workers; however, it is evident that their stay in Spanish destinations is linked to the job opportunities generated by the tourism sector and, consequently, with the existence of a successful migration project. In fact, success at work has tended to provide an incentive for staying in Spain after retirement.

In our research, the two samples show that the most frequent jobs of the respondents were linked to tourism specialization. For instance, 18 percent of the 103 retirees surveyed by ENI and 26 percent of the 263 selected from the MCVL had worked in services of catering and hospitality. Some of the respondents invested their savings in small catering businesses (pubs and restaurants) and hired one or two employees, or worked on their own. Northern and Western European workers selling houses, apartments, bungalows and land in coastal zones and developing activities such as advertising, production of tourism flyers, recreational services or sport activities were also common.

From the point of view of qualifications, 16 percent of the immigrants were managers or technicians, but most of them worked as non-skilled workers – waiters and waitresses, salespersons, real estate agents and manufacturing workers, according to ENI. In spite of this, over two thirds said that they had never been unemployed, which is a sign of a successful migratory project and of the job opportunities that they found in tourism destinations beyond the difficulties of the Spanish labour market. This working condition of immigrants is confirmed by the MCVL. This source indicates that highly skilled employees are a minority (engineers and university graduates represent 13.7% of the total), compared to the importance of those of lesser categories and administrative officers.

In the case of the hotel trade, we find employees with different levels of specialization, from waiters to hotel managers, but the lesser skilled workers tend to prevail. Nevertheless, the longitudinal analysis allows us to perceive that many of the migratory projects reflect an economic stability and, what is more important, an upward labour mobility. Many

of the immigrants started out as employees and ended up as owners, developing a successful career.

The professional progress of immigrants, namely the type of work and job stability, has important implications in their decision to stay. The longitudinal perspective provided by the MCVL allows us to identify that those retirees who had their own business or a more stable and better paid employment retired at a higher rate in Spain. The fact that 23.5 percent contributed financially as wage-earners during their working life marks an important difference with respect to the structure of the labour market in Spain, where this rate is much lower, and shows that many of them were entrepreneurs in the different activities promoted by tourism specialization. In contrast, temporary workers are unrepresented not only among retirees but also compared with the figures of this group in the Spanish labour market. Thus, it can be interpreted that this type of job generates fewer roots and plays a significant role when taking the decision to stay or to return.

The relationship between migration project and tourism is also showed by the residential mobility that respondents have had throughout their life. Most of the retirees in Spain live in the same province where they developed their professional career, except for those who had jobs in Madrid, Barcelona and other inland provinces, and who decided to move to coastal areas when they retired. The immigrants that worked in the tourism destinations used to rent an apartment out of those available in consolidated tourism areas, as the obsolescence of some tourism complexes drove them to be offered in the real estate market of housing for workers. In a second stage, as they got better jobs, they tended to move to one of the new tourism urbanizations, frequently in suburban areas.

Factors like career advancement or social support contribute to the modification of the immigrants' dwelling preferences as time goes by. However, the linkages between residential options and tourism specialization remain. As retirees, a part tend to move from consolidated urbanizations to new urbanizations, but always within the same tourism areas, as a consequence of the identity linkages that the respondents have developed.

A migration project linked to the communities of fellow citizens

As previously stated, tourism activities contribute to offer job opportunities to these migrants but it is also necessary to bear in mind the growth of the communities of active and retired fellow citizens as time goes by, since the growth of this group demands an expanding need for services and, therefore, of job opportunities (O'Reilly, K. 2007).

In fact, most of them have developed their professional activities in close connection with fellow country people, working at pubs and restaurants, selling property to foreign investors, normally of their own geographical origin, renting cars, entertaining tourists through leisure activities, taking care of elderly retirees, etc. Hence, their social space is an in-between space (Levitt, P. and Schiller, N.G. 2004).

As a consequence, many of these foreigners display a relatively low level of integration in their local communities, as reflected in the answers collected by the ENI and the interviews. For example, both sources show that they do not usually participate in politics or vote in the elections (Janoschka, M. and Durán, R. 2013):

'The politics I thought were… I had no vision, just a tourist view… I haven't been interested in politics' (Michael, Torremolinos, Málaga).

'I'm never as interested in politics as to be involved' (Hugh, Mojácar, Almería).

Additionally, the same sources reveal that they generally only take part in social clubs or associations when they are promoted by or organized for fellow citizens:

'I would find myself here amongst the Germans at the German club / Deutscher Club Costa Blanca' (Sylvia, Moraira, Alicante).

'I am a member of the 41 Club, which is more like a dining club' (Nigel, Calvià, Mallorca).

This reveals a tendency to 'seek out their own' (King, R. 2002; Warnes, T. and Williams, A. 2006: 137). This behaviour is similar that of retirement migrants. In interviews conducted by O'Reilly, K. with British (2000) and by Gustafson, P. (2002) with Swedish retirees, the residents recognized that they felt more foreign than Spanish in Spain, and they did not consider a full integration possible or desirable. In this sense, as stated by Breivik, J.K. (2012, 1650) regarding Norwegians, 'being Norwegian in Spain is made by a combination of pride and shame, enthrallment and struggle, integration and separation'. In our research, most of the respondents were not especially worried about integration. They had found strategies for everyday life and come to interpret when they had to deal with specific situations of legal or administrative nature, appreciating the efforts made to assist in their own language by municipalities.

Nevertheless, this lack of interest about the benefits of a greater integration does not preclude having a feeling of identity with the environment in which they develop their daily lives. In this sense, they often claim to wish remain in Spain to the end of their days, to the point that some of them manifest they wish to die in Spain:

'*It is a good place to grow old (…) where there is warm weather and could die comfortably*' (British, 68 years old man, retiree, former teacher of English language).

Similarly, they develop certain behaviours of socially integrated citizens, such as homeownership (67% of the 103 selected immigrants from the ENI purchased a house). All in all, we can say that they develop a personal project of social integration in which a certain sense of transnational identity is balanced with a tourist gaze of life.

Conclusions

In this research, we have confirmed the importance of in-depth interviews and the structural and longitudinal analysis of personal micro-data from statistical sources to study the professional and personal paths of immigrants in tourism destination. Our research is based on the realisation that there are two distinct groups of Northern and Western Europeans residing in Spain. On the one hand, the group made up by those who have arrived during their working lives, from the 1960s on, to enter the labour market and, on the other hand, migrating retirees. The former, whose numbers have grown steadily, has been quantified statistically thanks to the data offered by the Continuous Municipal Register Population, 2011 Housing Census and the Spanish Social Security records. The latter group, which has also grown substantially, has done so at a slightly later stage, from the beginning of the 1990s, as revealed by the Municipal Census and the Residential Variation Statistics. In both cases, the most common residential destinations are Spain's Mediterranean coastal regions and both Spanish archipelagos.

Our paper proposes that there is a certain link between both groups, demonstrating the bridges between labour and retire migrations. The presence of the retirees is not only the consequence of the international migration of retirees, but also of the fact that some of these retirees had formerly been workers who had migrated to Spain during their working years. Our study has allowed us to establish the contribution of these former workers to the number of retired pensioners, who can otherwise be mistaken for immigrants who had arrived after retirement. However, when examining this migration process in greater depth, we realize that its origin is not, in a strict sense, that of a migration of workers.

There are other features in this process that contribute to distort its character as a workers migration flow, or at least, set it apart from other more usual work migration processes: the low use of support networks at their host destination (at least during the first years in Spain); the lack of a contract of employment before emigrating; the absence of a clear idea regarding the kind of job they

wished to find in Spain; their limited proficiency in Spanish; the fact that they do not send remittances back to their home country; or the little prior contact they had had with host areas (and, consequently, with their job markets). Likewise, the fact that the immigrants highlight good weather, the environment or quality of life as factors that had led them to come and look for work in Spain equates them to retired or lifestyle immigrants, as explained by previous studies (Huete, R. *et al*. 2013).

Consequently, we believe that we are dealing with people who brought their dream life forward in a tourism environment during their working life, a phenomenon which, although partly examined by other studies (O'Really, K. 2000, Gustafson, P. 2009; Lunt, N. 2009), has attracted less attention in tourism research. This, in turn, shows the complexity of human mobility in tourism destinations, where the limit between older people who migrate and former labour migrants who have 'aged in place' is blurred (Warnes, T. and Williams, A. 2006, 1257).

Another question of great importance is the factors that condition the permanence of these working migrants. Among them, we have emphasized the labour opportunities and the job success that tourism offers in Spain. There is a link between qualifications, work stability and promotion on the one hand and their permanence on the other, both during their working life and after retirement. Also, we would like to underline the fact that the development of communities of fellow country people made up of active and retired in areas where working migrants reside ends up becoming a key element when explaining the permanence in Spain of former migrants. This is because many of them held jobs closely linked to niches of activities generated by the very existence of these communities, and also because they developed a social life linked to their fellow citizens, as their leisure preferences and social relations reveal.

Precisely this second element has been highlighted as an explanatory factor in the study undertaken by Casado-Díaz, M.A. *et al*. (2014). Thus, we might wonder how many of those active migrants might have taken the decision to stay in Spain if they had not found fellow expatriate communities. Although we cannot establish exact figures, the analysis of in-depth interviews reveals the importance that for their lifestyle their integration in those communities indeed had. For all these reasons, we believe that these immigrants have developed a personal process with a balance between integration and identity, leading them to generate transnational identities.

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Free movement of people and the Brexit

Éva GELLÉR-LUKÁCS[1], Ágnes TÖTTÖS[2] and Sándor ILLÉS[3]

Abstract

This paper deals with the development of free movement of people principle during the initial phase of United Kingdom (UK) exit from European Union (EU). Utilising descriptive methods we highlighted the cornerstones of negotiations till the deal. The Conclusions adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States on 19 February 2016 laid down a set of arrangements between the UK and the EU that try to find a solution for the questions around four problematic areas of EU integration mentioned in the 10 November 2015 letter of David Cameron, in order not to make the concerns of the UK so pronounced that it would lead to the exit of the country from the EU. The study examines the agreement's the fourth policy area (immigration) and the British concerns attached to the social benefits and immigration aspects of the free movement of EU nationals to UK, as well as answers of EU Heads of State and Government and the declarations of the European Commission's will. The analysis covers the abuses experienced by the UK, their legal roots and the possibilities to act against them. The contribution places great emphasis on exploring to what extent the future directions of amendments could be considered clear, how they could be transformed into EU norms, how they could affect the EU legal system and its application. We concluded that the idea of a multi-speed Europe has reached the freedom of movement of people principle. Finally, in light of the Brexit referendum, the authors also try to explore disputable scenarios of how the results could affect the UK's relation with the EU in the near future.

Keywords: Brexit, international migration, free movement of people, labour market, integration, European Union, United Kingdom

Introduction

Simon Ross, the chief executive of Population Matters, the UK's leading charity on population and sustainability issues, claimed that natural resources could not sustain the number of people in Britain or on the planet indefinitely: "It is imperative that we address the factors contributing to increased numbers. We are all affected adversely by the rapid population growth of recent decades, from pressures on housing and public services to the environment and climate change," he said." It's time we addressed the population problem, by improving sex education and family planning provision and by increasing public awareness of the strains population and consumption growth place on us. If we are to live sustainably and happily in the long-term, population growth is an issue that cannot be ignored." – he emphasised.

According to the same medium coverage the UK population is projected to reach 70 million by mid-2027. This mysterious absolute number may function as a threshold in the country of isles (Cangiano, A. 2016) where there is no chance to extend arable lands and the areas overcrowded are everyday experience for citizens.[4] Unlike most countries of the European Union with declining population Britons might not be satisfied due to population increase. The old idea of

[1] Senior lecturer, JOTOKI Postgraduate Law Institute, Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University, H-1053 Budapest, Egyetem tér 1–3. E-mail: drlukacseva@gmail.com

[2] Migration expert, Ministry of Interior, H-1051 Budapest, József Attila u. 2–4. E-mail: agnes.tottos@bm.gov.hu

[3] Director, Active Society Foundation, H-1094 Budapest, Liliom u. 8. E-mail: dr.illes.sandor@gmail.com

[4] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/29/uk-population-expected-to-rise-by-almost-10-million-in-25-years. Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

rigid physical, geographical isolation is supported with fresh thoughts of sustainable development.

In fact the United Kingdom is one of the most fertile countries in EU with net migration over 300,000 people a year. Based on an official scenario the UK population is projected to increase by 9.7 million over the next 25 years from an estimated 64.6 million in mid-2014 to 74.3 million in mid-2039. It is more than 10 percent growth.[5] Assumed net migration accounts for 51 percent of the projected increase over the next 25 years, with natural increase (more births than deaths) accounting for the remaining 49 percent of growth. Over the 10-year period to mid-2024, the UK population is projected to increase by 4.4 million to 69.0 million. This is 249,000 higher than the previous (2012-based) projection for that year. The population is projected to continue ageing, with the average (median) age rising from 40.0 years in 2014 to 40.9 years in mid-2024 and 42.9 by mid-2039. It means that one in 12 of the population is projected to be aged 80 years old or over. [6]

Free movement of people is one of the basic principles of the European Union (EU) (Urry, J. 2007; Gellér-Lukács, É. 2011). This basic right was originally related only to workers (European Economic Community, predecessor of EU), but later it was extended to family members of workers like children, economically inactive adults, retirees, and finally to all citizens of the European Union (Gellér-Lukács, É. 2004; Gyeney, L. 2006). The EU became an area of freedom, security and justice without inner borders where free movement of people testifies the basic freedom of the single market (Illés, S. and Gellér-Lukács, É. 2002; Gellér-Lukács, É. and Illés, S. 2003; Okulicz-Kozaryn, A. 2014). This general principle was disputed (Castles, S. 2014) by the UK fuelled by the plan of *Br*itain's *exit* (*Brexit*) from the European Union. The reasons behind Brexit were mainly supported by news on abuses of the principle of free move and stay in the UK (Blinder, S. and Allen, W.L. 2016).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the separate way aimed by the UK that would distant itself from the rest of the EU is indeed not the first instance of such kind. According to Protocol 21 of the Treaties the United Kingdom and Ireland shall not take part in the adoption by the Council of proposed measures pursuant to Title V of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), including Article 79 of TFEU aiming at developing a common immigration policy. Consequently, no measure adopted pursuant to that Title, no provision of any international agreement concluded by the Union pursuant to that Title, and no decision of the Court of Justice of the EU interpreting any such provisions or measures shall be binding upon or applicable in the UK (Peers, S. 2015). Additionally, in the field of coordination of social security rights the UK has opted out from granting rights for third-country nationals under the renewed coordination mechanism (Eisele, K. 2014).

The main objectives of this paper are two-fold. Firstly and dominantly it aims at documenting the background and negotiation strategies of the Brexit process in the field of free movement of persons including special aspects relevant for Hungary. Secondly, in light of the result of the Brexit referendum we would like to assess the impact of the Brexit deal on future negotiations related to the actual split of the UK from the EU. Supplementary issues like the role of statistical evidence or the long-lasting special status of the UK in the EU are also tackled upon.

The new settlement between the EU and the UK

On 10 November 2015 Prime Minister, David Cameron, put his thoughts into writing regarding the EU membership of the UK, highlight-

[5] http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationprojections/bulletins/nationalpopulationprojections/2015-10-29#tab-Main-points. Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

[6] Ibid.

ing four key areas where the UK was seeking reforms.[7] These areas were the economic governance, competitiveness, sovereignty, and immigration. Within the theme of immigration the reform plan contained the following.

– Firstly, it was proposed that free movement will not apply to new members to be admitted to the EU in the future until their economies have converged much more closely with old member states.

– Secondly, the importance of the goal of fighting abuses of free movement, which includes tougher and longer re-entry bans for fraudsters and people who collude in marriages of convenience, stronger powers to deport criminals and stop them coming back, as well as preventing entry in the first place, and also addressing European Court of Justice (ECJ) judgments that have widened the scope of free movement in a way that has made it more difficult to tackle this kind of abuse.

– Thirdly, Cameron proposed that people coming to Britain from the EU must live there and contribute for four years before they qualify for in-work benefits or social housing, furthermore, that the practice of sending child benefit overseas is to be ended. The third proposal clearly aims to decrease the number of those arriving to the United Kingdom by reducing the attractiveness of the British welfare system.

On 7 December 2015 President of the European Council (EC), Donald Tusk, informed the EC on where the Member States stand on the issue of the UK's proposals.[8] He emphasised that "while we see good prospects for agreeing on ways to fight abuses and possibly on some reforms related to the export of child benefits, there is presently no consensus on the request that people coming to Britain from the EU must live there and contribute for four years before they qualify for in-work benefits or social housing."[9] He also envisaged a concrete proposal to be prepared and finally adopted in February 2016.

On 17 December 2015 the General Affairs Council discussed the British reform proposals. The Member States confirmed their readiness to reflect to the British request with the intention to keep the UK in the EU.[10]

In line with his promise Tusk quickly, already on 2 February 2016, disclosed the multi-point package of proposals, which aimed at – in case of a positive outcome of the British referendum – enacting a number of measures handling the British requests in an appropriate manner.[11] He set a goal that the package of proposals should be adopted by the Council of the Heads of State or Government on its meeting on 18–19 February 2016. The UK also welcomed the package of proposals.

A heated discussion began on the proposed text. All information leaked confirmed the information of the press so far that the free movement of persons is the most controversial topic, and the agreement was practically delayed until the evening because of the questions of family benefits (the bargaining lasted for 40 hours).[12]

The negotiations were successful as the Heads of State and Government could agree and consequently accepted EC Conclusions on Brexit ("New settlement") on their meeting on 18–19 February 2016.[13] The document

[7] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf Retrieved: 02.02.2016.

[8] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/press/press-releases/2015/12/07-tusk-letter-to-28ms-on-uk/ Retrieved: 31. 01.2016.

[9] Furthermore: "All in all it is my assessment that so far we have made good progress. We need some more time to sort out the precise drafting on all of these issues, including the exact legal form the final deal will take. We also have to overcome the substantial political differences that we still have on the issue of social benefits and free movement."

[10] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/press/press-releases/2015/12/18-euco-conclusions/ Retrieved: 31.01.2016.

[11] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/02-letter-tusk-proposal-new-settlement-uk/ Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

[12] http://www.bruxinfo.hu/cikk/20160220-negyven-ora-alkudozas-utan-megszuletett-az-eu-brit-megallapodas.html Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

[13] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/19-euco-conclusions/ Retrieved: 10-03-2016

contained seven legal texts: the Conclusions of the EC (including issues of migration and external relations); a Decision of the Heads of State or Government concerning a new settlement for the UK within the EU; a Statement of the EC containing a draft Council Decision on the effective management of the banking union and a Declaration of the EC on competitiveness; four Declarations of the European Commission among which three are related to free movement (migration). Section D of Annex 1 ("Social benefits and free movement") is the most relevant regarding the free movement of persons (and therefore will be discussed in details in this paper).

It was clear that – in case the UK voted for remaining in the EU – the Commission would present proposals on the modification of the relevant secondary EU law and a proposal on a new draft of *Directive on residence rights* was to be expected, as well. The general expectation was that the Commission would present these proposals in line with the above mentioned EC Conclusions and the Commission's Declarations.

Background of the family benefits and immigration issues

After the global financial crisis the net inflows from EU countries to UK grew significantly (Wadsworth, J. *et al.* 2016). An estimated number of about 300,000 EU citizens arrived to the United Kingdom who wanted to work, study or reunite with family in 2015. The UK's social welfare system seems to be quite attractive: anyone who works for a minimum wage can receive 6,000–7,000 pounds extra from 'in-work' benefits per year.[14] Leaving aside the special characteristics of these benefits it should be stressed that these benefits are only available for low wage earners. They can be claimed by those whose annual income does not exceed 15,000 pounds, but the amount varies stepwise. The maximum support is available at a yearly income of 8,000 pounds, but then it starts to decrease, and at the 15,000 pounds threshold it ceases. In fact, this 'in-work ' benefit is a supplement, which guarantees a minimum of 15,000 pounds annual income for the person concerned. This is considered as a sort of minimum subsistence level.

In an international comparison it should be emphasised that the other two major migration destination countries (Germany and France) do not per se link such benefits with low-paid jobs. The UK classifies itself the fourth most generous country in Europe on the basis of benefits paid after Denmark, Luxembourg and Ireland.[15] Nor should it be overlooked that non-EU citizen workers cannot be employed in the United Kingdom as unskilled labour (for 'low-skilled jobs')[16] meaning that these jobs are available – in lack of available British workers – mostly for EU citizens. Indeed, it may be therefore that a major limitation of the benefits would affect the financial motivation of potential migrants with regard to migration to the UK.[17]

Obviously, theoretically speaking, a huge burden can fall by the amount of these benefits on the British budget, when each year hundreds of thousands of workers arrive and some of them also apply for benefits. But what is the proportion of those applying for benefits in practice?

In 2015 10 percent of people born in the UK and 12 percent of those born in other EU countries applied for benefits.[18] In the area of non-work-related benefits, however, the share of benefit receivers among citizens of other EU countries was only 2.2 percent

[14] Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit and Universal Credit.

[15] http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/284 Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

[16] https://www.gov.uk/tier-2-general/overview Retrieved: 11.03.2016.

[17] http://archive.openeurope.org.uk/Article/Page/en/LIVE?id=22825&page=PressReleases# „Restricting these in-work benefits would make a huge difference to potential migrants' financial incentives while allowing free movement to stand." Retrieved: 12.03.2016.

[18] http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/commentary/pulling-power-why-are-eu-citizens-migrating-uk Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

(and among those of working age, 6.8%). Moreover, if British citizens and citizens of the EU-10 countries are compared in terms of getting social housing, it can be seen that mobile workers from EU-10 countries have much less recourse to social housing.[19]

Further data support what is also described in a recent material of the Oxford University Migration Observatory, namely that the primary motivation of EU citizens for migration is not to get welfare benefits, but to work (78%) and these are followed by pursuing studies, and by family reunification. According to a survey conducted in 2015 the fastest growing group of workers is formed by citizens of EU-10 countries, among them the employment rate is high, 90 percent for men and 75 percent for women, both figures are higher than the rate of UK citizens.[20] *Table 1* shows the actual numbers of top sending countries.

migrants which means ca. one-third increase. The most dynamic increase was produced by Romania with 150 percent growth which equals to 136,000 net surplus. From an East-Central-European angle Hungary has the third place in absolute terms. The number of Hungarian immigrants staying in the UK was 50,000 in 2011, while this number increased to 96,000 by 2015. The growth was nearly 100 percent within five years. In addition, lots of migrants arrived to the UK from other countries of East-Central-Europe as well in the examined five year period.

Data on the number of Hungarians living in the UK vary greatly. According to the data of the Office of National Statistics (ONS) on population and community in 2015 there were 82,000 Hungarians living in the UK.[21] At the same time the overall number of Hungarian nationals who were registered

Table 1. Six most dynamic sending countries regarding EU migrants in the UK in 2011 and 2015

Origin country	2011	2015	Change
	1,000 migrants		
Poland	615	818	203
Romania	87	223	136
Spain	63	137	74
Italy	126	176	50
Hungary	50	96	46
Portugal	96	140	44
EEA total	*2,580*	*3,277*	*696*
Six most dynamic sending countries	1,037	1,590	553
Ratio of top six countries in all EEA, %	40	49	79

Source: Migration Observatory analysis of LFS data, quarterly averages, all ages. http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/commentary/pulling-power-why-are-eu-citizens-migrating-uk Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

According to *Table 1* out of the six most dynamic sending countries three are situated in East-Central-Europe. In absolute term Poland (White, A. 2014) is leading both for volumes and dynamism. The number of Polish migrants grew from 615,000 to 818,000 people during the investigated five years. The change was the highest with 203,000 more im-

in the National Health Service amounted to 210,000 until mid-2016. The differences between the two data-set are noted by the ONS in its explanatory document,[22] namely that the latter statistic contains also those who

[19] http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_publication/field_ef_document/ef1546en_3.pdf Eurofound (2015), *Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on public services*, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

[20] Ibid.

[21] https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationality. Retrieved: 10.06.2016. There is a 13,000 condience limit foreseen.

[22] https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/noteonthedifferencebetweennationalinsurancenumberregistrationsandtheestimateoflongterminternationalmigration/previousReleases. Retrieved: 10.06.2016.

have already left the country. Unofficial estimates on the number of Hungarians living in the UK oscillate between 80,000 and 150,000.

The conclusion to be drawn is that if the UK aims at achieving savings, it is not worth limiting the kind of benefits that are not necessarily taken by the migrants (non-work-related benefits) but those which are granted to them. That is why the UK wanted to reach a solution on the basis of which it became entitled to restrict access to in-work benefits for newcomers during a four-year-long period. However, neither the term of 'newcomer' nor that of 'four-year period' is clear. While it is believed that the newcomers as primarily East-Central-European guest workers, during the negotiations there was no distinction made amongst EU nations. However, the most sensible reaction came from the Polish side.

Abuse I – Family benefits

If we talk about the coordination of family benefits, it is important to be aware of further statistical data. Already in the beginning of 2013 the amount of child benefits paid overseas was discussed in the UK.[23] At that time – based on data from 2012 – there were child benefit awards in respect of 40,171 children who lived in another country (overwhelmingly in Poland). Prime Minister David Cameron started elaborating on the topic and in January 2014, speaking to BBC1's Andrew Marr show he said: "I don't think that is right and that is something I want to change."[24] He referred to Polish workers and the benefits paid to them and their families. Poland's foreign minister has soon reacted and criticised David Cameron for judging the export of benefits as a 'wrong' thing. Radoslaw Sikorski accused the Prime Minister of 'stigmatising' Poles by singling out the nation's migrant workers in his comment. Mr. Sikorski posted via the Twitter that: '*If Britain gets our taxpayers, shouldn't it also pay their benefits? Why should Polish taxpayers subsidise British taxpayers' children?*'[25] This incident clearly gave a hint that this topic would be on the sensible political agenda for long. And so it happened. In the spring of 2014 the British media began spreading numbers about exported family benefits. The Daily Mail newspaper e.g. wrote that "UK taxpayers are spending £30 million-a-year sending child benefit to families who live abroad across the European Union" and "UK taxpayer funds payments to 20,400 families with 34,268 children".[26] Published data showed that almost two-thirds of the benefits were sent to Poland (22,000 children), followed by Ireland (2,500), Lithuania (1,700), France (1,400) and Slovakia (1,200). Latvia (1,091) and Spain (1,020) also exceeded 1,000 children, all the other countries were lagging behind (e.g. Hungary with 196 children).

The exact magnitude of the problem was, however, not entirely clear. The above figures were published everywhere with slight changes, but a more serious search was necessary to find how these figures related to all British child-care expenditure. A parliamentary research report[27] showed that the above figures should be compared to 7.9 million beneficiaries (families), meaning that the 20,000 EU families amount to a total of 0.25 percent of all the beneficiaries. Official comparison can be found from the early 2016 according to which

[23] http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/288. Retrieved: 10.06.2016.

[24] Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2534738/Poland-hits-Cameron-plan-stop-child-benefit-exported-EU.html#ixzz45ViZrb9A. Retrieved: 10.03.2016.

[25] Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2534738/Poland-hits-Cameron-plan-stop-child-benefit-exported-EU.html#ixzz45ViZrb9A 'If Britain gets our taxpayers, shouldn't it also pay their benefits? Why should Polish taxpayers subsidise British taxpayers' children'. Retrieved: 12.03.2016.

[26] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2632914/Child-benefit-worth-30million-paid-Britain-families-EU-Cameron-admits-impossible-stop-it.html 'UK taxpayers are spending £30million-a-year sending child benefit to families who live abroad across the European Union" and "UK taxpayer funds payments to 20,400 families with 34,268 children' Retrieved: 17.03.2016.

[27] http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN06955/SN06955.pd pp. 17. Retrieved: 17.03.2016.

the rate is 0.26 percent, while the House of Commons states that 0.26 percent of total UK child benefit claims are paid to EU migrants whose children live in another EU member state (a mass of 13 million children is entitled to be compared to the 35,000 children who do not live in the British Isles).

It can be seen first, that the number of exports – 20,000 families annually – cannot be considered outstanding compared to the UK population and the number of families (i.e. 7.9 million) living there. Secondly, regarding the absolute number of entitled children, it can be seen that the numbers are clearly decreasing, from 40,171 in 2012 to 34,268 in 2015 (i.e. 15% decrease). Considering the diminishing trend we can say that the problem is tiny unlike the political attention that was given to it and the debate fuelled in the UK till in/out referendum.

David Cameron has admitted in the abovementioned Marr interview that according to existing EU law it is impossible to stop paying benefits across the borders to the family members of migrant workers. It is clear that he already wanted to change the scope of EU law in order to tackle this issue, although in light of the previous figures prioritization of this issue cannot be fully understood.

An important conclusion can be drawn, even if – as indicated – the actual impact will be seen in light of the specific solution given to the problem later, namely that Cameron strongly stressed that he wanted to abolish (to decrease) the export of child benefits, even though the magnitude of the issue (0.26% of the families involved and 25 million pound annual savings) does not seem to be paramount for the fifth biggest economy of the world.

Abuse II – Immigration issues

The right to free movement and residence has never been unlimited (Wiesbrock, A. 2010; Kotef, H. 2015; Ahrens, J. *et al.* 2016), even though Member States are obliged to act against abusive exercises of this right. The primary purpose of this restriction is not the sanction as such, but to reduce abuses for the purpose that the mobility *bona fide* EU citizens and their family members could have positive effects in the most comprehensive way on both the migrants and the Member States concerned. The EU system of intra-EU mobility presupposes the Member States trust towards each other and is intended to enhance mutually beneficial nature of this mobility to all stakeholders. In case this trust is disrupted as a result of the abuse, it risks the uniform and effective enforcement of the entire system (Tóth, G. *et al.* 2014).

The UK is, therefore, aiming at regaining the freedom, rights and competences, transferred to the EU in the area of free movement of persons, the freedom which the UK already enjoys in the area of immigration of non-EU nationals (Wiesbrock, A. 2010). The UK already used its freedom to focus heavily on managing migration to a great extent. In its 2005 paper Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain – five year strategy for asylum and immigration, one of the goals set out was to uphold an immigration system which responds to public concerns.

From an immigration perspective, that is from the point of view of the rules of entry and residence, rules of procedure and substantive conditions and limitations regarding exercising the right to free movement the Brexit settlement identifies future steps in two respects. One area of law concerns the prevention of the abuse of rights or fraud, which was set out by Point c) Section D of Annex I and in the Declaration of the European Commission in Annex VII. In this area the expressive purpose of the Union is to act against the use of false documents, the prevention of marriages of convenience (Töttős, Á. 2015) and reducing bogus intra-EU mobility (not sufficiently genuine residence in another Member State) used for invoking the Free Movement Directive in the EU citizen's own Member State.

Even though the Member States have already received guidelines regarding how to ensure proper implementation regarding the general application of the Directive as well as actions against marriages of convenience,

the Brexit settlement has envisioned further actions against the abuse of rights. While the plan to act against the use of false documents has only been mentioned in the documents, the plans on the fight against marriages of convenience and bogus intra-EU mobility have been set out in more details in the documents.

Viewing the Brexit settlement from the perspectives of EU peripheries it can be concluded that the idea of multi-speed Europe has reached the area of free movement of people principle, as well. While the UK already had an opt-out from harmonisation concerning the migration rules valid for non-EU nationals or the Schengen acquis, now the political cooperation in the interest of freedom of movement has also become fragmented. Furthermore, it is done in a way that as a result of the political bargaining process with one single Member State has resulted in providing an opportunity for all the Member States to withdraw from the results achieved so far.

From a legal perspective we cannot hide the fact that the plans set out in the Brexit settlement means a clear step back from the rights ensured by the free movement rules so far. We can therefore observe a unique phenomenon: the legal development that was primarily brought forward by the ECJ not only comes to a halt, but a step back is expected compared to the present achievements. Consequently, while other areas of EU legislation are usually characterised by including the results of jurisprudence, now limitations contrary to EU case law are about to be expressively set out by EU legislators.

As for the future of free movement, the wish of the UK, according to which this right would not be automatically be extended to the newly accessing Member States, will most probably come true.

The results of referendum and its short-term outcomes

The Remain/Leave referendum (in which 72.2% of registered voters took part) was held on Thursday 23 June 2016. 51.9 percent voted in favour of leaving the EU and 48.1 percent voted in favour of remaining a member state of the EU, thus, the Leave option won. The final results showed clear geographical pattern. England and Wales voted for Brexit (together 53.4%), while Scotland and Northern Ireland voted predominantly against (62% and 55.8% respectively).The results of the regions mirrored the general pattern except for the London region *(Figure 1)* where the majority supported the Remain option.

Unfortunately, academic research results have not been published yet since the referendum due to the relatively short time period. But we can hypothesise with great probabilities that retirees favoured Brexit in contrast of youngsters who preferred the Remain option (Hobolt, S. 2016). The academics with low absolute number compared to others segment of society said no to UK



Fig. 1. Brexit referendum results by regions in the UK. *Source*: Electoral Commission

exit (Cressey, D. 2016a,b). The residents of dynamic cities and their surroundings wanted to stay in the EU in contrast with declining towns and/or peripheral rural areas. In general voters of local districts with significant immigrant population preferred the Remain option against Leave.

David Cameron resigned and Theresa May became Prime Minister on 13 July 2016. Well in advance pound had been devaluated by the financial market, with all consequences on other markets. It was interesting that the subject of media news of migration focused more on the potential emigration of the employees of the City rather than the return of the former East-Central-European newcomers.

"Should European Union nationals already living in the United Kingdom be allowed to stay after Brexit? According to a new poll, 84 percent of Britons think they should. Based on the findings of the survey, which was carried out by ICM for think-tank British Future, the 84 percent includes those who voted in favour of the UK leaving the EU in the June referendum. As reported online by The Week, this is a most surprising finding, given that immigration was the cornerstone of the Leave campaign. In fact, 77 percent of those who voted for Brexit and 78 percent of Ukip supporters agreed EU nationals currently in the UK should be free to remain. Although 62 percent of those polled wanted to see a reduction in the number of unskilled migrants coming to the UK, a majority (including Leave voters) did not want to reduce the influx of highly-skilled migrants, such as engineers and doctors."[28]

Medium-term consequences of referendum – scenarios

We depicted the short-term outcomes of the referendum with its numerical results in the previous section. Based on these facts we tend to conclude that the referendum strengthened tendencies of uncertainty and disintegration in Europe (Welsh, M. 2014; Bachmann, V. and Sidaway, J.D. 2016; Tabernero, J and Ciardiello, F. 2016), discrimination in Britain (Fow, J.E. *et al.* 2015) and polarisation and socio-spatial peripheralisation in East-Central-Europe (Lang, T. 2015). It reinforces regional disparities in terms of political opinion of residents with urban and rural background in the UK (Hobolt, S. 2016). Moreover, it makes the separatist movement in Europe and the rest of the World stronger (Montanari, A. 2012) and also fortifies the separation of the nations in the UK (Hudson, R. and Williams, A.M. 1998). It fuels the idea and reality of multi-speed EU (Carmel, E. 2014). It strengthens the global nuclear status quo originating from the Cold War period (Cohen, J.H. and Sirkeci, I. 2011).

In the following we try to make some mid-term Brexit scenarios based on relevant literature. Obviously, we are aware of the uncertainty of projections for the future in general, what overlaps with other sorts of uncertainty stemming from Brexit (Vaughne, M. 2016). International comparisons are also necessary to collide ideas, conceptual frameworks and results which tend to explain, contextualise (Bachmann, V. and Sidaway, J.D. 2016) and conceptualise (Kagarlitsky, B. 2016; Pettifor, A. 2016) this particular event in Europe and its potential consequences.[29] Academic, business and policy debates on the relationship between the free movement of persons (Kotef, H. 2015) and the free movement of workers in particular (Buckley, M. *et al.* 2016) are necessary to explore the multi-layered outcomes of the Brexit phenomenon.[30]

[28] https://www.neweurope.eu/article/majority-brits-want-eu-migrants-stay/. Retrieved: 19.07.2016.

[29] The most recent legal disputes on the constitutional requirements of the UK for making the decision to withdraw from the EU are, however, not considered among the scenarios.

[30] The method used in this study to analyse the subject matter is highly descriptive. This method can be used in other papers and thus enables future comparative studies. Nevertheless, for such studies, comparable and reliable data sources and well-founded analyses are needed to be developed at national and international levels.

When making the mid-term scenarios we have chosen the analyses of Commerzbank (Germany), which provides a system of scenarios with numerical probabilities on each version of projection.[31] In our view there are four probable scenarios worth mentioning which are enumerated below starting with the less probable outcome:

– *Scenario 1.* Our odds: 0.01. The probability is one to one hundred on '*hardBrexit*' which would imply a sudden and strict separation from the EU. This scenario would affect the country's relationship most negatively; therefore, we give almost no probability to its realisation. (As a reference also Commerzbank value is shown in every case, for this scenario: 0.2).

– *Scenario 2.* Our odds: 0.09. The probability of '*adoption of existing Norwegian or Swiss models*' (Tálas, P. *et al.* 2016) is nine times higher than the hardBrexit. (Commerzbank value: 0.5).

– *Scenario 3.* Our odds: 0.30. The probability is three to ten on a '*peculiar Brit solution*' (Pisany-Ferry, J. *et al.* 2016). This scenario has below average chance nowadays. It depends mainly on the interference of Cameron's previous deal and May's future activity under the umbrella of British voters and as things now stands also the British Parliament. (There is no Commerzbank value for this case).

– *Scenario 4.* Our odds: 0.60. According to the authors' subjective judgement the '*postponing Brexit*' scenario might function in the near future with the highest probability. This option is built on the idea of a long transition and provides the biggest arena for stakeholders both in the context of the EU and other international organizations (Commerzbank value: 0.30).

Conclusions

International comparisons are necessary to conceptualise Brexit and its potential consequences (Scott, S. 2013; Bachmann, V. and Sidaway, J.D. 2016; Kagarlitsky, B. 2016; Pettifor, A. 2016). Academic, business and policy debates on the relationship between the free movement of persons (Kotef, H. 2015) and the free movement of workers in particular (Buckley, M. *et al.* 2016) are necessary to explore the multi-layered outcomes of this particular event in Europe. We argued in this paper that the principle of free movement of persons – one of the most sensitive issues in Europe – was put to a test through the Brexit process, and albeit the settlement symbolised a certain political compromise, it did not satisfy British public concerns. As a result, a new settlement becomes necessary. In our view, the basis of the forthcoming settlement could be very similar to the first settlement because the trends behind the Brexit process remained unchanged and the only compromise text available is the Brexit deal itself. No real room for manoeuvre seems to exist and this difficult situation supports to a great deal our clear vote for the '*postponing Brexit*' scenario.

Hungarian literature to date analysed the mobility of Hungarian citizens to UK as part of the general emigration process (Gödri, I. *et al.* 2014; Hárs, Á. 2014; Moreh, C. 2014) relating mostly with the special groups of highly skilled workers and low skilled workers (Eke, E. *et al.* 2011; Balázs, P. 2012; Juhász, R. 2014; Irimiás, A. and Michalkó, G. 2016). The added value of this paper is that it highlights the cornerstones of the development of the principle of free movement of people during the initial phase of Brexit. Statistical evidence stresses two basic facts (Schwanen, T. and Kwan, M.P. 2009) on the Brexit debate from a Hungarian perspective:

– Less than 200 children receive British 'in-work benefit' per year in Hungary.

– Between 2011 and 2015 the increase of immigrants of Hungarian origin was the fifth greatest in the UK in absolute terms.

Typical news in the British media was in August 2016: "Poland has overtaken India as the most common non-UK country of birth for people living in the UK, Office for National Statistics figures show. … India and the Republic of Ireland have traditionally been the sources of the UK's largest foreign-born groups. The latest net migration figures

[31] http://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/milyen_brexit_harom_honap_alatt_semmi_nem_tortent.237749.html Retrieved: 31.10.2016.

show a slowdown in the numbers settling in the UK from Poland and seven other former Eastern bloc countries – but that was offset by an increase in net migration from Bulgaria and Romania, which hit record levels of 60 000."[32].

The UK is clearly aiming at regaining the freedom, rights and competences, transferred to the EU in the area of free movement of persons, the freedom which the UK already enjoys in the area of immigration of non-EU nationals (Wiesbrock, A. 2010). The UK already used its freedom to focus heavily on managing migration to a great extent. Already in its 2005 paper "Controlling our borders: Making migration work for Britain – five year strategy for asylum and immigration", one of the goals set out was to uphold an immigration system which responds to public concerns.[33] The only question remains how this system will look like and how it will influence competitiveness of the UK and East–West migration patterns.

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BOOK REVIEW

Dominguez-Mujica, J. (ed.): Global Change and Human Mobility. Singapore, Springer, 2016. 347 p.

Migration has accompanied humanity since the dawn of time. Viewed in geopolitical, cultural, and ethnic terms, the world in which we live is to an enormous extent the result of migration processes and their implications. Present-day migrations, by which I mean in the period since World War II, have taken on a special character by virtue of their massive extent and dynamism, their ethno-racial and professional structure, their destination countries, and the manifold, increasingly difficult to describe and foresee consequences they give rise to. Specialists in the field of contemporary population movements argue that migration analysis should be expanded to include research into 'human mobility'. A welcome contribution to this ongoing debate can be found in 'Global Change and Human Mobility', edited and published by Springer in 2016. It contains 17 chapters by various authors addressing migration issues, and presents the reader with new trends in human mobility along with new interpretations of familiar processes.



After the first chapter, which is both introductory and theoretical, the remainder of the book sets out case studies on various aspects of migration. These are not related to each other and discuss an assortment of themes. Commendably, each chapter has an extensive theoretical preface, allowing the reader to understand the nature of the question being addressed, followed by (often very interesting) empirical research.

Chapter 1 by Armando Montanari and Barbara Staniscia introduces the issues which form the central concern of the book. It should be noted that the authors have been very thorough in tracing the development of interest in human mobility, and how multidisciplinary studies have gained in significance. The wide range of research into population movements, in all its various forms, scales, practices and technologies means that the concept of human mobility has many 'fathers' (as pointed out by King, R. 2012). Today's widely recognised and formally 'promulgated' mobility paradigm gained importance through the publication of John Urry's 'Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century' (2000), Tim Creswell's 'On the Move' (2006) and Urry's 'Mobilities' (2007). According to the authors of Chapter 1, the contemporary approach has its roots in comparative studies carried out by the Chicago School in the 1920s. These studies resulted in the concept of the dynamism of the urban structure becoming a priority in research from the 1960s onwards, which in turn contributed to the recognition of the phenomenon of human mobility as a research subject in the 1980s. In my opinion, especially worthy of note is the section of the chapter discussing studies conducted over the last 20 years from which we can see the speed of change in this area of research. This chapter will prove useful as an introduction to human mobility as an issue of multidisciplinary research, and a guide to further reading thanks to its extensive bibliography.

In Chapter 2, Daniel Göler and Ziga Krišjāne undertake a comparison of the migration networks formed by migrants from Albania and Latvia. The authors point out that these networks may respond differently to events of global importance, such as economic crises, therefore in addition to studying phenomena in a transnational dimension, it is also necessary to look at 'diverse regional characteris-

tics'. In this chapter the authors propose the use of transregionalism as a new conceptual framework, which seems very interesting especially in the context of comparative research in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the choice of case studies is a little surprising. On the one hand, it may be commended as original, but on the other hand, given the diverse history and scale of migration it is somewhat risky. In this light, it would seem appropriate that the applicability of the proposed research framework be tested with further case studies.

In Chapter 3, Dirk Godenau and Ana López-Sala examine the problems of unregulated migration and the subject of border control. They attempt to find points of contact between migration and border studies, and as background to their analysis they select initiatives being undertaken along the southern border of Europe. This aspect of their contribution is extremely important today, when divisions over migration policy have taken on new significance in the face of the refugee crisis in Europe, and have exposed the lack of a common approach to matters of border security.

Chapter 4 also addresses the issue of unregulated migration, but from the point of view of the situation of women. Sinehlanhla Memela and Brij Maharaj present an emotive description of the situation of female refugees and a critical assessment of the effectiveness of previously conceived policy towards them. The chapter is a kind of 'manifesto' which emphasises the double discrimination of the women concerned (because of their gender, but also due to political persecution), and puts forward recommendations for improving their lot.

Chapters 5 to 9 discuss migration and integration issues from various research perspectives. In Chapter 5, Victor Armony deals with immigration policy and the integration model developed in Canada. Although Canada is seen as an almost perfect model country in terms of integration, the author draws attention to the tensions which exist between the Francophone-dominated province of Quebec and the rest of the country inhabited by an English-speaking majority. He highlights the ongoing struggle between advocates of the multiculturalist and interculturalist models, which is also the reason for the existence of two competing approaches to the integration of newcomers to Canada.

The next chapter takes us to South America, where Susana María Sassone analyses the role of migrants as actors and agents of the spatial transformation of contemporary Argentine cities. The author's study of immigrant communities in the towns and cities of Argentina points to a "new profile of the postmodern migrant" (p. 98), who reacts variously to globalisation and creates neighbourhoods in a specific manner – on the basis of transnational relationships.

In Chapter 7, Yann Richard, Mathilde Maurel and William Berthomière analyse the relationship between integration and migrant associations in France. The authors examine four immigrant communities (Algerian, Portuguese, Turkish and Vietnamese) and ask whether there is a connection between the distribution and density of existing organisations and the degree of migrant integration, and whether membership in those organisations makes easier for migrants to integrate or not. This issue is extremely important from the point of view of integration policy, and therefore the authors are to be commended for seeking to identify the subject. It is a pity, however, that when the authors come to draw conclusions they leave the questions posed at the outset with no clear answer.

Chapter 8 introduces us to the issue of the integration of the Thai community. The authors, Daniel Šnajdr and Dušan Drbohlav, focus on strategies adopted by Thai migrants in the Czech Republic, drawing comparisons with four models of migration and integration used by this community (in the US, Germany, the UK and Scandinavia). The chapter also addresses the important contemporary issue of marriage migration, which in recent years is becoming the domain of women from the poorer regions of Southeast Asia.

Chapter 9 takes us into the world of emotions and expectations. Anna Irimiás and Gábor Michalkó present the results of research into Hungarians who have migrated to the UK. These highlight the significance of the individual expectations of migrants concerning the receiving country at different stages of the migration process, and migrants' adaptive capacity. An extremely interesting aspect of the chapter is the authors' description of post-accession migration from Central and Eastern Europe with a focus on the specificity of the behaviour of Hungarian migrants. They point out that Hungary has traditionally had a 'sedentarist' population for whom labour migration is a new phenomenon.

Chapter 10 addresses the question of illegal immigration from the point of view of the role of social initiatives in the United States attempting to mitigate problems associated with this phenomenon which has aroused such conflicting emotions. Miguel Glatzer and Tara Carr-Lemke focus on a case study dealing with the New Sanctuary Movement of Philadelphia. They show how this organisation is attempting both to assist irregular migrants to comply with relevant laws, and to change negative public attitudes.

Chapters 11 to 14 relate to the migration of young people. Chapters 11 and 12 focus in particular on the migration behaviours of Spanish youth. In the first of the pair, Josefina Domínguez-Mujica, Ramón Díaz-Hernández and Juan Parreño-Castellano present the general characteristics of the emigration of young people from Spain during the last economic crisis, while in the second, Birgit Glorius describes migration to Germany. In both cases, the authors emphasise that contemporary migrations of young people have little in common with past labour migrations and

should be treated as a new form of population movement. Today's young migrants are very consciously using their transnational connections to make migration processes more flexible, and are adept at developing different adaptation strategies in the face of changing circumstances.

In Chapter 13, Cristóbal Mendoza and Anna Ortiz examine the academic careers and life transitions of foreign PhD students in Barcelona. Then, in Chapter 14, Maria Lucinda Fonseca, Sónia Pereira and Juliana Chatti Iorio describe the migration of Brazilian students to Portugal. Both these chapters illustrate the very important role played by educational institutions in creating new migration networks, and they also highlight the existence of competition for talent between sending and receiving countries.

The last three chapters also deal with issues in which there is growing interest: migration spillover into rural areas, the relationship between development and migration, and environmental migration. In Chapter 15, Birte Nienaber and Ursula Roos consider whether international migration is contributing to the development of a 'globalized countryside' (looking at the example of Germany), in line with the premise of Cid Aguayo (2008), that globalisation processes take place in all aspects of life, even in small settlements. Although the authors do not definitively conclude that we can in fact speak of a 'globalized countryside', this chapter deserves attention because it describes the important contemporary phenomenon of migration spillover, which is increasingly affecting small towns and rural areas where high migration levels had previously not been experienced. This is a new challenge for integration policy. Chapter 16, by Ioan Ianos, discusses internal and external migration in Romania with particular attention to the correlation between migration and economic development. The impact of the EU's flexible mobility environment on migration patterns is also emphasised. The last chapter, written by Judith Medina do Nascimento, Claudio Moreno-Medina, Alexandre N. Rodrigues and Herculano Dinis links two issues: environmental migration and risk management. The migration strategies of local inhabitants and the question of their home area attachment are analysed as a challenge to the borders of volcanic areas at risk.

The popularity of population mobility issues has led to the appearance of many related publications. It is extremely difficult to produce a book on this subject which contains original material and thus serves to complement existing studies. 'Global Change and Human Mobility' has to a large degree been able to achieve this. The book's authors in the main present fresh subject matter and analysis, unfamiliar to a wider audience. Although the level and depth of the content varies, it is noteworthy that in most of the chapters we find a well researched introduction to the given topic, often providing a critical (which I consider a positive trait) evaluation of existing theoretical assumptions. It should be noted, however, that the book focuses on Europe and the Americas, and does not give examples from other parts of the world. The lack of attention given to Asian migration (with the welcome exception of Chapter 8) is particularly regrettable as this is a process which is currently in dynamic transition.

According to Hannam, K. *et al.* (2006, pp. 9–10), today the area of research into mobility encompasses: "studies of corporeal movement, transportation and communication, capitalist spatial restructuring, migration and immigration, citizenship and transnationalism, and tourism and travel". This goes far beyond the traditional understanding of migration studies which dominated until recently. From this perspective, I feel that the book could have included a case study on tourism and travel as very significant elements of human mobility.

An undoubted strength of the book is the fact that most of its chapters relate to countries where migration transition is taking place, in varying forms. I was particularly interested in the chapters dealing with migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Studies relating to this area were for many years focused on analysing the situation in the receiving or sending countries, whereas today there is a very visible trend towards assuming a fluidity in relations between different spaces. Studies show that there has been an increase in the intensity and diversity of migrations, which include almost all social groups. Very importantly in my view, the diversity of contemporary migrations means that it is increasingly difficult to describe them and foresee their likely impact. The studies contained in 'Global Change and Human Mobility' attempt to strike a balance between the importance of global (transnational and transregional dimensions) and local factors (associated with locational characteristics). This allows the reader to look for the common characteristics of migrations, but also understand the specific nature of the migration in each case, in line with the assumption that a global process can manifest itself in the form of diverse local phenomena.

In my opinion the book can be recommended to a wide audience, including scholars, students and all those interested in contemporary migrations. Although specialist issues are addressed, readers will be able to understand the nature of a given problem to be analysed thanks to the detailed chapter introductions. As a university teacher, I believe this book will be very helpful in working with students, as each of the chapters can be a starting point for many hours of discussion.

Barbara Jaczewska[1]
Translated by Mark ZniderICZ

[1] Faculty of Geography and Regional Studies, University of Warsaw, Warsaw. E-mail: bgibki@uw.edu.pl

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Whereas migration has been a key topic in geography and sociology already for some time, it could be expected that the events of 2015 will only serve its further growth. True, as this volume was finalised in September that year, we cannot expect it to have focused on the refugee crisis that reached its peak during exactly that month. The introduction as well as the conclusions nevertheless refer to the world-famous image of Aylan Kurdi – a young boy fleeing or migrating to Europe with his family – as he lies drowned on the Mediterranean shores of Turkey (p. xv; p. 227). The manner in which various acts of migration have been "discursively framed in recent times, and how that framing impacts on individual and collective lived experience, whether through formal policies or through more nebulous and often hostile public attitudes," is what concerns the authors of this volume (p. xv).

From the perspective of social sciences in Hungary and Central and Eastern Europe, an interesting feature of the book is its open and explicit positionality: "in terms of the politics of the contributions contained herein ... they are all supportive of migration" (p. xvi). Such a transparent approach can be exemplary in a region where social scientists still too often think or at least work under the premise that objectivity is always necessary, or even desirable. The added value of not assuming that is reflected in the volume's aim: "this text seeks to explore *and problematise* the relationship of discourse to issues of representation, and as such, highlights *inequality, exclusion, subjugation, dominance and privilege* in the context of migration" (p. xv, my emphasis). Indeed, such a position implies an emancipatory character of the contribution, instead of simply providing a descriptive account of the state of affairs that can never be fully objective anyway.



Perhaps almost inevitably, such a position will also frame the analysis so that it will arrive at conclusions such as that "the mainstream media routinely circulate content which presents the migrant and migration in a predominantly negative light" (p. 225). While such a general statement is far-fetched (cf. The Economist 2011; Carvalho, P. 2015; Harford, T. 2015; Travis, A. 2016), it needs to be seen in the light of that "the book is not an exhaustive account of the phenomenon of migration. Far from claiming to be definitive, this volume is unapologetically selective" (p. xvi).

Still, an extensive volume on migration in our days would benefit from at least touching upon, if not thoroughly engage with, influential conservative thinkers such as Roger Scruton (2015). The latter argued that "true conservatism seeks to maintain the authority of and public allegiance to the state... It encourages respect for the customs and institutions of civil society, including marriage and the family, religion," etc. (Freeman, S. 2016, p. 32). For Scruton, liberalism "regards individual freedom and individuality as fundamental values," and "thereby threatens to undermine the institutions that are the source of individuals' identity as well as the bonds of their community" (Freeman, S. 2016, p. 32). Whether or not we agree with such criticisms of liberalism, we cannot fully ignore them in a time of their apparent growing influence.

The volume should be interesting for Central and Eastern European scholars already for its methodology. While approaches differ, most chapters apply particular models of discourse analysis that are still relatively uncommon in our region. The editors understand discourse as "both an expression and a mechanism for power, by which particular social realities are conceived, made manifest, legitimated, naturalised, challenged, resisted and re-imagined" (p. xv). Public and political discourses on migration are of key importance as "they are responsible for framing the issue, and for how, when and where it arrives on the public/political spectrum" (p. xvi). In other words, discourses can strongly influence public opinion and policy, which could well be observed in the ways the 2015 refugee crisis was framed in Hungary (Balogh, P. 2016).

The anthology includes fifteen case studies, fourteen of which focus on communities in a specific country (in one case, in two countries). Six cases are on Ireland; two on the UK; and one each on Italy, the US, Finland, Israel, France/Germany, and Spain.

From a geographic point of view, an interesting observation is made in Chapter 1, which is less country-specific than the others. The point is made that arrivals by sea are emblematic and iconic of the more general coverage of migrations, and have a particular resonance. Although (attempts at) crossing or circumventing fences at land borders can also be very dramatic, the drowning of thousands in the Mediterranean and elsewhere indeed well illustrates the heightened vulnerability of people trying to move on huge water surfaces.

A number of chapters deal with how various migrants, not least Muslims, are 'othered' in political and public discourses. Chapter 5 on Finland particularly highlights the responsibility of public national media in maintaining the ideal of equality and integrity of various groups versus its involvement in the public exercise in othering. Relatedly, Chapter 7 on debates in the Irish Parliament argues that parliamentary discourses have a significant impact upon other institutions (such as the media) and upon the publics' understanding of 'illegal migration'. Chapter 9 examines media depictions of Roma communities in Ireland, demonstrating how well-worn tropes regarding this group were circulated with ease, showing a lack of reflexivity on behalf of the media. Raising these issues should be particularly relevant in the case of Hungary.

Highly important for East Central Europe, Chapter 8 studies how Irish politicians constructed non-Irish EU migrants to Ireland during the period in which the Irish economy turned from 'boom to bust'. It concludes that politicians on all sides of the spectrum were not averse to perpetuating to frame migrant workers as an economic threat. The study also describes how pro-migrant policy-makers became ensnared in a reactive approach when the course of the debate was set by problematising the issue. Again, there are some parallels here to Hungary, where (despite a lack of economic recession) over the past year certain initially pro-migrant or at least hesitant politicians on the left were gradually giving in to hegemonic discourses.

Despite a number of challenges with integration, Chapter 10 for instance describes more positive developments. In Israel, namely, Salsa music and dance has created and maintained a 'pan-Latin' identity among Latin American labour migrants, at the same time serving as a cultural interface for interaction with the hegemonic society. Elsewhere, as detailed in Chapter 13, commonly organised French-German exhibitions do not only deal with public negotiations of immigrant representations, but also form a cross-cultural stage for negotiation.

The anthology's conclusions (Chapter 16) reflect on some possibilities and challenges of mobilising discourse as resistance. Admittedly partisan, these consider the efficiency of different modes and means of disrupting and replacing anti-immigrant discourses. Various opportunities for agency are discussed, targeting academics, policy-makers, civil society actors, online activists, and migrants themselves.

The conclusions also mention Hungary, whose policies towards refugees and migrants are contrasted to Germany's *Willkommenskultur* (p. 227). This was indeed a fair description in September 2015, when the book was finalised. Nevertheless, by the end of that year Prime Minister Orbán's stance has gained some acceptance throughout Europe (Higgins, A. 2015), with a number of Western European countries introducing temporary border-controls within the Schengen Area. Most recently, Angela Merkel has called for a burqa ban in Germany and said the refugee crisis "must never be repeated," while making her pitch for a fourth term as Chancellor (Dearden, L. 2016). Whatever direction European migration debates and policies will be taking in the future, it is clear that the topic of refugees and migrants will need continued engagement by social scientists and others. In a climate of hardened debates, the present volume is an important a contribution.

Péter Balogh[1]

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[1] Institute for Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences (CERS-HAS), Pécs, Hungary.
E-mail: baloghp@rkk.hu

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Nadler, R., Kovács, Z., Glorius, B. and Lang, T. (eds.): Return Migration and Regional Development in Europe: Mobility Against the Stream. London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 385 p.

The European Union (EU) enlargement towards East Central European countries guaranteed free movement of people within member states. Perceptions about the new migration policies and the fear of invasion of cheap manual labour from Accession eight (A8) countries such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia created the archetypal figure of the 'Polish plumber'. This shows the excessive politicisation and instrumentalisation of migration issues in Western Europe. Considering the recent migration crisis, the instrumentalisation of migration is not unfamiliar in East Central Europe either. Significant income disparities between the Western and Eastern parts of Europe, better working conditions, skills development such as mastering foreign languages were among the main pull factors for people in post-socialist countries to work abroad. Since the EU enlargement in 2004, and especially during the years of the financial and economic crisis, a significant number of young and skilled has tried to pursuit fortune and happiness in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, and a few years later in Germany and Austria. Even traditionally 'sedentarist' and 'a-mobile' populations, like Hungarians, opted for mobility along with the more mobile East Central European peoples, like Polish, Slovaks or Romanians (Illés, S. and Kincses, Á. 2012).

It is widely accepted that economic reasons influence migration processes, but these are far to be the only ones. The social, cultural and political context in countries of origin affects the decision to mobility. Moreover, emotional processes as well as personal traits and attitude also shape human mobility and vice versa as much in the case of lifestyle migration (O'Reilly, K. 2007) as in the case of labour migration (Wright, K. 2011). During the past decade both the academia and media paid much attention to the receiving countries and on issues like immigration, integration processes and acculturation. Yet, although neglected as a top-research topic, return is also a fundamental element of East Central European migration schemes. Thus, 'Return migration and regional development in Europe' engages a very pertinent topic.

This recent edited volume belongs to the Springer 'New Geographies of Europe' series, the aim of which is to welcome contributions "where the focus is upon novel spatial phenomena, path-dependent processes of socio-economic change or policy responses at various levels throughout Europe". This volume responds to all the aforementioned goals. The book, edited by Robert Nadler, Zoltán Kovács, Birgit Glorius and Thilo Lang, came out of a joint research project entitled 'Re-Turn' funded by the European Regional Development Fund, and of a workshop organised in 2013 in Budapest on the topic of return migration and regional development.

The collection of studies provides an extensive review of the current state of return migration and reintegration of citizens in their country of origin, with a special focus on policy approaches that should ease return migration. All subjects are of key importance in East Central European countries. The focus of the volume is to "enrich the debate on the changing migration patterns in Europe based on up-to-date theoretical and empirical work" and the book's mission is to create an "anthology of state-of-art research on return migration in Europe" (p. 3). The volume does not fail to deliver on its aims. It is divided into four main parts, although these parts are not equally balanced since part one, two and three contain four and five chapters each, while part four lists only two.

A general overview of the 'mobility against the stream' is presented in the stimulating introductory session written by the editors. The scarcity of data is well-known in migration studies, but it is particularly evident in the case of return migration. Still, it is assumed that return migration interests more than 3.4

million people within the EU, as a map on the main flows of European migration indicates (p. 7). The volume, in fact, provides different methodological and data gathering approaches that could be applied in different scenarios. Furthermore, in the introduction, neoclassical theory and structuralist approaches, widely used in migratory studies, are described with the specific aim to highlight the freshness and dynamism of social network theories and transnational approaches applied throughout this volume. The innovation of such theories and approaches is the focus on social and cultural processes and motives of (return) migration that give a much human-centred rather than purely economic vision of the phenomena (see the essays by King and Kilinç; Ní Chearbhaill; and van Blanckenburg). Following these parts, the nexus between return migration and regional development is investigated, demystifying the assumption that return migrants can easily, quickly and successfully be (re)integrated in their home society. The authors present evidence for that, in general, irregular working conditions and unemployment affect return migrants.

Part I focuses on the conceptual approaches towards return migration in Europe, and features four essays. In Chapter 2 Ludger Pries from Ruhr University Bochum widely explores multiple and multidirectional mobility patterns from a historical and sociological point of view. His starting point is the German guest-worker programme in the 1970s. Circular migration and transnational mobility are widespread phenomena not only in Germany, but in East Central Europe as well. Persons on the move identify themselves less and less as immigrants or returnees, keeping lively the possibility to change their spatial nexus according to their changing needs. The theoretical and methodological challenges to investigate circular migration are also addressed in Pries's work, in which current migration policies are discussed.

Katrin Klein-Hitpass's contribution in Chapter 3 on return migrants puts skilled labour force in the centre. She analyses the processes that make return migrants knowledge brokers and innovators. In her case study on Poland, Klein-Hitpass compares Polish mobility before and after the EU accession. She evidences that in the 1990s those who emigrated were well-trained and skilled and, upon return, significantly contributed to economic development in their homeland through their improved technological, managerial or communication skills. Although this trend seems to have changed after the EU enlargement, the mass of younger and less educated Poles mainly coming from rural areas can hardly be considered as that of knowledge-brokers.

From the same geographical area, Poland, is Izabela Grabowska's inspirational work on how the interplay of opportunity structure and agency influences life course occupational trajectories. Grabowska from the University of Warsaw conducted an extensive qualitative research based on structured and biographical interviews in Warsaw and in the small town of Nysa. The research aim was to construct a typology of the meanings of migration to one's career development applying the theory on agency approach. Her findings show that the meaning of migration, such as fixative, incident, exploration or project in her classification, always depends on individual personality. She argues that in our current age people, especially the young, are "pushed into global biographies" (p. 103), which means that living in one place during the whole lifetime is extremely hard because occupational trajectories often require mobility. She claims for a new perspective on migration. In the case of transnational migrants it makes less sense to speak about return migration, because even when they return home they are considered global citizens ready to embark on the next opportunity in a foreign country. I would strongly suggest her essay to the young and graduated who aim to realise their dreams abroad since it helps to cope with emerging challenges.

In Chapter 5, Jelena Predojevic-Despic, Tanja Pavlov, Svetlana Milutinovic and Brikena Balli analyse the returning and transnational business practices in Albania and Serbia through a pilot study, contributing to the debate on the nexus between returning migrants and regional development. Investigating micro- and small-sized enterprises, the authors evidence that several types of networks were established between the origin and destination countries.

Part II deals with research methods and implementations and results. This part highlights the difficulties in data gathering and introduces possible data sources for return migration studies, such as cross-country surveys as a quantitative method (Danzer and Dietz), new approaches to analyse existing data sets (Nadler), in-depth interviews (King and Kilinç) and interdisciplinary research (Nì Chearbhaill). These methods are in part already applied in several research designs in East Central European countries (e.g. Lakatos, J. 2015 in Hungary), but could be further redefined.

In Chapter 6, Alexander M. Danzer and Barbara Dietz with a cross-country survey across five EU partnership countries investigate the assistance of migration agencies and pre-migration skill development in the case of 2,000 temporary and return migrants. In this part, Robert Nadler's essay on measuring return migration in Eastern Germany can be considered as the most innovative from the methodological point of view. His data source was the German Employment History Data based on employers' social security notifications sent to the administrative register between 2001 and 2010. In this way, Nadler managed to measure not only the employability of domestic migrants but spatial mobility between Western and Eastern Germany as well.

The other chapters in this part fail to experiment new research methods except Chapter 8. King and

Kilinç's study explores the most numerous foreign population in Germany, the Turks. Their analysis focuses on second generation Turkish-German men and women using semi-structured life-history narratives. Employing this method, rich data on gendered narratives could be scrutinised. It is interesting to note that self-realisation and belonging were among the main challenges faced by Turkish-German as much as by Irish individuals in the study by Nì Chearbhaill who explored return migrants' search for linguistic and cultural identity.

Part III is entitled 'New regional perspectives and research questions on return migration in Europe'. Here again readers find the topic of circular migration but the country under scrutiny is Latvia. The chapter is valuable for the methods applied since Krisjane, Apsite-Berina and Berzins use an online survey distributed among 2,565 Latvian nationals in five different countries. Their aim was to explore migrants' return intentions and evidence of the decisive role of labour market constrains in the homeland. The online survey method was employed by Bürgin and Erze-Bürgin as well to study the German-trained Turkish workforce (Chapter 13).

In Chapter 11, Birgit Glorius, one of the co-editors of the volume from the Institute of European Studies in Chemnitz studied the mobility decision processes of Erasmus students in Halle, Germany. Her findings show that the institutional framework plays a significant role in decision making along with rationality, subjectivity and emotionality. Foreign students establish social capital in the destination country that can hardly be capitalised in their home country. It is widely accepted that having constructed a good international network and social capital is valuable, but the missing network in the home country limits the possibilities to career development. This is a fact that all students from East Central Europe who aim to study abroad should bear in mind.

Chapter 12 by van Blanckenburg is particularly interesting for covering the importance of memory and cultural identity in successful entrepreneurs' motivations to return to East Germany. This neglected topic is highly relevant in post-socialist countries, still, our current knowledge on this phenomenon is extremely limited. Childhood memories, perceptions, beliefs, and strong moral obligation nurtured the wish to return to the antecedents' territory and this provides a wider spectrum of approaches and methods to apply to migration studies.

In Chapter 14, Caroline Hornstein Tomić and Sarah Scholl-Schneider explore the experiences of return migrants in Croatia and Czech Republic. Their research gives voice to the bitter awareness often experienced by return migrants that even if they try hard to be 'agents of change' and 'knowledge-brokers' in their home society, the obstacles are numerous and the chances to succeed are little. Still, return migrants, as showed by Hornstein Tomić and Scholl-Schneider, are more tolerant and more democratic than their fellow compatriots. Having innovative, new or just simply different ideas, return migrants add their own puzzle-piece to post-socialist countries 'fluid-democracies' (Bauman, Z. 2000).

Part IV gathers two essays. The first one critically analyses several European national policies aimed at stimulating return migration (Boros and Hegedűs), while the conclusive essay signed by the editors is a sum-up of the analysed topics and issues with clear future research and policy implications. In Chapter 15 Lajos Boros and Gábor Hegedűs from the University of Szeged scrutinises 41 international, national and sub-national policy documents focusing on retention, re-employment or re-attraction of return citizens. For a wider comparison, the authors also examined successful remigration policy practices and brain gain strategies in China, Taiwan, India, South Africa and Ghana. Their findings show that although national policies vary greatly, European countries, until now, have not been able to leverage on return migrants. It seems to be clear that a co-operation between sending and host countries (e.g. between Italy and Romania, the UK and Poland) is essential not only to convince but also to help migrants to return to their country of origin.

It is worth noting that although return migration and retention are issues of current political debate offering fertile ground for propaganda, "efficient return initiatives and competent institutional background with a decentralised decision-making system" (p. 353) fail to be established. This again shows a huge discrepancy between social and economic trends and political slogans. As a common burden, all East Central European countries have to face brain drain. The young and skilled, but as this volume evidences the not so young and lower-skilled as well, cannot be hindered anymore to try to live according to Western European standards. Countries like Poland, Hungary, Slovakia or Romania should work not only on attractive return migration policies, but on establishing an attractive social, cultural and political environment, too.

The different essays of this volume show how complex the phenomenon of return migration is and how inefficient the current return policies are. Having read this book, one might ask oneself that if it is so challenging to ease return migration within EU countries and to offer policy tools to integrate knowledge brokers, transnational entrepreneurs and graduate students, how will the EU cope with mass migration from war-torn and socially, economically and politically instable countries?

From the geographical point of view the volume is well-balanced, although slightly more emphasis is given to Germany and Turkey. The volume presents empirical research not only from old and new EU member states, but also provides essays on Albania,

Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, Ukraine and Moldova, offering a complex vision on return migration in Europe. In my view, the volume could have been more complete with some essays on (re)migration flows between Southwestern Europe and East Central Europe. For its volume, especially the case of Romanians settled in Spain or in Italy would have been interesting to study. To conclude this review, I think that the strong and meticulous editorship makes the book a solid composition and a goldmine for references. It is a highly recommended source for policy makers, academics, undergraduate and postgraduate students.

Anna Irimiás

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[1] Tourism Department, Kodolányi János University of Applied Sciences, Székesfehérvár and Budapest. E-mail: annairimias@hotmail.com

Marvin, S., Luque-Ayala, A. and McFarlane, C. (eds.): Smart Urbanism: Utopian Vision or False Dawn? Abingdon–New York, Routledge, 2016. 196 p.

Smart city as a key concept has become prominent in urban planning for the last few years. It is increasingly cited as a fundamental response to meeting present and future challenges of rapid urbanisation. Smart urbanism promises to provide optimised, high-tech solutions to our contemporary socio-environmental urban problems such as transport congestion, resource limitation and climate change. The emergence of the notion of smart city is seen in various strategic programmes and initiatives.

According to critical social scientists, smart urbanism is one of the most popular urban development visions of the 21st century (together with resilient and sustainable cities). Contrary to the earlier concept of the creative city, this idea has been introduced by a small number of multinational companies. For example, Cisco started to use it for the first time in the late 1990s. Currently, IBM is one of the largest contributors in developing smart technological initiatives, focusing on data collection systems and public administration management (e.g. urban safety management, healthcare and energy distribution – Vanolo, A. 2016).



IBM's own smart 'philanthropic' initiative, the Smarter Cities Challenge is one of the best examples of globally circulating smart urbanism policy mobility (Wiig, A. 2015). It is also necessary to note that more than 50 percent of the recent smart urban development projects worldwide have focused on innovations in transportation and urban mobility, making the topic of smart urbanism and this book as well very relevant for human mobility research.

Most of the brand new, state-of-the-art smart or 'ubiquitous cities' are concentrated in East Asia and the Middle East (e.g. Songdo, Masdar City) but the concept is becoming very popular in Europe as well. Although several large-scale smart initiatives are financed worldwide to improve the technological efficiency of cities, the actual meaning of the smart city is still unclear and undefined.

Vanolo, A. (2016) classifies the growing academic and policy literature on smart urbanism into three broad sections. The first one has a focus mainly on the management and technological issues of smart cities. The main points of analysis of this literature are the potential opportunities and problems of smart technology implementations in urban contexts. These analyses tend to have a problem-solving approach focusing on achieving optimal outcomes.

Second, there are emerging critical debates within social sciences on smart urbanism. Here the focal points are the relationship between smart city initiatives and neoliberalism, the corporate- and profit-oriented characteristics of smart urban development projects, the changing power relations generated by those initiatives, and the management of big data and surveillance within the conditions of smart urbanism.

Third, a rather new direction in the research on smart urbanism critically explores various smart city initiatives, looking "beyond both the celebrative and always critical approaches," analysing diverse ways in which new urban technologies are used, negotiated or overturned by citizens (Vanolo, A. 2016; p. 28).

The chapters of 'Smart Urbanism: Utopian Vision or False Dawn?' can be categorised into the second and third sections of academic literature on smart cities. This edited volume critically evaluates the promises, drivers, potentials and consequences of smart urban planning. It analyses what drives smart city initiatives and it aims at advancing the critical academic research on smart urbanism. The book consists of 11 chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion, written by the three editors (Simon Marvin, Andres Luque-Ayala and Colin McFarlane, three human geographers based at Durham and Sheffield Universities in the UK) and 17 contributors from

Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Although critical academic research on smart urbanism is emerging, current investigations are mainly single-city case studies and "fragmented along disciplinary lines" (p. 1). However, 'Smart Urbanism' is truly interdisciplinary. Beside human geographers, the contributors have diverse disciplinary backgrounds such as sociology, philosophy, architecture, urban planning, critical media studies or geocomputing.

The origin of this edited volume can be linked to the international workshop on 'Smart Urbanism: Utopian Vision or False Dawn?', co-organised by the editors at Durham University in 2013. As Marvin *et al.* claim in the foreword of the book, this workshop was one of the first international forums for academics and professionals from all over the world to discuss critically the concepts and practices of smart urbanism.

Luque-Ayala, McFarlane and Marvin state three main objectives of this volume in the introduction. First, developing a critical and interdisciplinary approach and investigating the emergence of smart and digital modes of urbanisation. Second, analysing extensively the key trends, forms and consequences of smart urban governance from an internationally comparative perspective. Third, exploring how specific urban conditions facilitate and coerce transitions towards smart urbanism and support the co-production of alternative pathways.

Each chapter of the volume aims at analysing a specific dimension of smart urbanism. Chapter 2 by Rob Kitchin, Tracey P. Lauriault and Gavin McArdle introduces the five most common critiques of smart cities: the promotion of technocratic and corporatised forms of governance; the creation of buggy, hackable urban systems; the implementation of panoptic surveillance and predictive profiling; and a false portrayal of data and algorithms as objective and non-ideological. Then, the chapter focuses on urban data and it investigates city benchmarking and real-time dashboards. Kitchin *et al.* challenge the common realist epistemological claim "to show the city as it actually is" (p. 29).

Chapter 3 continues to clarify the claims to objectivity, truth and evidence in the smart cities discourse. Donald McNeill investigates IBM's Smarter Cities Challenge and argues that visual technologies are crucial to both the ontological (cities that cannot be seen in such a way are by definition not smart) and practical ("cities that cannot be viewed cannot be made to work in a smart manner") structures of smart cities (p. 35). One of the key contributions of this chapter is identifying a link between the techno-political practices of 19th century urban transformations and the smart city initiatives pursued by IBM and other corporations.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the emergence of smart urbanism narratives in the Global South, respectively in India and South Africa. In Chapter 4, Ayona Datta analyses the social and political consequences of local smart initiatives. The empirical part of the research focuses on Dholera which is allegedly the first smart city in India. This technology-driven urban project turns its back to the challenges of India's traditional cities with pollution problems, traffic congestion and slums and engages with the global values of smart urbanism. Datta uncovers that India's smart city programme is a process operating through land accumulation by dispossession, a form of politics connected to dispossession, modernisation and liberalisation.

In Chapter 5, Nancy Odendaal investigates the inclusion of e-governance and digital infrastructure development into urban objectives. In contrast with the portrayal of smart urbanism in India, Odendaal argues that smart initiatives from the bottom up can play an important role in expanding democratic access and realising a commitment to social development. However, the mobilisation potential of smart initiatives is restricted by the relatively low internet penetration rate and the preference for face-to-face communication in many countries of the Global South.

Chapters 6 and 7 apply Foucauldian approaches and examine the power, knowledge and governmentality implications of smart urbanism. In Chapter 6, Jennifer Gabrys emphasises an important but often overlooked part of the smart cities discourse, the re-articulation of smart cities as sustainable cities. One of the dominant ways in which sustainability is achieved in smart cities is through 'citizen sensing', sensor-based ubiquitous computing across urban infrastructures. Gabrys argues that smart urbanism has the potential to rearrange our understanding of citizenship, where "both cities and citizens become functional datasets to be managed and manipulated" (p. 10) in order to control environmental governance and ways of life. In Chapter 7, Francisco R. Klauser and Ola Söderström analyse the implication of governing the city through software-mediated techniques of regulation and management at a distance. These mechanisms of regulation and management are based on well managed assemblages of computerised systems that operate as channels for multiple forms of data collection, transfer and analysis. Klauser and Söderström use Foucault's concept of security in order to uncover the power and regulatory dynamics within smart urbanism.

In Chapter 8, by using assemblage thinking, Gareth Powells, Harriet Bulkeley and Anthony McLean investigate how the electricity grid is reconsidered around new conditions of smart urbanism. Their research on energy network demonstrates how the making of the smart grid process is a highly unequal process. Specific political, social, economic and environmental processes are stressed while other issues are marginalised. Powells *et al.* challenge the traditional urban assemblage literature (which emphasises

the multiplicity and complexity of projects, practices and outcomes of cities as assemblages). They suggest that there are some projects and forms of governance that are more central of smart urbanism than others. The resulting uneven power geometries mean that the experience of smart grid is not equal for all citizens.

Chapters 9 and 10 focus on the future of smart urbanism, both the dystopian and more optimistic perspectives. In Chapter 9, Nerea Calvillo, Orit Halpern, Jesse LeCavalier and Wolfgang Pietsch investigate Songdo, a new state-of-the-art smart city in South Korea, where Cisco plays a crucial role in developing digital connectivity and ubiquitous computing infrastructures. Songdo is portrayed as a new form of digital urban experimentation where all urban forms and beings are to be digitally interconnected. In this new urban world, data drives urban transformations and a rearrangement of urban life. The half-built Songdo serves new urban ontologies that are digital, abstract and oppressively real (e.g. cameras, control rooms, windowless data centres).

Chapter 10 offers a different perspective, the possibilities of smart urbanism beyond corporate imaginations. Robert G. Hollands reminds us of the ideological nature of smart urbanism – neither technology nor its corporate urban reincarnation will make cities more prosperous, efficiently governed, less environmentally wasteful or equal. On the other hand, as an alternative vision of smart urbanism, Hollands explores the possibility of more modest and small-scale interventions, where human initiatives and technology are used in democratic ways to support progressive ideas and make cities more sustainable.

The conclusion, Chapter 11, identifies key implications of the book for urban theory, urban governance and methodological challenges of smart urbanism. McFarlane, Marvin and Luque-Ayala argue that smart urbanism processes seem less a radical shift in urban socio-environmental governance but more a set of specific types of limited interventions which are connected to our existing ideologies, debates and socio-economic practices. Kitchin *et al.* identify the logics of smart urbanism linked to the techno-managerial vision of urban governance. This view reduces urban problems to technological and data-driven issues where everything can be monitored and measured.

Apart from the technocratic view, smart urbanism stresses the entrepreneurial and security-oriented imaginaries as well. However, McFarlane *et al.* suggest that these visions of smart urban governance are not exhaustive and they are only partially operationalised. Hollands argues in Chapter 10 that smart urbanism can be linked not only to urban neoliberalisation but to alternative forms of smart urbanism as well that supports a more democratic and participatory use of technology (e.g. using digital media to facilitate collective action in DIY urban design).

To conclude, this edited volume provides an excellent critical analysis on the emergence of the smart cities discourse and its impact on the urban economy, environment, politics and everyday life. While critical urban theorists need to engage with the analysis and criticism of smart urbanism and develop alternatives to the neoliberal, technocratic, positivist and surveillance-related imaginaries of smart urban projects, it is crucial for this critique not to overemphasise the importance of smart logics in urban governance. Since the mechanisms of smart urbanism are still very fragmented, it might be too early to talk about a radically new way of urban governance.

Although smart urban initiatives are at a very early stage in Hungary and other East Central European countries (and there are no case studies from this region in the book), it is still necessary to critically understand this new direction in urban governance with its rising popularity in Europe. One of the main reasons behind the emergence of the smart cities discourse in the continent is the embeddedness of the concept in the European Union research funding system Large-scale financial support is provided within the current Horizon 2020 programme to reduce greenhouse gas emission through improving the technological efficiency of buildings, energy and transportation systems. Although several billion Euros are allocated to fund these projects, the actual concept of smart city is still linked to rather simplified visual imaginaries and vague terminology (Vanolo, A. 2016).

'Smart Urbanism' is a major reference point in key debates about smart urban governance. The rich and theoretically informed case studies on the Global North and South as well make the book a must-read for graduate students and early career researchers in urban studies.

László Cseke[1]

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[1] Interuniversity Department of Regional and Urban Studies and Planning, Polytechnic University of Turin, and University of Turin, Turin, Italy.
E-mail: laszlo.cseke@polito.it

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