Freedom for the Zombies!

Abstract

In this paper, I analyze and criticize some of the most important elements of László Bernáth’s concept of free will and its existence, as it has appeared in his work “Does Free Will Exist?”. First, I argue that the concept of free will does not imply phenomenal consciousness, i.e. that unconscious free decisions can exist. On this basis, in the following sections of the text I will criticize Bernáth’s argumentative strategy of arguing for the existence of free will by relying on the methodological principle of phenomenological conservatism and the phenomenology of the inner experience of certain volitional decision situations. For if it is not an essential element of the concept of free will that such situations are phenomenally conscious, then one cannot argue for or against their existence solely leaning on the phenomenology of such experiences. Finally, I argue
against Bernáth’s conception of the debate around free will as if it were constituted by the irresolvable opposition between a metaphysical conservative position, which takes the phenomenology of inner experience seriously, and a metaphysical progressivist position, which relies on empirical science rather than inner experience. Rather than presenting a picture of a hopeless struggle between these irreconcilable positions, or even worldviews, I will conclude the paper by suggesting a more optimistic picture, one that
trusts in the strength of rational arguments.