Acquisition and inheritance of agricultural land in Bulgaria - from fragmentation towards consolidation

  • Minko Georgiev Faculty of Economics, Agricultural University of Plovdiv
  • Dafinka Grozdanova Faculty of Economics, Agricultural University of Plovdiv
Keywords: agricultural land, acquisition, inheritance, fragmentation, consolidation, legal entities

Abstract

The theory of agricultural land mobility tries to answer the question whether or not it is possible to produce more and cheaper agricultural goods through land consolidation. Acquisition, inheritance, and in the Bulgarian case also the use of property of agricultural lands, are an instrument for the vertical and real/literal integration of the farmers. However, they indirectly affect the access to agricultural land.

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Published
2020-11-24
Section
Cikkek